Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Two companies filed a lawsuit in federal court against two of their former employees, who had served in executive positions. The former executives responded by suing the companies in Florida state court. They later moved for summary judgment in the federal action. While that motion was pending, the companies moved for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of their federal action, which the executives opposed. The district court granted the companies’ motion for voluntary dismissal, and it denied the executives’ request for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending the federal lawsuit to that point. On remand, the district court again granted the voluntary dismissal. The executives moved to alter or amend that judgment and be awarded fees and costs immediately, which the court denied. The executives appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court sufficiently protected the executives from the prejudice of duplicative litigation by essentially inviting them to move for payment of their costs and fees if the companies ever refiled their federal lawsuit. The court adequately explained its reasoning for granting the dismissal without prejudice on that condition. In all aspects of the decision, the court acted within its discretion. View "Emergency Recovery, Inc., et al v. Bryan Hufnagle, et al" on Justia Law

Service hired Forwarders as its agent in 2010. The Agreement had a three-year term, a continuous one-year renewal option, and a mutual nonrenewal provision. A 2013 amendment stated that the Agreement would renew perpetually for consecutive one-year terms, unless Service, in its sole discretion, notifies Forwarders of its intention to terminate the Agreement 30 days before the annual expiration date. The amendment, however, left undisturbed the Agreement’s provision that Service shall not be deemed to be in default unless Forwarders has provided written notice of an alleged material breach and has given Service an opportunity to cure, after which Forwarders may terminate. “[T]ermination of this Agreement by [Forwarders] for any other reason shall be deemed a termination without cause.”Forwarders sought a declaratory judgment that the amended Agreement was terminable at will. Service conceded that the amended Agreement was of indefinite duration and that Illinois law presumes that such contracts are terminable at will but argued the presumption was rebutted because the Agreement provided that Forwarders could end the Agreement only if Service failed to timely cure a material breach after notification. The court granted judgment on the pleadings that the termination was lawful. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The amended Agreement lacks a clear statement that the contract can only be terminated based upon the occurrence of certain conditions or events. Service has not rebutted the Illinois law presumption that this contract of indefinite duration is terminable at will. View "Beach Forwarders, Inc. v. Service By Air, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Zubair Kazi, through co-plaintiff KFC of Pueblo, Inc., owned the only Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Pueblo, Colorado. In 2019 Defendant KFC US, LLC licensed a second Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Pueblo. Kazi believed that KFC acted improperly in how it went about licensing this second restaurant and sued KFC for breach of contract, bad faith (breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing), promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. His lawsuit went to trial on his bad-faith claim only, and the jury found in his favor. KFC appealed. The Tenth Circuit held that Kazi’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was barred by Kentucky law because KFC’s alleged bad faith did not undermine any benefit or protection afforded to Kazi by his franchise agreement with KFC. The court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of KFC and against Kazi and KFC of Pueblo, Inc. View "Kazi, et al. v. KFC US" on Justia Law

PayPal users can transfer money to businesses and people; they can donate to charities through the Giving Fund, its 501(c)(3) charitable organization. Kass created a PayPal account and accepted PayPal’s 2004 User Agreement, including a non-mandatory arbitration clause and allowing PayPal to amend the Agreement at any time by posting the amended terms on its website. In 2012 PayPal amended the Agreement, adding a mandatory arbitration provision. Users could opt out until December 2012. In 2016, PayPal sent emails to Kass encouraging her to make year-end donations. Kass donated $3,250 to 13 charities through the Giving Fund website. Kass alleges she later learned that only three of those charities actually received her gifts; none knew that Kass had made the donations. Kass claims that, although Giving Fund created profile pages for these charities, it would transfer donated funds only to charities that created a PayPal “business” account; otherwise PayPal would “redistribute” the funds to similar charities.Kass and a charity to which she had donated filed a purported class action. The district court granted a motion to compel arbitration, then affirmed the arbitrator’s decision in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit vacated. In concluding that Kass had consented to the amended Agreement, the district court erred by deciding a disputed issue of fact that must be decided by a trier of fact: whether Kass received notice of the amended Agreement and implicitly agreed to the new arbitration clause. View "Kass v. PayPal Inc." on Justia Law

Esplanade Productions, Inc. sued The Walt Disney Company and affiliated entities (collectively Disney) for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, breach of confidence and unfair competition, alleging Disney had used the creative ideas of Esplanade’s principal, Gary Goldman, in Disney’s animated motion picture Zootopia without compensating Esplanade. The trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of Disney regarding the individual elements of the works and the works as a whole, finding they were not substantially similar as a matter of law. The court overruled Disney’s demurrer as to the title “Zootopia.” The court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Disney, ruling there was no evidence the creators of Disney’s Zootopia had access to Goldman’s work and, even if there was evidence of access, any inference of copying was rebutted by the undisputed evidence a Disney employee had independently created the title “Zootopia.” On appeal from the judgment entered in favor of Disney, Esplanade challenged the trial court’s demurrer ruling and the grant of summary judgment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that there is simply no evidence that Disney producers would have had reason to discuss an animation project, nor is there evidence that they would have occasion to share that information with those working on Zootopia. Esplanade’s access argument relies solely on speculation and conjecture arising from the fact that some of the individuals involved occasionally provided feedback on one another’s work. That is insufficient as a matter of law to establish access. View "Esplanade Productions v. The Walt Disney Co." on Justia Law

