Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Decedent became a resident of Golden Living Center, a nursing home, in 2009. Later that year, Courtyard Gardens took over ownership and operation of the facility. Thereafter, Decedent's son, Ronald Quarles signed a new admission agreement and optional arbitration agreement. In 2011, Kenny Quarles, another of Decedent's sons acting as power of attorney, filed an amended complaint against Courtyard Gardens and other entities associated with it and the Center, seeking damages for negligence, medical malpractice, and violations of the Arkansas Long-Term Care Residents' Act. Courtyard Gardens filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The circuit court denied Courtyard Garden's motion to compel arbitration, concluding that questions of fact remained regarding Ronald's authority to bind Decedent to the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration, holding that there was no valid arbitration agreement as a matter of law because Ronald had neither actual authority nor statutory authority to enter into the arbitration agreement on Decedent's behalf. View "Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab., LLC v. Quarles" on Justia Law

SEECO, Inc. owned oil-and-gas leases and possessed rights authorizing it to explore for and develop minerals from several tracts of land. SEECO filed an interpleader action to determine the ownership of the oil, gas, and minerals in the land. Appellee requested that the circuit court quiet title and confirm title in Appellees. Several defendants were named in the action. The circuit court ruled that a 1929 mineral deed, even with a blank left empty in the granting clause, conveyed one hundred percent of the mineral interest in three tracts of land to J.S. Martin. Appellees included the Stanton Group, as Martin's heirs and successors in interest, and SEECO. Appellants appealed, arguing that the 1929 mineral deed was void because the description of the interest was so vague that it was unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 1929 mineral deed was unambiguous, and the circuit court did not err by refusing to consider the parol evidence of a subsequent 1930 deed. View "Barton Land Servs., Inc. v. SEECO, Inc." on Justia Law

This dispute centered on a contract for the construction of a residence. The contract between the general contractor (Contractor) and the owners (Owners) was contingent upon Owners obtaining financing. After construction was completed, Contractor asserted a materialman's lien on the house, arguing that Owners had refused to fully compensate Contractor. After Owners filed suit to protest the lien, the parties agreed to discharge the lien. Contractor later sued Owners based on Owners' failure to disclose that they had obtained inadequate financing. The circuit court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Contractor's claims were statutorily barred for failure to strictly comply with requirements for the notice of its lien. The order was silent as to the other two grounds Owners had asserted for dismissal and with respect to any of the arguments raised in defense of Owners' motion to dismiss. Contractor appealed, arguing reversal based on other arguments raised below but not ruled on. The Supreme Court affirmed, as (1) the circuit court did not provide a ruling on Contractor's first three arguments, and they were therefore not preserved for appellate review; and (2) Contractor's fourth argument had no merit given the Court's summary affirmance on the first three points. View "TEMCO Constr., LLC v. Gann" on Justia Law

A construction company and its principals (collectively, Appellants) hired a plumbing company (Peters), excavation company (Bostic), and marble company (Esquire) as subcontractors for the construction of Appellants' home. After Buyers purchased the home, Buyers filed a complaint against Appellants, alleging negligence and breach of the implied warranties of habitability, sound workmanship, and proper construction. Appellants filed a third-party complaint against Peters, Bostic, and Esquire, alleging several causes of action. Bostic subsequently filed cross-claims against Peters, and Peters filed cross-claims against both Bostic and Esquire. Thereafter, the circuit court (1) granted Peters' motion for summary judgment on the third-party complaint, (2) granted summary judgment for Bostic on Peters' cross-claim, and (3) granted Esquire's motion for summary judgment on the third-party complaint. Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction because a final order had not been entered disposing of all the claims. View "J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd." on Justia Law

