Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs leased state trust land and owned all structures and improvements on the land. Under the terms of the lease, the improvements that existed on the land would become the state's property upon lease termination. After the leases were entered into, the legislature created a property tax classification ("Class Nine") in which property was taxed at a lower rate than that applicable to commercial property. For certain years, Maricopa County classified the improvements under the classification applicable to general commercial property and taxed Plaintiffs accordingly. The State Board of Equalization denied Plaintiffs' request for Class Nine classification. Plaintiffs then filed a declaratory judgment action in the tax court. The tax court granted summary judgment for the County based on Plaintiffs' failure to meet the requirements of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-12009(A)(1)(a), which provides that improvements on land leased from the state qualify for a reduced ad valorem tax rate if they become the property of the state on termination of the leasehold interest in the property. The Supreme Court remanded, holding that section 42-12009(A)(1)(a) applies when, at the time of taxation, improvements exist on the land that, under the terms of the lease, would become the state's property upon lease termination. View "CNL Hotels & Resorts, Inc. v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases involved two properties purchased by John Hogan. Each parcel became subject to a deed of trust when Hogan took out loans from Long Beach Mortgage Company. Hogan was delinquent on both loans, which triggered foreclosure proceedings. A notice of trustee's sale recorded for the first parcel identified Washington Mutual Bank as the beneficiary and Deutsche Bank as the beneficiary for the second parcel. Hogan filed lawsuits seeking to enjoin the trustees' sales unless the beneficiaries proved they were entitled to collect on the respective notes. The superior court dismissed the cases. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Arizona's non-judicial foreclosure statute (Statute) does not require presentation of the original note before commencing foreclosure proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's orders dismissing Hogan's complaints and vacated the court of appeals, holding that the Statute does not require the beneficiary to prove its authority or show the note before the trustee may commence a non-judicial foreclosure. View "Hogan v. Washington Mut. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In the underlying federal court action, an auto insurer (Insurer) sought a declaratory judgment that it had validly denied Insured's underinsured motorist (UIM) claim. Insured was injured while a passenger on a motorcycle driven by her husband, who had a motorcycle insurance policy with Insurer. Insured counterclaimed for breach of contract and bad faith. The U.S. district court certified several questions to the state Supreme Court. The Court held (1) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01(G) required Insurer to provide UIM coverage for Insured under the auto policy, where Insured's total damages exceeded the amount of her tort recovery from her husband under the husband's motorcycle policy; and (2) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01(H) did not permit Insurer to refuse to provide Insured with UIM coverage under her auto policy because she was partially indemnified as a claimant under the liability coverage of the separate motorcycle policy issued by Insurer to Insured's husband, whose negligence contributed to Insured's injuries.

In April 2008, plaintiff American Asphalt sued CMX for professional negligence and breach of implied warranty. On October 1, 2008, the superior court issued an order informing plaintiff that if it did not file a motion to set as required by Ariz. R. Civ. P. 38.1(e), the case would be placed on the inactive calendar after January 20, 2009 and dismissed without further notice after March 23, 2009. American did not file a motion to set and the case was dismissed without further notice on April 29, 2009. Plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal, contending that its failure to comply with Rule 38.1(a) was excusable because it had substituted counsel around the time of the Rule 38.1(d) filing deadline. The superior court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, finding no excusable neglect partly because the court's order provided notice as required by the rule. On review, the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and remanded, holding that a notice issued several months prior to placing the case on the inactive calendar does not comply with the rule because the rule requires contemporaneous notice when a case is placed on the inactive calendar.