Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a dispute involving a Master Services Agreement (MSA) between BHP and Deep Marine. At issue on appeal was whether Underwriters could enforce BHP's contractual insurance, defense, and indemnity obligations to Deep Marine after Deep Marine's bankruptcy discharge. The court concluded that, even assuming arguendo that the MSA required indemnification against liability and that Deep Marine will eventually be held liable, Underwriters still could not prevail because BHP's indemnification obligation runs only to Deep Marine; Deep Marine would not, and could not, incur any loss in the Duval action, so Underwriters could not seek indemnification from BHP; because BHP had agreed to continue providing Deep Marine with a nominal defense, Underwriters would not have a breach of contract claim against BHP; the additional insured and primary insurance requirements do not apply BHP's self-insurance; BHP's only obligation was an indemnification obligation to Deep Marine; unlike Underwriters, it had no secondary liability to injured tort victims, like Duval; and Duval had no claim against BHP and, therefore, tender under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c) was improper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Duval v. Northern Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's finding of fraud and entry of a nondischargeable judgment for SG Homes. The court concluded that SG Homes justifiably relied on defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations and thereby suffered proven damages. Therefore, the bankruptcy court's finding of fraud on the basis of justifiable reliance was not clearly erroneous. Further, the award of damages for SG Homes was not clearly erroneous and the bankruptcy court did not err in determining that the judgment debt was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "SG Homes Associates, LP v. Marinucci" on Justia Law

Fred and Nancy Eagerton petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter a judgment as a matter of law in their favor and against SE Property Holdings, LLC, consistent with the Court's mandate in "Eagerton v. Vision Bank," (99 So. 3d 299 (Ala. 2012)). SE Property Holdings, LLC, is the successor by merger to Vision Bank. The underlying suit arose from a loan that the Eagertons personally guaranteed, secured by a mortgage on property within the Rock Creek Tennis Club in Fairhope. The bank declared the original and second loans in default and accelerated balances due under both. The bank sued the primary obligor, and the Eagertons as person guarantors on one of the original loans. The primary obligor declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The reorganization plan consolidated the two loans. The obligor eventually defaulted on the terms of the reorganization plan. The bankruptcy was dismissed, the property foreclosed, and the money obtained in the foreclosure sale was applied to the consolidated loan. The Eagertons argued that the Chapter 11 reorganization of the debts of primary obligor (the consolidation of the original loan with the second loan), created a new indebtedness not encompassed by their guaranty contracts. The Eagertons therefore argued that the creation of this new indebtedness, without their knowledge or consent, operated to discharge them from any further obligations under their guaranty contracts. The bank, on the other hand, argued, among other things, that the consolidated loan was a replacement note contemplated by the guaranty contracts and that the Eagertons had waived the material-modification defense. The Supreme Court in "Eagerton v. Vision Bank" concluded that the Eagertons' guaranty contracts were unambiguous; that based on the language in the guaranty contracts the Eagertons did not intend to guarantee any indebtedness other than that indebtedness arising out of the original loan and any extensions, renewals, or replacements thereof; and that, once the Eagertons' original loan was modified pursuant to the Chapter 11 reorganization of Dotson 10s, the Eagertons were at that point discharged from any further obligations under their guaranty contracts. Because the circuit court did not follow the mandate in the Court's prior decision in "Vision Bank," the Supreme Court granted the Eagertons' petition and issued the writ. View "SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Eagerton" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy trustee of Northlake, a Georgia corporation, filed suit against defendant, a shareholder of Northlake, alleging that a 2006 Transfer was fraudulent. The facts raised in the complaint and its exhibits, taken as true, were sufficient to conclude that Northlake's benefits under the Shareholders Agreement were reasonably equivalent exchange for the 2006 Transfer. Because the complaint contained no allegations indicating why these benefits did not constitute a reasonably equivalent exchange for the 2006 Transfer, the court had no ground to conclude that they did not. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Crumpton v. Stephen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his breach of contract and retaliation claim against Boston Scientific. Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and then Boston Scientific terminated his employment shortly after his filing. The court concluded that, because the guaranteed payments at issue, if due at all, were property of the bankruptcy estate, plaintiff lacked standing to assert his breach of contract claim. Plaintiff's argument that had Boston Scientific not terminated him, the payments he received under the Employment Agreement would have been future earnings also failed. Because plaintiff never requested leave to amend his complaint to include a retaliation claim, the district court could not be faulted for failing to allow him to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Longaker v. Boston Scientific Corp., et al" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the fallout from the failure of the Fountainebleau development in Las Vegas, Nevada and involved the contract dispute between the Term Lenders, the Revolving Lenders, and the Borrowers. The district court dismissed the Term Lenders' claims against the Revolving Lenders, finding that the Term Lenders lacked standing to sue. The district court also denied the Borrowers' motion for summary judgment against the Revolving Lenders, rejecting the Borrowers' argument that the Revolving Lenders had breached the contract as a matter of law and alternatively finding there were material issues of fact about whether the Revolving Lenders breached the contract. The court held that the Term Lenders lacked standing to enforce section 2.1(c) of the Credit Agreement promise and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the breach of contract claims. The court could not conclude as a matter of law that the Revolving Lenders broke their promise to fund the Borrowers under section 2 of the Credit Agreement and affirmed the district court's denial of the Borrowers' request for turnover of the loan proceeds and specific performance. View "Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd., et al v. Bank of America, NA, et al" on Justia Law