Appellants, state police officers, brought this suit individually and on behalf of a class consisting of members of the Arkansas State Police Retirement System (ASPRS), contending that various state defendants had violated the law by failing to properly fund the ASPRS between 1992 and 2003 and that the improper funding violated the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court dismissed some of Appellants' claims and remanded. On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants. On appeal, Appellants asserted that the circuit court erred in finding that a uniform and travel-expense allowance provided for in Ark. Code Ann. 12-8-209 was not reportable to the ASPRS as a portion of payroll pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 24-6-209(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 24-6-209(a) does not include a uniform and travel-expense allowance such that it is reportable to ASPRS for purposes of calculating retirement benefits. View "McLemore v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Holline and William Parsons (Plaintiffs) were enrolled in Today's Option, a Medicare Advantage Plan sponsored by the Pyramid Life Insurance Company (Pyramid). After Plaintiffs were each disenrolled from their respective plans, they brought suit against Pyramid, asserting numerous state law claims. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part declaring that the Medicare Act did not provide the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs' claims in this case. Pyramid then moved for Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification and a stay pending appeal, requesting permission to file an interlocutory appeal on the issues of whether Plaintiffs' state-law claims arose under the Medicare Act and whether their claims, to the extent they did not arise under the Act, were expressly preempted by the Act. The circuit court certified this appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the finding supporting Rule 54(b) certification was in error. View "Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Parsons" on Justia Law

Four independent shippers, all located outside Arkansas, engaged Western Brokerage, a transportation broker in Arizona, to arrange for the transportation of produce from Arizona to Pennsylvania and New York. Western Brokerage requested carriers. Hotfoot, an Arkansas trucking company, agreed to transport multiple loads. Hotfoot engaged Freight Ambulance, an Arkansas company, to deliver the produce. After the delivery was made, Hotfoot unsuccessfully made a demand on Western Brokerage for the payment of the unpaid balance. Hotfoot subsequently filed an amended complaint against the four independent shippers and Western Brokerage for breach of contract. The Pulaski County circuit court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, Appellants limited their arguments to Shipping Point Marketing (SPM), one of the independent shippers, and SPM's president and the president of Western Brokerage (collectively, Appellees). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that questions of fact existed surrounding the personal jurisdiction of Appellees. View "Hotfoot Logistics LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., Inc." on Justia Law

Circle D Contractors filed suit in district court to collect from the Bartletts money owed for the installation of a swimming pool. The district court ruled in favor of Circle D. The Barletts appealed. Circle D did not refile an additional complaint within thirty days, and the Barletts moved to dismiss Circle D's complaint as untimely. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, ruling that Circle D had failed to strictly comply with the requirements of District Court Rule 9 by failing to timely refile its complaint in circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) only substantial compliance with the rule that a plaintiff refile its complaint in circuit court is required; and (2) Circle D substantially complied with rule 9 because all of its pleadings that were previously filed in district court were filed in circuit court, albeit by the Bartletts, and moreover, Circle D also refiled its complaint in circuit court. Remanded. View "Circle D Contractors, Inc. v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

Johnny Washington and his son were traveling in their 1994 Ford Explorer when their vehicle was struck by a driver (Karah Williams) who had run a stop sign. The Explorer rolled over twice, fatally injuring Johnny. Paulette Washington, individually and as administratrix of Johnny's estate, filed a complaint against Ford Motor Company for negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, and breach of warranties. The jury returned a verdict finding that Ford and Williams, in equal measure, had been the proximate cause of Johnny's death. The jury awarded $4,652,125 in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages. Ford appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the judgment was not final because it did not set forth a specific dollar amount owed by Ford. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Appellant issued a motorcycle insurance policy to Brian McCallum that contained accident and healthcare coverage. The policy included a provision for subrogation of payments made for any injury caused by a third party. After McCallum was involved in a collision with Margarita Saldivar, Appellant paid McCallum's medical expenses. Appellant then filed a complaint alleging Saldivar's negligence and seeking to receive subrogation benefits from Saldivar. The circuit court rejected Appellant's argument that it was entitled to subrogation benefits from Saldivar and granted summary judgment in Saldivar's favor. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutes; and (2) Appellant properly sought general "subrogation benefits from the third party,'" as permitted by Ark. Stat. Ann. 23-79-146. View "Progressive Halcyon Ins. v. Saldivar" on Justia Law