Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl (WPP) appealed from the district court's dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant and cross-appellants cross-appealed the district court's decision to dismiss some of WPP's claims without prejudice. WPP generally alleged violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78(a), that amidst large operating losses unknown to investors, Spot Runner executives solicited WPP to buy shares in it at the same time that executives of the company were selling personally owned shares. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) fraudulent scheme against all of the defendants, the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5(b) fraudulent omissions claim against the general counsel for Spot Runner and Spot Runner, and the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5 insider trading claim against Spot Runner. The court reversed the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5(b) omission claims against the founders of Spot Runner.

When it was sued by its former president and CEO, the Equine Assisted Growth and Learning Association (EAGALA) requested coverage for the costs of its defense from its insurance carrier, Carolina Casualty. Carolina Casualty denied coverage, contending that the complaint was brought "by, on behalf of, or in the right of" EAGALA, a type of claim excluded from coverage by the insurance policy. EAGALA sued Carolina Casualty to establish coverage for the costs of defending the suit. The district court granted Carolina Casualty's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed EAGALA's complaint after determining that it was unnecessary and improper for the court to consider extrinsic evidence to discern whether Carolina Casualty had a duty to defend EAGALA. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that under the language of the insurance policy, extrinsic evidence was admissible to determined whether the complaint was actually filed by, on behalf of, or in the right of EAGALA. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, holding that the district court erred when it refused to consider extrinsic evidence as required by the terms of the insurance policy.

This action arose out of the sale of Giant Cement Holding, Inc. (Giant) by defendant Cementos Portland Valderrivas (CPV) to defendant Corporacion Uniland S.A. Sagarra Inversiones, S.L. (Sagarra) challenged the transaction on the basis of CPV's self-dealing because of its position as the majority shareholder on both sides of the transaction. Sagarra purported to bring this action individually and derivatively on behalf of nominal defendant Uniland Acquisition Corp. (Uniland Delaware). The court held that to the extent the Complaint asserted a multiple derivative action on behalf of Uniland Delaware, it must be dismissed because Sagarra did not have standing to raise those claims based on the court's review of Spanish law. The court held that for the same reasons, Counts I and II, which assert multiple derivative claims on behalf of Uniland Delaware, were dismissed. The court's determination with respect to Sagarra's lack of standing as to Counts I and II was equally applicable to Count III. The court finally held that because Count IV raised fiduciary duty claims under Spanish law, the better course of action was for the court to exercise its discretion and dismiss Count IV. Therefore, defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint was granted and an implementing order would be entered.

This case stemmed from a dispute between a hedge fund manager and the hedge fund's seed investor. The central issue was contractual and involved whether the hedge fund manager could use the Gate Provision in the Partnership Agreement to lock up the seed investor. The court held that the hedge fund manager's refusal to honor the withdrawal request and return the seed investor's capital in full was a violation of the Seeder Agreement and a breach of contract. The court held that, in the alternative, even if the Gates were potentially applicable, it was a breach of fiduciary duty for the hedge fund manager to use the Gates solely for a selfish reason. Therefore, the court ordered the immediate return to the seed investor of all of its capital and awarded interest to compensate it for the delay. The court also disposed of several other claims raised by the hedge fund manager and the seed investor.