Mingtel, a Texas-based company, ordered two batches of computer tablets from Shenzen Synergy Digital, a Chinese company, hoping to resell them through the Home Shopping Network (“HSN”). The first batch bombed on HSN, with customers complaining about slow speeds and flawed screens. Mingtel then rejected the second batch out of hand. Synergy sued for breach of contract; Mingtel countersued, alleging Synergy provided nonconforming goods. The district court sided with Synergy.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court found Mingtel did not examine the tablets as soon as practicable because it failed to inspect them when they arrived in the United States. Instead of testing those capabilities upon the tablets’ arrival in the United States, Mingtel shipped them directly to HSN’s warehouse and examined them only after they were sold and returned by customers. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that, given those facts, Mingtel did not timely inspect the tablets. It follows that Mingtel did not provide Synergy with a notice of nonconformity within a reasonable time. The court wrote that Mingtel was obligated to pay for the tablets and take delivery of them. Because it failed to do so, the district court properly found Mingtel liable. View "Shenzen Synergy Digital v. Mingtel" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Concord Baptist Church of Jefferson City, Inc. (Concord Baptist) sustained damage to its facilities in a severe storm. After disagreements with its insurer, Church Mutual Insurance Company (Church Mutual), regarding the amount of loss, Concord Baptist initiated this action, alleging breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Church Mutual, concluding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Concord Baptist failed to comply with a cooperation clause contained in the insurance policy, which precluded coverage. Concord Baptist appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Concord Baptist admits that it materially breached the policy, the court need not address Concord Baptist’s argument regarding whether the failure to submit to an EUO was a material breach. However, the court noted that Missouri courts have found a material breach where an insured failed to submit to an EUO before commencing an action against the insurer. Regarding the second element, whether Church Mutual suffered substantial prejudice from Concord Baptist’s material breach, the court agreed with the district court that the undisputed facts show that it did. Finally, as to the third element, whether Church Mutual exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to procure Concord Baptist’s cooperation, the court again agreed with the district court that the undisputed facts demonstrate Church Mutual’s diligence. View "Concord Baptist Church of Jefferson City v. Church Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

This dispute involves several insurers and one defendant insurer’s alleged duty to defend a lawsuit brought against a general contractor of a residential building project. The district court entered partial summary judgment, holding that the defendant insurer had a duty to defend the general contractor in the underlying action for construction defects. The court also issued a stay of other issues raised by the parties, and administratively closed the case. After the defendant insurer filed the present appeal, the underlying action was resolved in a settlement agreement.   The Fourth Circuit concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the present interlocutory appeal challenging the defendant insurer’s duty to defend the general contractor. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal. The court explained that while the relief granted in the district court’s order originally may have been prospective in nature, the resolution of the underlying action has eliminated from that order any forward-looking mandate. Thus, the court explained that the order before the court in this appeal currently lacks the character of an injunction and does not require the court to consider any question separate from issues that may be appealed after entry of a final judgment in the district court. View "Westfield Insurance Company v. Selective Insurance Company" on Justia Law

MSSC, Inc., sued Airboss Flexible Products Co., alleging anticipatory breach of contract and seeking to enforce a purchase order between the parties after Airboss threatened to stop filling orders unless MSSC agreed to a price increase. Airboss supplied products to MSSC, and MSSC used those products to manufacture parts for their customers. The parties’ purchase order for the Airboss products was identified as a “blanket” order that listed the parts to be supplied but did not include specific quantities. Instead, the purchase order indicated that quantities would be based on the needs of an MSSC customer. MSSC was obligated to create and send “releases” per the terms and conditions, but neither the purchase order nor the terms and conditions obligated MSSC to send any number of firm orders to Airboss—either as a raw number or as a percentage of MSSC’s total need. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of MSSC, finding that the contract was a requirements contract and was likely enforceable. Airboss moved for summary judgment, arguing that the purchase order failed to satisfy the statute of frauds of the Uniform Commercial Code, MCL 440.1101 et seq. In response, MSSC moved for summary judgment, arguing that the blanket purchase order was a requirements contract that satisfied the statute of frauds. The trial court granted MSSC’s motion, concluding that because the purchase order was identified as a “blanket” order, it contained a “quantity term” that satisfied the statute of frauds. Airboss appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Contrary to the lower courts, the Michigan Supreme Court found the parties entered into a release-by-release contract, which allowed Airboss to stop selling parts to MSSC. View "MSSC, Inc v. Airboss Flexible Products Co." on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery affirmed the judgment of the trial court awarding $75,000 in fees and expenses to Plaintiff's counsel in the underlying stockholder class action instead of the requested award of $1,100,000, holding that the amount requested in this case was unreasonable because the benefits achieved by mooting the lawsuit were insignificant.Plaintiff brought the underlying action challenging a merger agreement under which Centene Corporation agreed to acquire Magellan Health, Inc. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that, as part of a sale process conducted by Magellan, prospective bidders entered confidentiality agreements that contained provisions that rendered stockholder disclosures materially deficient. Shortly thereafter, Magellan issued supplemental disclosures and waived its rights under three of the four confidentiality agreements. These actions mooted Plaintiff's claims and stipulated to dismissal. Plaintiff's counsel then petitioned the court for the $1,100,000 attorneys' fees and expenses award. The court awarded $75,000 in fees and expenses. The Court of Chancery affirmed and then issued this decision to warn other courts applying Delaware law of policy dangers in regard to mootness fee petitions, holding that there was no error in the award of fees and expenses in this case. View "Anderson v. Magellan Health, Inc." on Justia Law