Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint and reinstated the judgment of the trial court dismissing all of Petitioner's claims against Respondents for breach of contract, fraud, and related torts, holding that the discovery rule did not defer accrual of Petitioner's cause of action until it knew that Respondents caused its injury.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioner on the grounds that Respondents' claims were time-barred. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the discovery rule deferred accrual of Respondents' cause of action until it knew that Petitioner caused its injury. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the dismissal of all claims, holding that summary judgment was appropriate because, at the time of the breach of contract at issue, Respondent learned of facts that, if pursued, would have led to the discovery of Petitioner's alleged misrepresentations. View "Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services of Nev. v. Triex Texas Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Traders set up accounts with Trean, a Chicago Mercantile Exchange introducing broker, managing the customer side of the futures-trading business. Stone handled the trading side. The traders engaged in naked trading—speculating rather than hedging. Stone set a high margin accordingly. Stone was a principal in all trades and, with the clearing house bore, the immediate economic risk; Trean guaranteed Stone’s positions and shared in its commissions. The market did not cooperate. Trean learned that the traders had not met Stone’s margin call and were not cooperating with Stone. Trean told the traders that it would close their accounts but that they were free to deal directly with Stone. Stone thereafter prohibited any trades that would increase the holdings’ net risk. The traders liquidated. Of the $1,020,000 with which they began, they lost $548,000.The traders sued, contending that their contract with Trean did not allow it to cease dealing with them for the reason given and that Trean’s decision led Stone to impose unacceptable conditions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Trean. Regardless of whether Trean was entitled to end its dealings with the traders, no reasonable jury could find that Trean injured them. Trean’s decision did not affect the value of their futures contracts; they did not have a greater loss than they would have by moving their accounts to a different introducing broker and retaining Stone. View "Daneshrad v. Trean Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an investor and venture capitalist and the CEO of InterOil Corporation (“InterOil”), developed a business relationship. Throughout that relationship, Plaintiff (and “entities controlled and beneficially owned by him”) provided loans, cash advances, and funds to the CEO and InterOil. Plaintiff and the CEO continued to have a business relationship until 2016, at which point the CEO’s actions and words made Plaintiff concerned he would not receive his shares back from the CEO. In late 2017, as part of a larger suit against the CEO, Plaintiff and Aster Panama sued the J.P. Morgan Defendants for (1) breach of trust and fiduciary duty, (2) negligence, and (3) conspiracy to commit theft. The district court granted summary judgment on all counts relating to the J.P. Morgan defendants and awarded them attorneys’ fees under the Texas Theft Liability Act (“TTLA”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Under Texas law, the only question is whether the J.P. Morgan Defendants expressly accepted a duty to ensure the stocks were kept in trust for Plaintiff or Aster Panama. That could have been done by express agreement or by the bank’s acceptance of a deposit that contained writing that set forth “by clear direction what the bank is required to do.” Texas courts require a large amount of evidence to show that a bank has accepted such a duty. Here, no jury could find that the proffered statements and emails were sufficient evidence of intent from the J.P. Morgan Defendants to show an express agreement that they “owe[d] a duty to restrict the use of the funds for certain purposes.” View "Civelli v. J.P. Morgan Chase" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing certain defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that the defendants' contacts were too attenuated for them to have purposefully established minimum contacts within Nebraska.The out-of-state defendants at issue on appeal facilitated the sale of allegedly defective software installed by a local mechanic in four of Plaintiff's trucks. Plaintiff asserted against them claims for strict liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranties. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the quality and nature of the defendants' activities related to this action did not support personal jurisdiction. View "Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel ECM, LLC" on Justia Law

