Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Following the bankruptcy of BioBased Technologies, LLC, certain members of BioBased (Appellants) brought an action against other members, the members’ lawyers, and the managers of the corporation for fraud, breach of duty to disclose company information, conversion of membership interest, civil conspiracy, and breach of contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment on some claims, dismissed some claims, and found that the remainder of the claims were barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on Appellants’ claims for fraud, breach of duty to disclose company information, and conversion of membership interest claims based on Appellants’ lack of standing, as Appellants had standing to assert their claims; (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on Appellants’ fraud claim against certain defendants on the basis that Appellants “failed to meet proof with proof” to show that the defendants made false representations of fact; (3) the circuit court erred in dismissing claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (4) the circuit court erred in concluding that the bankruptcy proceeding had res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on Appellants’ state-law claims. Remanded. View "Muccio v. Hunt" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a complicated bankruptcy proceeding. On appeal, Lender challenged the district court's judgment which, in relevant part, disallowed Lender's claim for a contractual prepayment consideration. Applying Colorado law, a lender was not entitled to a prepayment penalty when the lender chooses to accelerate the note. Absent a clear contractual provision to the contrary or evidence of the borrower's bad faith in defaulting to avoid a penalty, a lender's decision to accelerate acts as a waiver of a prepayment penalty. In this instance, the plain language of the contract plainly provided that no Prepayment Consideration was owed unless there was an actual prepayment, whether voluntary or involuntary. Accordingly, the acceleration of the Note due to GCMM's default by nonpayment under Article 4 did not trigger the obligation to pay the Prepayment Consideration under Article 6. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. GC Merchandise Mart, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Acting as receiver, the FDIC conveyed substantially all of WaMU's assets and liabilities to JPMorgan Chase, including certain long-term real-estate leases. At issue was whether the owners of the leased tracts could enforce the leases against Chase by virtue of the FDIC's conveyance. The court held that, in the interest of maintaining uniformity in the construction and enforcement of federal contracts, the landlords did not qualify as third-party beneficiaries. The court concluded, however, that the landlords have "standing" to prove the content of the Agreement and that the Agreement, properly construed, was a complete "assignment" sufficient to create privity of estate under Texas law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Excel Willowbrook, L.L.C., et al. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

Horsfall worked as a real estate agent for First Weber, 2001-2002, and was the listing agent on First Weber’s contract with Call, who was trying to sell property. The contract gave First Weber exclusive rights collect commissions for sale of the property during the listing period and an exclusive right to collect commissions from sales to defined “protected buyers” for one year after the listing expired. The Acostas made an offer on the property and became “protected buyers.” Call’s contract with First Weber ended in August and at the same time, Horsfall left First Weber to establish his own brokerage, Picket Fence. In October, the Acostas contacted Horsfall. Without involving First Weber, Horsfall resuscitated the transaction with Call. The Acostas and Call executed a sales contract for the Call property. Picket Fence received a $6,000 commission, inconsistent with Horsfall’s status as First Weber’s agent under the earlier contract and in violation of Wisconsin real estate practice rules. Six years later, First Weber sued Horsfall in state court, asserting r breach of contract, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment. The state court entered a judgment against Horsfall for $10,978.91. Horsfall filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing First Weber as a creditor. First Weber responded that its judgment was non‐dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), as involving “willful and malicious injury.” The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit found the debt dischargeable. View "First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Horsfall" on Justia Law

The multinational telecommunications firm Nortel declared bankruptcy in 2009 and various debtors comprising the Nortel brand auctioned their business lines and intellectual property, raising $7.5 billion. The debtors subsequently disputed whether they had agreed to allocate the auction funds through arbitration. The Bankruptcy Court held that they had not agreed to arbitrate their disputes about allocation. The Third Circuit affirmed: the contract at issue does not reflect the debtors’ intent to arbitrate disputes about the auction funds. The court declined to consider the Joint Administrators’ related challenge to the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to allocate the contested funds, noting that the Bankruptcy Court has not yet held the hearing to allocate the funds, so that review would be premature. View "In Re: Nortel Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

