Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Bankruptcy
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Little Hearts Marks Family II L.P. ("Little Hearts") was a member of 305 East 61st Street Group LLC, a company formed to purchase and convert a building into a condominium. 61 Prime LLC ("Prime") was the majority member and manager, and Jason D. Carter was the manager and sole member of Prime. In 2021, the company filed for bankruptcy and sold the building to another company created by Carter. The liquidation plan established a creditor trust with exclusive rights to pursue the debtor’s estate's causes of action. Little Hearts sued Prime and Carter for breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment, seeking damages for lost capital investment and rights under the Operating Agreement.The bankruptcy court dismissed all claims, ruling that they were derivative and belonged to the debtor’s estate, thus could only be asserted by the creditor trustee. The district court affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claims, agreeing that these were derivative and could only be pursued by the creditor trustee. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, determining that these were direct claims belonging to Little Hearts and could proceed. The unjust enrichment claim was dismissed as duplicative of the contract claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re 305 East 61st Street Group LLC" on Justia Law

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Rudolph Rivas, a home builder and real estate developer, engaged the accounting firm Pitts & Pitts, operated by Brandon and Linda Pitts, for various accounting services from 2007 to 2017. The services included preparing quarterly financial statement compilations and tax returns. In 2016, errors were discovered in the financial statements prepared by the Accountants, leading to financial difficulties for Rivas, including overpayment of taxes and loss of credit, which allegedly forced his business into bankruptcy. Rivas sued the Accountants in August 2020, claiming negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract.The district court granted summary judgment for the Accountants on all claims. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the summary judgment on the negligence and breach of contract claims but reversed it on the fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims, holding that these claims were not barred by the anti-fracturing rule and had sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the anti-fracturing rule barred Rivas's fraud claim because the gravamen of the claim was professional negligence. The Court also held that no fiduciary duty existed as a matter of law under the undisputed facts, thus the breach of fiduciary duty claim failed. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment for the defendants on all claims. View "Pitts v. Rivas" on Justia Law

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Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC, an American mattress manufacturer, executed financing deals in 2016 and 2020 with various lenders. Following financial struggles exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, Serta filed for bankruptcy. The 2020 financing deal, known as the "uptier" transaction, involved Serta and some lenders (Prevailing Lenders) exchanging existing debt for new super-priority debt, which was controversial and led to multiple legal disputes.The bankruptcy court in the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case. Serta and the Prevailing Lenders sought a declaratory judgment that the 2020 uptier transaction was valid under the 2016 agreement's "open market purchase" exception. The bankruptcy court granted partial summary judgment in their favor, ruling that the term "open market purchase" was unambiguous and that the 2020 uptier was valid under this exception. The Excluded Lenders and LCM Lenders, who did not participate in the uptier, appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the 2020 uptier transaction was not a permissible "open market purchase" under the 2016 agreement. The court found that an "open market purchase" refers to transactions on a specific market generally open to various buyers and sellers, such as the secondary market for syndicated loans. The 2020 uptier, conducted privately with individual lenders, did not meet this definition. The court reversed the bankruptcy court's ruling on this issue.Additionally, the court addressed the inclusion of an indemnity provision in Serta's bankruptcy reorganization plan, which aimed to protect the Prevailing Lenders from losses related to the 2020 uptier. The court found that this indemnity was an impermissible end-run around the Bankruptcy Code's disallowance of contingent claims for reimbursement and violated the Code's requirement of equal treatment for creditors. The court reversed the bankruptcy court's confirmation of the plan insofar as it included this indemnity. View "Excluded Lenders v. Serta" on Justia Law

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Steven Andrew Clem, the former owner of a defunct homebuilding company, appealed a judgment regarding the nondischargeability of a debt incurred from a failed home construction project. An arbitration panel had found Clem personally liable to LaDainian and LaTorsha Tomlinson for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). Clem subsequently filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and the Tomlinsons initiated an adversary proceeding. The bankruptcy court determined that Clem had obtained over $660,000 from the Tomlinsons through false representation or false pretenses, making the debt nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).The bankruptcy court's decision was based on findings that Clem had committed fraud by nondisclosure during the performance of the contract, including failing to inform the Tomlinsons about the switch from concrete piers to helical steel piers, failing to disclose the puncturing of a water line, and misrepresenting the purchase of a Builder’s Risk insurance policy. The court also found that Clem failed to provide proper accounting for the Tomlinsons' funds. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in not applying collateral estoppel to the arbitration findings, which had already determined that Clem's actions did not constitute knowing violations of the DTPA or fraud. The appellate court found that the issues of fraudulent misrepresentation and nondisclosure had been fully litigated in the arbitration, and the arbitration panel had explicitly found no fraud or knowing DTPA violations.The Fifth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Clem, holding that the Tomlinsons were collaterally estopped from relitigating the fraud claims and that Clem's conduct did not meet the criteria for nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(2)(A). View "Clem v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law