DWS Properties (DWS) owned rental property. The sole member of DWS was Dustin Shore. After a pipe burst at the property causing substantial damage, Shore executed contracts with Performance Adjusting Public Insurance Adjusters (Performance) and Multi-State Restoration (Multi-State), in which Performance agreed to provide public adjusting service relative to the loss, and Multi-State agreed to perform emergency clean-up work at the property. Performance and Multi-State (Plaintiffs) were never paid for the services they provided, and after Shore filed for personal bankruptcy, Shore's debts to Plaintiffs were discharged. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against DWS, seeking damages for book account, breach of contract, quasi-contract, and unjust enrichment. DWS filed a motion to dismiss, which the hearing justice converted into a motion for summary judgment and granted, reasoning that Shore had signed the contracts in an individual capacity without making any reference to DWS. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded, holding (1) summary judgment was inappropriate on Plaintiffs' contract claims; and (2) the fact that DWS was not explicitly named on the contracts did not entitle it to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' equitable claims. View "Multi-State Restoration, Inc. v. DWS Props., LLC" on Justia Law

OCV supplies equipment and licenses software for in-room hotel entertainment and sought a judgment of $641,959.54 against Roti, the owner of companies (Markwell, now defunct) that owned hotels to which OCV provided services. The district judge granted summary judgment, piercing the corporate veil, but rejecting a fraud claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the Markwell companies were under-funded, OCV failed to treat the companies as separate businesses and proceed accordingly in the bankruptcy proceedings of one of the companies and made no effort to determine the solvency of the companies. View "On Command Video Corp. v. Roti" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute between a Netherlands holding company and an Italian businessman. The businessman made a loan to the holding company for a joint venture. The joint venture eventually went into bankruptcy and defaulted on its loan obligations, including the loan from the businessman. The businessman filed this action alleging, among other things, that the holding company induced him to make the loan by representing that it would support and continue to back the joint venture. The holding company denied making those representations or having any obligations to the businessman. The holding company moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds. The Court of Chancery (1) found the businessman's claims were not barred for lack of standing; (2) denied summary judgment on the ground of laches; (3) denied summary judgment on the holding company's English statute of frauds defense; (4) granted summary judgment in the holding company's favor on the businessman's Italian law claim for breach of implied or oral contract and his Dutch law claim; and (5) granted the holding company's motion for summary judgment regarding the businessman's claim for unjust enrichment. View "Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V." on Justia Law

Pielet Brothers Scrap Iron and Metal, was founded Arthur Pielet and his brothers shortly after World War II. Arthur sold his interest to his sons in 1986 through an agreement providing for a lifetime payment to him of a “consulting” fee, and, on his death, for a lifetime fee payment to his wife, Dorothy. The agreement was binding on successors and assigns. In 1994, the then- successor company, P.B.S., dissolved, but payments to Arthur continued until 1998, when its successor, MM, had financial difficulties. It filed for bankruptcy in 1999. Litigation began. The trial court awarded Dorothy almost $2 million. In the appellate court, P.B.S. argued the traditional rule that a cause of action that accrued (1998) after dissolution (1994) cannot be brought against a dissolved corporation. The appellate court rejected the argument, holding that Dorothy’s claim could survive, but remanded for determination of whether the companies could be relieved of liability for the fee under a theory of novation. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the claim of breach of contract against P.B.S. could not survive the corporate dissolution. The issue of novation is relevant as to two other successor corporations and required remand. View "Pielet v. Pielet" on Justia Law