Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Dittmer appealed the district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) of their two lawsuits against a failed bank, the FDIC as the bank's receiver, and the successor representative to the Estate of John Peters. Barkley is a Missouri general partnership with two equal partners, John Peters and Joe Dittmer. In the first of two eventual lawsuits arising out of a 2006 loan transaction to Barkley, Dittmer, representing Joe Dittmer's half interest in Barkley, sued Premier Bank, seeking declaratory judgment that the loan should be declared void as to Dittmer and sought to enjoin the bank from selling encumbered property. The suit was filed in Missouri state court, and the primary basis for Dittmer's complaint was that Peters did not have authority from his partner, Joe Dittmer, to mortgage Barkley property for this transaction. The second suit included the same claims as the first case but included various Dittmer successors as plaintiffs, and both the FDIC and the personal representative were added as defendants. The court found that under 12 U.S.C. 1821(j), the district court correctly dismissed Dittmer's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; given the language of the Missouri Uniform Partnership Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 358.090(1), the amended partnership agreement, and the power of attorney documents, the district court correctly dismissed the claim in the second suit against the FDIC; and the court agreed with the district court that the doctrine of res judicata required dismissal of the second suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dittmer Properties v. FDIC, et al" on Justia Law

Respondents Christopher Roinestad and Gerald Fitz-Gerald were overcome by poisonous gases while cleaning a grease clog in a sewer near the Hog's Breath Saloon & Restaurant. The district court concluded that Hog's Breath caused respondents' injuries by dumping substantial amounts of cooking grease into the sewer thereby creating the clog and consequent build up of the gas. On summary judgment, the district court found the saloon liable under theories of negligence and off-premises liability and granted respondents damages. The saloon carried a commercial general liability policy issued by Petitioner Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company which sought a ruling it had no duty to indemnify Hog's Breath. The district court agreed that under the terms of the policy, the insurer had no duty under a pollution exclusion clause. The appellate court reversed the ruling in favor of the insurer, finding the pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous and that its application to cooking grease (a common waste product) could lead to absurd results and negate essential coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the saloon released enough grease to amount to a discharge of a pollutant, and that the insurance policy pollution exclusion clause barred coverage in this case. View "Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company v. Roinestad" on Justia Law

Glenn Mosell was a commercial real estate broker in investment sales and a land developer who owned about 290 acres of property in Canyon County. He planned to develop this property and other land that he had an option to purchase into a destination resort which would include, among other things, resort-based residences; a state-of-the-art winery; a luxury 4-star boutique hotel; a world class day spa; a gourmet restaurant; an event and business conference center; polo fields; an equestrian center; a sporting and athletic club; and an amphitheater for music events and concerts. He contacted restaurateur John Berryhill to see if he would be interested in building the restaurant in the development. Berryhill was the owner and president of Berryhill & Company, which operated a restaurant and catering business. Berryhill agreed to participate in the proposed development, but not to build the restaurant. In 2007, Berryhill & Company signed a lease of space in downtown Boise in order to move his restaurant from a strip mall to that space. Mosell and Berryhill both signed a personal guaranty of Berryhill & Company's obligations under the lease. Berryhill & Company then began making tenant improvements to the leased property. Mosell Equities paid Berryhill & Company by check. The word "loan" was written on the memo line of the check. Over the next ten months, Mosell Equities issued nine additional checks to Berryhill & Company, each had the word "loan" written on the memo line except for two. The restaurant opened in August 2007. Because of the economic downturn, Mosell decided not to proceed with the polo project and did not launch the intended sales effort in 2008. Later that year, Mosell Equities stopped paying the rent on additional space, and Mosell and Berryhill ended their relationship. In 2009, Mosell Equities filed suit against Berryhill & Company on multiple claims: (1) breach of an express contract; (2) breach of an implied contract; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) conversion; (5) fraud; and (6) piercing the corporate veil. The case was tried to a jury, and the verdict was in favor of Berryhill. Mosell moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict citing insufficient evidence, and the district court granted that motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, and that the district court erred in granting the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Mosell Equities v. Berryhill & Co." on Justia Law

AgFirst Farmers Cooperative (AgFirst) sued Diamond C Dairy (Diamond) for cattle feed allegedly purchased by Diamond. Diamond admitted it owed AgFirst for some of the feed but contended that some shipments could have been sent to a facility in Ft. Dodge, Iowa that was owned by another company. The trial court disallowed this defense by refusing to allow Diamond to withdraw its admissions admitting that the feed had been delivered to its facility. Diamond also contended it did not owe AgFirst for some shipments because Diamond's facility did not have sufficient storage capacity to accommodate those loads of feed. The circuit court rejected this second defense and awarded AgFirst a money judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court's findings of fact were adequate to support its determination that there was sufficient storage space at Diamond's facility to have accepted AgFirst's deliveries; (2) the record was inadequate to determine whether the award of attorney's fees and expenses to AgFirst was appropriate; and (3) the court applied the wrong test in denying Diamond's request to withdraw admissions relating to the Ft. Dodge defense. Remanded for a new trial on that issue. View "AgFirst Farmers Coop. v. Diamond C Dairy, LLC" on Justia Law