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Debra Stevenson and Eugene Smith co-own a property for which Stevenson initially took out a loan from Wells Fargo. After defaulting, she refinanced with Fremont Investment & Loan, which paid off the Wells Fargo loan. Stevenson defaulted again and filed for bankruptcy. HSBC Bank, as Fremont's successor, sought to enforce its interest in the property through equitable subrogation, claiming the right to stand in Wells Fargo's position.In bankruptcy court, HSBC was found to be the holder of the note and entitled to equitable subrogation for the amount used to pay off the Wells Fargo loan. The federal district court adopted this decision, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that HSBC could enforce its interest despite Fremont's knowledge of Smith's co-ownership and refusal to sign the loan documents.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment to HSBC. The court held that Stevenson and Smith were collaterally estopped from relitigating issues decided in federal court, including HSBC's standing and entitlement to equitable subrogation. The court also rejected their Truth in Lending Act (TILA) rescission argument, as it had been previously litigated and decided against them. The court affirmed the Superior Court's ruling, finding no genuine issues of material fact and that HSBC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Stevenson v. HSBC Bank USA" on Justia Law

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Highland Capital Management, L.P. (Highland) was an investment fund managed by James Dondero, who also managed several of its subsidiaries. Highland had a practice of lending money to its subsidiaries and to Dondero personally. During Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, Dondero was removed, and a court-appointed board took over. The board attempted to collect on promissory notes executed in Highland's favor by the subsidiaries and Dondero. When they refused to pay, Highland initiated adversary actions in bankruptcy court.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas handled the initial proceedings. Highland filed several adversary actions against Dondero and the subsidiaries, seeking enforcement of the promissory notes. The cases were consolidated, and the bankruptcy court recommended granting summary judgment in favor of Highland. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas adopted the recommendations and entered judgment against all defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Highland had established a prima facie case for the validity and enforceability of the promissory notes. The court found that the defendants' arguments, including claims of oral agreements to forgive the loans, lack of authority to sign the notes, mutual mistake, prepayment, and Highland's responsibility to make payments, were unsupported by credible evidence. The court concluded that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that Highland was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Highland Capital v. NexPoint Asset" on Justia Law

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An affiliate of Cambrian Holding Company held a lease to mine coal on land owned by Hazard Coal Corporation. During Cambrian's bankruptcy, it proposed selling its lease interest to American Resources Corporation, which falsely warranted it could obtain a mining permit. The bankruptcy court approved the lease assignment based on this false understanding. Hazard Coal later discovered American Resources could not lawfully mine coal and repeatedly tried to unwind the assignment, but the bankruptcy court rejected these attempts.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky initially approved the sale of Cambrian's lease interest to American Resources. Hazard Coal did not object before the sale but later moved to reconsider the sale order, citing American Resources' permit-blocked status. The bankruptcy court denied this motion, stating Hazard Coal could have raised its objections earlier. Hazard Coal did not appeal this decision. Subsequently, Hazard Coal moved to compel American Resources to restore power to the mine or rescind the assignment, but the court again denied the motion, reiterating that Hazard Coal had forfeited its objections by not acting timely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Hazard Coal appealed the bankruptcy court's declaration that Cambrian had validly assigned the lease to American Resources. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion. The court held that the bankruptcy court reasonably interpreted its prior orders as barring Hazard Coal's challenge to the lease assignment due to its failure to timely assert its rights. The court emphasized that Hazard Coal's objections were forfeited because they were not raised in a timely manner. View "In re Cambrian Holding Co., Inc." on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute between Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC and Mallinckrodt PLC. Sanofi sold its rights in a drug to Mallinckrodt for $100,000 and a perpetual annual royalty. The drug was successful, but Mallinckrodt filed for bankruptcy and sought to convert Sanofi's right to royalties into an unsecured claim. Mallinckrodt aimed to discharge all future royalty payments and continue selling the drug without paying royalties, leaving Sanofi with only an unsecured claim.The bankruptcy court approved Mallinckrodt's discharge, ruling that since Sanofi had fully transferred ownership years ago, the contract was not executory. It also held that Sanofi's remaining contractual right to future royalties was an unsecured, contingent claim, which Mallinckrodt could discharge. The District Court affirmed these rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed these rulings de novo. The court held that Sanofi's right to payment arose before Mallinckrodt filed for bankruptcy, making its royalties dischargeable in bankruptcy. The court rejected Sanofi's argument that the future royalties were too indefinite to be a claim, stating that the Bankruptcy Code allows for claims that are both contingent and unliquidated. The court also disagreed with Sanofi's assertion that bankruptcy cannot resolve its royalties claim because it will not exist until Mallinckrodt hits the sales trigger each year. The court ruled that a claim can arise before it is triggered, and most contract claims arise when the parties sign the contract. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that Sanofi's contingent claim arose before Mallinckrodt went bankrupt and is therefore dischargeable in bankruptcy. View "In re Mallinckrodt PLC" on Justia Law

