Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellant entered into a mortgage with Aegis Lending Corporation. The mortgage was later assigned to Pacifica L. Ninteen, and the servicing rights were eventually transferred to Vantium Capital, Inc. (“Acqura”). After foreclosure proceedings were commenced against Appellant, Appellant filed suit against Acqura, alleging numerous state law claims. Specifically, Appellant claimed that Acqura’s violated its Servicer Participation Agreement with Fannie Mae by failing to follow guidelines applicable under the federal Home Affordable Modification Program. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that Minn. Stat. 58.18(1) did not provide a private cause of action for Appellant to pursue damages for Acqura’s alleged violation of its agreement with Fannie Mae and that Appellant therefore lacked standing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 58.18(1) provides for a private right of action and therefore gave Appellant standing to pursue her claim. View "Gretsch v. Vantium Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, appellants Max and Peggy Espeland refinanced their home with E-Loan, Inc. Shortly thereafter, their loan was purchased by another bank and securitized. The Espelands eventually defaulted on the loan and their home was sold in a non-judicial deed of trust foreclosure. The Espelands brought an action in the superior court to void the sale, arguing mainly that inconsistencies in and multiple transfers of the loan and security documents caused defects in the chain of title. The superior court disagreed and granted summary judgment against the Espelands. The Espelands appealed. Thereafter, the Espelands moved for relief from judgment, citing fraud by the defendants. The superior court denied this motion. The Espelands filed a second appeal, and the Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals for decision. Because the Espelands did not produce any evidence of defects with the chain of title or with the foreclosure, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment. Because after reviewing the record the Court saw no evidence of fraud or malfeasance, it affirmed the superior court’s denial of the motion for relief from judgment. View "Espeland v. OneWest Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

Defendants executed a promissory note in favor of FirstMerit Bank secured by a mortgage on several parcels of real estate. After Defendants defaulted on the promissory note, FirstBank initiated foreclosure proceedings. The common pleas court entered a decree in foreclosure, and the properties were sold at auction. Because the sale of the properties resulted in a deficiency, FirstMerit obtained a cognovit judgment against Defendants. Defendants moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B), asserting as a defense that they had reached an oral settlement agreement with FirstMerit under which FirstMerit had agreed to cease legal proceedings and release Defendants from their obligations. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the statute of frauds barred their defense. The appellate court reversed, determining that Ohio Rev. Code 1335.05 did not prohibit Defendants from raising as a defense that the parties orally agreed to modify the terms of their agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the oral agreement in this case fell within the statute of frauds, and therefore, Defendants were precluded from raising the agreement as a defense in a motion for relief from judgment. View "FirstMerit Bank, N.A. v. Inks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the Citibank defendants engaged in tortious conduct and breached contractual obligations owed to him in connection with private equity investments in Brazil. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of the complaint. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case under the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. 632, because plaintiff's claims arose out of a foreign financial operation. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's tort and contract claims against the Citibank defendants under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Wilson v. Dantas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs entered into a loan agreement with Potomac Realty Capital LLC (PRC) to rehabilitate and renovate certain property. As security for the loan, NV One granted a mortgage on the property. Plaintiffs later filed a complaint against PRC, asserting violations of the Rhode Island usury law, among other claims. The trial justice granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs with respect to the usury claim, entered an order declaring the loan usurious and void, and voided the mortgage. At issue on appeal was whether a usury savings clause in the loan document validated the otherwise usurious contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their usury claim because (1) the loan was a usury; and (2) the usury savings clause was unenforceable on public policy grounds. View "NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

Downing, Thorpe & James Design, Inc. (DTJ) was an architectural firm incorporated in Colorado. Thomas Thrope, one of DTJ’s three founding principals, was allowed to practice individually as a foreign architect in Nevada, but DTJ was not allowed to practice as a foreign corporation in Nevada. In 2004, DTJ contracted with a Nevada developer to provide architectural services for a Las Vegas subdivision owned by Prima Condominiums, LLC (Prima). Prima obtained a loan from First Republic Bank in exchange for a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on one of the subdivision’s units. After Prima defaulted on its payments, DTJ recorded a notice of mechanic’s lien against the property for unpaid services. First Republic then foreclosed and purchased the property. DTJ subsequently brought an action against First Republic for lien priority and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment for First Republic. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because DTJ had failed to comply with Nevada’s statutory registration and filing provisions, it was barred from maintaining an action in Nevada for compensation for its architectural services; and (2) Thorpe’s individual status had no bearing on whether DTJ could bring or maintain an action for compensation for its services. View "DTJ Design, Inc. v. First Republic Bank" on Justia Law

In 2006, Joseph and Mary Romero signed a mortgage contract with the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as nominee for Equity One, Inc. They pledged their home as collateral for the loan. The Romeros alleged that Equity One urged them to refinance their home for access to the home's equity. The terms of the new loan were not an improvement over their then-current loan: the interest rate was higher and the loan amount due was higher. Despite that, the Romeros would receive a net cash payout they planned to use to pay other debts. The Romeros later became delinquent on their increased loan payments. A third party, Bank of New York (BONY), identified itself as a trustee for Popular Financial Services Mortgage, filed suit to foreclose on the Romeros' home. BONY claimed to hold the Romeros' note and mortgage with the right of enforcement. The Romeros defended by arguing that BONY lacked standing to foreclose because nothing in the complaint established how BONY held their note and mortgage, and that the contracts they signed were with Equity One. The district court found that BONY had established itself as holder of the Romeros' mortgage, and that the bank had standing to foreclose. That decision was appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in finding BONY's evidence demonstrated that it had standing to foreclose. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bank of New York v. Romero" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and other checking account customers filed suit against the Bank for allegedly charging excessive overdraft fees in breach of their account agreement. The district court denied the Bank's renewed motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that state law applied when courts determined whether a valid arbitration agreement is in effect, and the Federal Arbitration Act's, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., presumption did not; under North Carolina law, the Bank Agreement was entirely superseded, and the arbitration agreement in that agreement therefore became ineffective; the district court properly looked to the PNC Agreement to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes; under North Carolina law, the PNC Agreement's silence was insufficient to form such an agreement; based on the terms of the agreement, the PNC Agreement applied retroactively; and because the agreement governing the dispute at hand did not permit the Bank to compel arbitration, the district court properly denied the motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her mortgage lender, Wells Fargo, alleging that Wells Fargo breached the mortgage-loan contract and violated extracontractual duties by requiring her to have more flood insurance than the amount set by federal law. At issue was whether a covenant included in all contracts for home mortgage loans guaranteed by the FHA unambiguously permitted mortgage lenders to require their borrowers to obtain flood insurance beyond the amount the agency required. The court concluded that the covenant unambiguously made the federally required flood-insurance amount the minimum, not the maximum, the borrower must have. Accordingly, plaintiff could not prevail on her claims against Wells Fargo and the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Feaz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

This litigation arose out of the failure of WaMu and the assumption of WaMu's assets and liabilities by Chase from the FDIC, acting in its capacity as WaMu's receiver. On appeal, the FDIC and Chase challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hillside. The district court concluded that Hillside, which owned premises leased by WaMu before the financial crisis, had third-party standing to enforce the alleged assignment of WaMu's real estate lease to Chase under a purchase agreement between the FDIC and Chase, even though the FDIC validly repudiated the lease under section 212(e) of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C. 1821(e), and the parties to the purchase agreement asserted that it did not in fact assign the lease. The court held that Hillside lacked prudential standing to litigate whether WaMu's liabilities were assigned to Chase under the agreement because it was neither a contracting party nor a third-party beneficiary under the agreement. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "Hillside Metro Associates, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law