Lehigh appealed the district court's award of damages to plaintiffs under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C. 2801-2841. At issue was whether a franchisor could be held under the PMPA for failing to provide notice to a "trial franchisee" prior to termination of its franchise. The court held that the PMPA provided a right of action, both to "full" and "trial" franchisees, when a franchisor failed properly to notify it prior to terminating the franchise. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiffs compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs, and interest. View "Jimico Enterprises, Inc. v. Lehigh Gas Corp." on Justia Law

Dean Pepper, the owner and sole shareholder of D.F. Pepper Construction (DFP) was driving one of his trucks home in the early winter morning. An icy road caused the truck to slide into Pepper's house and crash through the foundation and west wall. The house was later condemned and demolished as a result of the damage. The house was insured by Nationwide Casualty Insurance Company. Nationwide paid the loss. As subrogee of Pepper, Nationwide then sued DFP, the registered owner of the truck, alleging vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, Pepper. The superior court issued judgment in favor of Nationwide, finding that Pepper had been negligent and that the antisubrogation rule did not apply in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. D.F. Pepper Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Massachusetts corporation when it entered into a contract with Defendants. The contract was to be performed entirely in Rhode Island. Defendants subsequently commenced a civil action against Plaintiff. At the time, Plaintiff had a certificate of authority from the secretary of state, but after Plaintiff filed this action, the corporation's certificate of authority was revoked. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, determining that Plaintiff did not have a certificate of authority to transact business in Rhode Island, and therefore, it lacked the capacity to sue in the state. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a certificate was not required in this instance, but Plaintiff must obtain a certificate before proceeding to final judgment. View "Custom Metals Sys., Ltd. v. Tocci Building Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joe F. Watkins, Patricia M. Smith, and RE/MAX Lake Martin Properties, LLC sued Bear Brothers, Inc., ETC Lake Development, LLC ("ETC Lake"), and E.T. "Bud" Chambers, among others, asserting claims related to the construction and development of a condominium project on Lake Martin. ETC Lake and Chambers crossclaimed against Bear Brothers seeking to recover losses suffered on the project as well as indemnification for the costs of litigating the plaintiffs' action and any damages for which they might be found liable to the plaintiffs. In January 2010, Bear Brothers moved the circuit court to compel arbitration of the cross-claim against it. The circuit court did not rule on that motion. Bear Brothers renewed its motion in July 2011, and the circuit court granted the motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim in December. Bear Brothers then moved the circuit court "to stay [the] proceedings [in the plaintiffs' action] pending the outcome of a related arbitration." After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion to stay. Bear Brothers appealed the circuit court's order denying the motion to stay to the Supreme Court; ETC Lake and Chambers moved to dismiss the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the motion at issue in this case was a motion to stay related proceedings pending the arbitration of a crossclaim between codefendants and was filed separately from the initial motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim and subsequent to the circuit court's order granting the motion. Thus, Bear Brothers did not demonstrate a right to appeal the denial of the motion to stay at this time, and accordingly the Court dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. View "Bear Brothers, Inc. v. ETC Lake Development, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties in this case entered into a real estate agreement thirteen years ago. The trial court concluded that the agreement constituted a contract for deed and that the purchasers had therefore acquired an equitable interest in the property in question. The court initiated a foreclosure on that interest, even though it had not been pled. Plaintiffs, the purchasers as found by the superior court, David and Barbara Prue, appealed the foreclosure. Defendant, the seller as found by the court, Larry Royer, appealed the court’s conclusions that the contract was an enforceable contract for deed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the court’s conclusion that the parties entered into a contract for deed and that it was enforceable, but reversed the foreclosure decree as premature. View "Prue v. Royer, Sr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner of a voting interest in Coldwell Banker Lewis-Kirkeby-Hall Real Estate, Inc. (CBLKH). Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a contract under which the parties agreed that Plaintiff would sell Defendant his shares of CBLKH voting stock. On the closing date of the contract, Defendant failed to attend the closing and did not pay the amount agreed upon for Plaintiff's shares. After negotiations between the parties failed, Plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract against Defendant. Defendant raised the defense that his consent to enter into the contract was obtained by fraud. After a trial, the trial court entered judgment against Defendant for $250,000. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court correctly concluded that the contract was clear and unambiguous as to Defendant's receipt of financial documents; but (2) the court erred in barring Defendant's fraudulent inducement evidence under the parole evidence rule. View "Poeppel v. Lester" on Justia Law