After Petitioner sold certain properties, he used the proceeds to purchase fractional interests in commercial office buildings. The fractional interests were called Tenants in Common Interests (TICs), and each of the TICs was promoted by a company called DBSI, Inc. DBSI later filed a petition for bankruptcy, and the properties underlying Petitioner's TICs became the subject of foreclosure proceedings. The bankruptcy court determined that many of DBSI's transactions were fraudulent. Petitioner filed a complaint against Cassidy Turley Maryland (Defendant), under whose advice Petitioner acted in purchasing the TICs, alleging that Defendant failed to disclose material facts regarding the investment. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Petitioner's investment in this case was a "security" for purposes of the Maryland Securities Act; (2) the circuit court erred in determining that Petitioner's claims under the Act relating to fraud and misrepresentation by Defendant were barred by limitations; (3) the court erred in concluding that Petitioner's common law tort claims were time-barred as a matter of law; and (4) the court did not err in deciding to reserve judgment on the admissibility of a bankruptcy examiner's report until it had further information. View "Mathews v. Cassidy Turley Md., Inc." on Justia Law

After South Louisiana Ethanol filed for bankruptcy, CHS filed suit contending that South Louisiana Ethanol's option contract with Plaquemines constituted the assignment of a litigious right under Louisiana law, entitling CHS to redeem the litigious right by reimbursing Plaquemines for the cost of the option contract plus interest. The district court granted Plaquemines's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the sale fit within the statutory judicial-sale exception to redemption, as described by Bluefields S.S. Co. v. Lala Ferreras Cangelosi S.S. Co. and its predecessors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the law at issue did not apply to judicial sales. View "CHS, Inc. v. Plaquemines Holdings, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Aleris supplied aluminum to Behr under a requirements contract until a labor dispute forced Aleris to close its Quebec factory in 2008. After learning of the closure, Behr took delivery of aluminum worth $2.6 million from Aleris without paying for it and scrambled to obtain aluminum from other suppliers, which Behr says increased its costs by $1.5 million. Behr filed suit in Michigan state court. That suit was stayed in 2009 when Aleris’s parent company filed for bankruptcy in the U.S. Aleris filed for bankruptcy in Canada. Aleris sued Behr in federal court seeking recovery of $2.6 million for the aluminum delivery. Behr asserted numerous defenses and counterclaims including a setoff for its increased costs after the factory closure. The district court abstained from adjudication of Behr’s counterclaim, characterizing it as “part and parcel of the stayed state-court proceedings,” then granted summary judgment to Aleris in the amount of $1.1 million and closed the case. Behr satisfied the judgment. The state court declined to lift the stay. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the decision gave Behr full value for its untested counterclaim and has the impact of depriving the Canadian estate of monies to which it might be entitled. View "RSM Richter, Inc. v. Behr America, Inc." on Justia Law

Four upper-level managers at Tradesmen, a construction staffing company, formed a competing company in 2009. Tradesmen filed suit alleging breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information, breach of duty of loyalty, tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with business expectancy, conversion, and civil conspiracy, and seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to covenants not to compete and injunctive relief. Proceedings against one defendant were stayed, due to bankruptcy. The district court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants, except with respect to the declaratory judgment count, but found that the covenants had already expired. The district court denied attorney’s fees. The Seventh Circuit held that because of the stay, the summary judgment ruling was not a final decision, so that it lacked jurisdiction on appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291, except with respect to the request for injunctive relief (28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1)). The court affirmed on that issue, reasoning that Tradesmen failed to show that it suffered any harm, let alone irreparable harm, from the remaining defendants’ actions. View "Tradesmen Int'l, Inc. v. Black" on Justia Law

In 1999, I-4 leased Florida land to Lazy Days, with an option to purchase, prohibiting assignment without written consent. In 2008, Lazy Days notified I-4 of its intention to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and assign the lease to LDRV. The parties negotiated a settlement agreement in 2009. I-4 consented to assignment. Lazy Days agreed not to “argue against the Bankruptcy Court abstaining from consideration of Lease interpretation issues ... except to the extent necessary in connection with the assumption and assignment of the Lease.” The agreement provided that “there is no intent to, nor is the Lease modified in any respect,” but did not state whether the purchase option survived. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed a reorganization plan incorporating the agreement and closed the case in 2010. In 2011, LDRV attempted to exercise the option. The parties each filed state court lawsuits and LDRV moved to reopen in Bankruptcy Court, which held that the anti-assignment provision was unenforceable and that refusal to honor the option violated the agreement. The district court vacated. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the Bankruptcy Court properly exercised jurisdiction; the agreement’s exception applied because the proceeding was “in connection with ... assignment of the Lease.” The court rejected arguments that the parties agreed to waive application of 11 U.S.C. 365(f)(3) and that the Bankruptcy Court committed an unconstitutional taking and denied I-4 due process. View "In Re: Lazy Days' RV Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law