Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 1986, appellee personally guaranteed a loan made by Petra to AEGIS. Appellee subsequently sued Petra in district court in late 2008, seeking a declaratory judgment that he did not have any obligations under a Guaranty Agreement. Petra counter-sued in early 2009, seeking to enforce the Guaranty Agreement. The court concluded that Petra's claim was time-barred where the limitations period began in 1987 when AEGIS declared bankruptcy and appellee was obligated to pay Petra under the Guaranty Agreement, and the limitations period expired in 1999. The court also concluded that Petra should have the opportunity to produce evidence sufficient to create a substantial question of material fact to the governing issues of the case. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Farouki v. Petra Int'l. Banking Corp., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Wells Fargo for fraudulent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel after Wells Fargo initiated foreclosure when plaintiffs stopped paying on their mortgage loan. The court held that plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the modification of their home loan and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' claims under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The court also held that plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim for promissory estoppel and the district court did not err in dismissing their claim. View "Freitas, et al v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the Pendergrass rule, which establishes a limitation on the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule. Plaintiffs restructured their debt with a Credit Association in an agreement. Plaintiffs did not make the required payments, and the Credit Association recorded a notice of default. Eventually, Plaintiffs repaid the loan, and the Association dismissed its foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs then filed this action seeking damages for fraud and negligent misrepresentation and including causes of action for rescission and reformation of the restructuring agreement. Relying on the Pendergrass rule, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Credit Association, ruling that the fraud exception did not allow parol evidence of promises at odds with the terms of the written agreement. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the Pendergrass rule did not apply in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Bank of America Ass'n v. Pendergrass was ill-considered, and should be overruled. View "Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Ass'n" on Justia Law

This dispute stemmed from WaMu's lease agreement with Interface, the lessor. WaMu subsequently closed as a "failed bank" and entered into receivership under the direction of the FDIC. The FDIC then entered into a Purchase and Assumption Agreement (P&A Agreement) with JPMorgan, which set forth the terms and conditions of the transfer of WaMu's assets and liabilities to JPMorgan. Interface filed a breach of lease claim against JPMorgan. On appeal, Interface challenged two district court orders that granted JPMorgan's motion for summary judgment, denied Interface's motion for summary judgment, and granted the FDIC's, the intervenor, request for declaratory relief. The court concluded that Interface was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the P&A Agreement executed between FDIC and JPMorgan, and, as a result, Interface lacked standing to enforce its interpretation of that agreement. The court also concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to award declaratory relief to the FDIC. Consequently, the court vacated and remanded the judgment. View "Interface Kanner, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

First Franklin Financial Corporation and Jason Gardner attended foreclosure mediation. The parties disputed the outcome of the mediation. Gardner argued that the parties reached a binding agreement requiring First Franklin to offer a trial loan modification plan to Gardner and subsequently filed a motion for sanctions. The district court granted the motion and ordered First Franklin to pay monetary sanctions and to enter into a loan modification with Gardner on the terms agreed upon by the parties at foreclosure mediation. First Franklin filed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and held that the motion court did not err (1) in finding that Gardner and First Franklin entered into a binding agreement requiring First Franklin to offer the loan modification to Gardner; and (2) in finding that First Franklin did not mediate in good faith and in granting Gardner's motion for sanctions. View "First Franklin Fin. Corp. v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action, asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and violation of the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq. The district court was persuaded that the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 24, 484(A), and federal regulations preempted the CLEC, and that plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract. The court held that the district court erred in deeming plaintiff's CLEC claim against Capital One preempted by federal law and regulations where Capital One was subject to the terms of the CLEC in loans it acquired through assignment. The court also held that a breach of contract claim had been adequately pleaded and therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the claim. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Decohen v. Capital One N.A." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the manner in which defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase), the successor in interest to Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), acquired plaintiffs' mortgage. Plaintiffs' mortgage was among the assets held by WaMu when it collapsed in 2008. Specifically, the issue was whether defendant acquired plaintiffs' mortgage by "operation of law" and, if so, whether MCL 600.3204(3), applied to the acquisition of a mortgage by operation of law. Upon review of briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable statutory authority, the Supreme Court held that defendant did not acquire plaintiffs' mortgage by operation of law. Rather, defendant acquired that mortgage through a voluntary purchase agreement. Accordingly, defendant was required to comply with the provisions of MCL 600.3204. Furthermore, the Court held that the foreclosure sale in this case was voidable rather than void ab initio. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Kim v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

LVNV Funding, LLC filed a complaint against Rae Nardi for an amount due on her credit card account with Citibank. LVNV claimed, as an assignee, it had a contractual relationship between Nardi and Citibank and a cause of action for recovery of the amount due on the account. Nardi filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the failure to attach to the complaint a copy of the agreement between Nardi and Citibank constituted a violation of Ark. R. Civ. P. 10(d). The circuit court granted summary judgment for Nardi, finding that LVNV violated Rule 10(d), which requires that a copy of the "instrument or document" upon which the claim is based be attached to the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that compliance with Rule 10(d) is mandatory, and therefore, entry of summary judgment was proper. View "LVNV Funding, LLC v. Nardi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the servicer of their home loan, violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605, because it did not respond adequately to three letters in which they challenged the monthly payment due on their loan. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the claim because a servicer must receive a valid "qualified written request" to incur the duty to respond under section 2605, and it determined that the letters were not qualified written requests that triggered the statutory duty. Because plaintiffs' letters to defendant challenged the terms of their loans and requested modification of various loan and mortgage documents, they were not qualified written requests relating to the servicing of plaintiffs' loan. Because section 2605 did not require a servicer to respond to such requests, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claim and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Medrano, et al v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, et al" on Justia Law

Beneva and Iberiabank became parties to the sublease at issue through a series of assignments. At issue was whether the sublease transferred by the FDIC to Iberiabank after it took over the assets of a failed bank was enforceable despite a clause purporting to terminate the sublease on sale or transfer of the failed bank. Because the court found that the FDIC acted within its power to enforce contracts under 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(13)(A) and that the termination clause was unenforceable against Iberiabank as the FDIC's transferee, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Iberiabank. View "Iberiabank v. Beneva 41-I, LLC, et al" on Justia Law