This appeal involved a contract dispute between Bart Enterprises International, Ltd. (Bart Enterprises), and its assignees (Bart Group), and Walter Mercado Salinas (Mercado) where the contract described Bart Enterprises as being "in the business of producing and distributing entertainment programming," and described Mercado as "a well-known psychic and astrologer who provide[d] psychic and astrological counseling to the public." The court held that the district court did not err in denying the Bart Group's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages; the district court did not abuse its discretion by striking the Bart Group's six proposed expert witnesses; the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant the Bart Group a new trial on damages based on the sufficiency of the evidence; there was nothing wrong with the judge's closing comment; the district court did not err by denying the Bart Group's motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative, to amend the judgment to include nominal damages; and because the court had determined that there were no errors constituting an abuse of discretion, there was no accumulation of error either. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant-Appellant Loren David appealed a district court's judgment confirming an arbitration panel's award of damages to James Valley Grain, LLC. In July 2007, James Valley and Defendant contracted to sell James Valley soybeans to be grown during the 2008 season. In August 2008, James Valley sued, alleging Defendant improperly cancelled the contracts in April 2008 and claiming damages for anticipatory repudiation, breach of contract and promissory estoppel. James Valley moved to compel arbitration, arguing the National Grain and Feed Association ("NGFA") Rules were incorporated into the contracts. Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that no valid arbitration agreement existed and, if there was a valid arbitration agreement, it was unconscionable and that James Valley waived arbitration by filing the complaint. The district court ordered arbitration, finding that the arbitration clause was properly incorporated, that the arbitration clause was not unconscionable and that James Valley did not waive its right to arbitrate by filing the complaint. The parties arbitrated the case before a panel from the NGFA. A hearing about confirmation of the arbitration award was held, and the district court confirmed the arbitration award. Defendant argued the district court erred by confirming the arbitration decision because a valid arbitration agreement did not exist, the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and the arbitration panel failed to properly apply the law and arbitration rules. James Valley argued Defendant waived his right to challenge the arbitration award because he did not move to vacate the award within the statutory time limit. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment confirming the arbitration award.

Appellant appealed the bankruptcy court's approval of a multi-million dollar, global settlement in one of the largest Ponzi scheme bankruptcies in American history. The settlement had been substantially consummated and the appeal had been rendered largely moot. The court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement where the record upon which the bankruptcy court based its approval of the settlement was sufficient and where the settlement satisfied the Flight Transportation/Drexel factors. Accordingly, the order of the bankruptcy court approving the settlement was affirmed.

Plaintiff a law school faculty member living in Ohio, contracted with defendant (Nevada corporation, doing business in California) for publication of his manuscript, giving a Virginia address. Based on delays in publication, plaintiff sued for breach of contract, interference with contract and prospective advantage, defamation, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress; misrepresentation, and fraud. After several motions, including default judgment and reinstatement, and discovery, defendant successfully moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Defendant waived the personal jurisdiction defense and voluntarily submitted to the district courtâs jurisdiction, when its attorney entered a general appearance on its behalf.

Sanpete America purchased 110 acres of farmland and water rights from Christian Willardsen pursuant to a land purchase agreement and a warranty deed. After discovering problems with respect to the conveyance of the water right at issue, Sanpete America filed a complaint against Willardsen and Douglas Neeley, Willardsen's attorney, asserting various causes of action and seeking damages. Two successive district court judges issued judgments dismissing Sanpete America's claims against Willardsen and Neeley. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed both judges' conclusion that Sanpete America was entitled to no damages and judgment dismissing Sanpete America's claims, holding (1) Willardsen conveyed his portion of the water right to Sanpete America under a warranty deed, (2) Willardsen breached no covenants in the deed, and (3) Neeley's actions were not the cause of Sanpete America's alleged damages.

Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. and the Board of Trade of the City of New York, Inc. (collectively, defendants), merged in 2007. Plaintiff was a member of the Board of Trade before the merger and the merger agreement required that if a member, including plaintiff, wished to continue in the newly merged enterprise, the member had to submit an Election Form specifying that preference by a stated deadline. Plaintiff did not receive the Election Form until after the deadline had passed and thereafter, defendants learned that many members, including plaintiff, had failed to submit the Election Form. Defendants waived the deadline and then, in an ad hoc manner and without notice to any member, imposed a new deadline. Defendants subsequently decided that plaintiff's Form was untimely and, of all the post-deadline-filled Forms, plaintiff's Form was the only one that defendants deemed untimely and refused to honor. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an action alleging breach of contract and the Court of Chancery ruled in favor of defendants. The court concluded, however, that defendants waived the initial deadline and also failed to retract that waiver by providing reasonable notice of their new deadline. Because the retraction of the waiver was invalid as a matter of law, plaintiff's Election Form was timely. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Chancery was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.