Doe alleges that she was sexually assaulted by a massage therapist during a massage at a San Rafael Massage Envy retail location. She filed suit against the Arizona-based franchisor that licenses the “Massage Envy” brand name (MEF), and the independently owned San Rafael franchise where the assault allegedly occurred. MEF moved to compel arbitration on the basis of a “Terms of Use Agreement” presented to Doe when she checked in for a massage she had booked at the franchise location. The trial court concluded that there was no agreement to arbitrate between Doe and MEF.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting MEF’s argument that the “Terms of Use Agreement,” which was available to Doe via a hyperlink on the electronic tablet she was given at the franchise, was a valid and enforceable “clickwrap” agreement of the sort that courts routinely enforce. Doe did not have reasonable notice that she was entering into any agreement with MEF, much less notice of the terms of the agreement. The transaction was nothing like the typical transactions in which clickwrap agreements are used; Doe went to a physical location, where she was already a member, and was handed a tablet to check in for a massage. View "Doe v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants Michael and Dawn Heath sold Plaintiff Harry Johnson a gasoline and automobile-service station in Wells, Nevada. Soon after the sale, Plaintiff allegedly discovered that the property had material, undisclosed defects and that Defendants had artificially inflated the business’s profits by scamming customers over the years. In suing them, Plaintiff asserted many state-law claims against both Defendants and a claim against Defendant Michael Heath under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s RICO claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims. The issue Plaintiff's appeal raised for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether Defendants’ actions as alleged plausibly violated the federal RICO statute. Because the Court concluded they did not, it affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Johnson v. Heath, et al." on Justia Law

In 2006, Price approached Marcone about using e-commerce in the appliance parts industry. Price and Marcone entered into a non-disclosure agreement while evaluating the concept, but no partnership resulted. Price then created PartScription. Both companies sell appliance replacement parts online. In 2017, Price restarted talks with Marcone. In 2018, Marcone’s CEO proposed that PartScription and Marcone form a “50-50” partnership. Price accepted, and they shook hands on the idea. Price drafted a term sheet for the contemplated partnership. The first line sheet states “PartScription and Marcone (PSM) have agreed to form a partnership/joint venture to serve the independent hardware industry.” Negotiations continued. During a conference call, Marcone representatives purportedly “stated that they approved of the terms,” and offered one change regarding a joint bank account. Days later Price sent a follow-up email saying that his notes indicated “Marcone ha[d] approved the terms outlined in the draft PSM term sheet” and asking whether they needed to memorialize the agreement. No further memorialization took place. Marcone's representatives became unresponsive.In 2021, PartScription filed suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. PartScription’s complaint fails to plausibly allege a valid contract; any amendment would be futile. The only documentation speaks of general goals— not obligations—and fails to identify definite and certain binding terms. View "KAP Holdings, LLC v. Mar-Cone Appliance Parts Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of Appellee on his claims for conversion and unjust enrichment, holding that the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the conversion and unjust enrichment claims.Appellee filed suit against Appellant and others, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. During trial, Appellant moved for a directed verdict on Appellee's conversion and unjust-enrichment claims. The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, the jury returned verdicts against Appellant on the conversion and unjust enrichment claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support Appellee's claims of conversion and unjust enrichment against Appellant; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on these claims. View "Bunta v. Superior VacuPress, LLC" on Justia Law

Scotty Fain, Sr., Scotty Fain, Jr., and Kris Durham appealed a district court judgment entered following findings that there was no contract between the parties, no transfer of ownership interest in Integrity Environmental, LLC, and no violation of fiduciary duties as alleged in the complaint against Integrity Environmental, LLC, Andrea Vigen, Lewis Vigen, and Kelly Harrelson. They also challenged the court’s findings that a substitute arrangement agreed upon by all parties led to an accord and satisfaction, novation, and waiver of contractual rights. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Fain, et al. v. Integrity Environmental, et al." on Justia Law

TURSS provided background and credit screening services to property management professionals and landlords through its online platforms and undertook to build an online platform to sell customizable electronic lease forms. TURSS sent Helix a letter of intent that the platform would be completed in 2009. The companies entered into a five-year marketing agreement that required TURSS to provide the platform and Helix to provide the product. TURSS would receive 35% of the revenue generated from sales and Helix would receive 65%. The agreement was not exclusive. Helix provided electronic forms and supporting materials to TURSS but the platform was still not completed in 2015.Helix sued TURSS for“willful and intentional” breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel. The court ultimately granted TURSS summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that Helix failed to present proof of its damages with reasonable certainty. Helix did not present evidence of revenues of a similar product or a similar business in a similar market. Where a plaintiff seeks lost profits for a new company, "without a track record of profit, attempting to sell a new and untested product to a new market,” the specter of impermissible speculation arises. View "Ivey v. Transunion Rental Screening Solutions Inc." on Justia Law