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GFS Industries, a Texas limited liability corporation, entered into an agreement with Avion Funding to receive $190,000 in exchange for $299,800 of GFS’s future receivables. GFS stated it had not filed, nor did it anticipate filing, any Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. However, two weeks after signing the agreement, GFS petitioned for voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Western District of Texas and elected to proceed under Subchapter V, a 2019 addition to the Bankruptcy Code designed to streamline the Chapter 11 reorganization process for certain small business debtors. Avion filed an adversary complaint in GFS’s bankruptcy, claiming GFS obtained Avion’s financing by misrepresenting whether it anticipated filing for bankruptcy. Avion sought a declaration that GFS’s debt to Avion was therefore nondischargeable.The bankruptcy court agreed with GFS, ruling that in the Subchapter V context, only individuals, not corporations, can be subject to § 523(a) dischargeability actions. The court followed the reasoning of four bankruptcy courts and declined to follow the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Cantwell-Cleary Co. v. Cleary Packaging, LLC (In re Cleary Packaging, LLC), which held that the Subchapter V discharge exceptions apply to both individual and corporate debtors. The bankruptcy court ruled GFS’s debt to Avion was dischargeable and dismissed Avion’s complaint. Avion timely appealed to the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the bankruptcy court's interpretation of the interplay between § 523(a) and § 1192(2). The court found that § 1192 governs discharging debts of a “debtor,” which the Code defines as encompassing both individual and corporate debtors. The court also noted that other Code provisions explicitly limit discharges to “individual” debtors, whereas § 1192 provides dischargeability simply for “the debtor.” The court concluded that 11 U.S.C. § 1192(2) subjects both corporate and individual Subchapter V debtors to the categories of debt discharge exceptions listed in § 523(a). Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the bankruptcy court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Avion Funding v. GFS Industries" on Justia Law

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Inmarsat Global Limited and related entities(collectively, “Inmarsat”) operate a satellite network providing communications services to remote locations, including ships at sea. Inmarsat sells the services at retail to end-users and at wholesale to distributors. Speedcast International Limited was a leading Inmarsat distributor, purchasing Inmarsat’s services and providing them to its own customers. Speedcast is the debtor in the bankruptcy. Several contracts governed the business relationship among the parties. Their last contract terminated all of the creditors’ claims against the debtor except for narrowly defined “Permitted Claims.” The creditors sought a reversal of the district and bankruptcy court’s conclusion that a particular claim was not a permitted one.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Termination Agreement’s definitions of Released Claims and Permitted Claims are unambiguous. Consequently, the court wrote that it need not consider any extrinsic evidence. The court found Inmarsat’s pricing argument unpersuasive. The Shortfall Amount is not a payment for services delivered by Inmarsat to Speedcast. The SAA provides that the Shortfall Amount is part of the performance that Speedcast promised “[i]n exchange for” Inmarsat agreeing to grant a 30% discount. The Shortfall Amount, in turn, is not levied on the services that Inmarsat delivered to Speedcast; it is levied due to the customers Speedcast failed to provide. View "Inmarsat Global v. SpeedCast Intl" on Justia Law