Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case stemmed from district court decisions regarding an uninsured motorist claim between Plaintiffs-Appellants Sam and Deva Ferrell and Defendant-Respondent United Financial Casualty Company (United Financial, d.b.a. Progressive Insurance Company). The parties underwent arbitration, and the Ferrells subsequently filed a petition that sought confirmation of the arbitration award and an award of costs and attorney fees. The district court ordered confirmation of the arbitration award and interest based upon an agreement of the parties. On the issue of attorney fees, the district court found that arbitration began five months prior to the amendment of I.C. 41-1839 which explicitly allowed attorney fees in arbitration, and therefore the statute as it existed did not provide for attorney fees in this case. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case back to the district court. View "Ferrell v. United Financial Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The O'Neals appealed a circuit court order that granted Bama Exterminating Company, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration. The dispute arose shortly after the O'Neals closed on the purchase of a house. As part of the loan disclosures, Bama Exterminating prepared an inspection report that the house was termite-free. The report did disclose a prior infestation at the house's carport from several years earlier. Mr. O'Neal signed the report right below the arbitration provision. Two weeks after closing, the O'Neals discovered "bugs" in the walls. They called Bama Exterminating who confirmed that the bugs were termites. The O'Neals then sued Bama Exterminating alleging negligence, wantonness and breach of contract. Bama Exterminating answered their complaint with the affirmative defense of the arbitration clause in the inspection report. The parties moved toward trial in the circuit court. When mediation failed, Bama Exterminating moved the court to compel arbitration. The O'Neals argued that the exterminator waived its right to compel arbitration by its participation in the litigation process. The Supreme Court found the exterminator did not waive its right to compel arbitration, and therefore affirmed the circuit court's decision to grant the company's motion. View "O'Neal v. Bama Exterminating Company, Inc. " on Justia Law

The Waikoloa Beach Villas condominium project was developed by Respondent, Sunstone Waikoloa, LLC. Petitioner, the Association of Apartment Owners of the Waikoloa Beach Villas, contacted Respondent to resolve issues resolving purported construction defects. Petitioner then filed a motion to compel mediation and arbitration. Respondent argued that it could not request arbitration because it had failed to comply with the requirements of the Declaration of Condominium Property Regime for the Villas. The Declaration imposed numerous requirements that Petitioner must meet before initiating arbitration or litigation proceedings against Respondent. The lower court granted Petitioner's motion. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversed. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the ICA, holding that section R.4(c) of the Declaration violated Haw. Rev. Stat. 514B-105(a) because it imposed limitations on Petitioner in arbitration or litigation more restrictive than those imposed on other persons. Remanded. View "Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Waikoloa Beach Villas v. Sunstone Waikoloa, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Nina Strausberg signed an arbitration agreement as a mandatory condition of her admission to Defendants' nursing home. Despite having signed the arbitration agreement, Plaintiff sued the home its operators alleging negligent care. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on which party has the burden to prove that a contract is unconscionable and therefore, unenforceable. The district court found that Plaintiff had failed to prove unconscionability and, therefore, granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the district court erred by placing the burden on Plaintiff to prove unconscionability. The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that Plaintiff had the burden to prove that the agreement was unconscionable because unconscionability is an affirmative defense to contract enforcement, and under settled principles of New Mexico law, the party asserting an affirmative defense has the burden of proof. Furthermore, the Court held that federal law preempted the Court of Appeals' holding because it treats nursing home arbitration agreements differently than other contracts. View "Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers" on Justia Law

While employed with Employer, Employee agreed to arbitrate any disputes arising from his employment. Employee's employment was later terminated. Employee filed a charge of discrimination with the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division of the Utah Labor Commission (UALD), alleging that Employer discriminated against him, retaliated against him, and harassed him. The UALD dismissed Employee's discrimination claims. Employee appealed to the Utah Labor Commission. The district court subsequently granted Employer's motion to compel arbitration and ordered Employee to submit to arbitration. The Supreme Court vacated the order compelling arbitration, holding that the district court erred in compelling arbitration because the plain language of the arbitration clause in Employee's employment contract allowed him to pursue administrative remedies prior to submitting to arbitration. View "Zions Mgmt. Servs. v. Record" on Justia Law

Joe Robertson appealed a circuit court order that held his claims against Mount Royal Towers were subject to an arbitration agreement and compelled him to arbitrate those claims. Finding that Robertson had not met his burden of showing that the arbitration agreements he signed were not applicable in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Robertson v. Mount Royal Towers" on Justia Law

Richard and Lisa Keane and the companies they managed, and Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC (BFU) had a disagreement arising from a development deal involving the Houston Professional Plaza. They went to mediation, but the parties had a disagreement regarding the terms of the mediated agreement. They then turned to arbitration. The arbitrator granted two awards in favor of BFU. The award did not specify any date by which the Keanes were to pay the money, nor did the award include interest. The district court confirmed the arbitration awards, and issued a writ of execution. The sheriff returned the writ not satisfied. BFU then obtained an order for a debtor's examination. A partial satisfaction of judgment was made, but the Keanes did not direct how the payment made was to be applied to the two arbitration awards. BFU applied the partial satisfaction to one of the awards, and filed a motion to have the Keanes held in contempt for failing to pay the second. The Keanes challenged the contempt action. The Supreme Court, after its review of the matter, found that because the order confirming the arbitration award did not require the Keanes to do anything and because contempt cannot be used to enforce payment of the debt in this case, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding them in contempt and the order later entered awarding the respondent attorney fees and court costs. View "Bald, Fat & Ugly v. Keane" on Justia Law

In 2007, Anita Johnson purchased a vehicle from a dealership operated by JF Enterprises. Johnson signed numerous documents at a single sitting, including a retail installment contract and a one-page arbitration agreement. In 2010, Johnson sued the dealership, its president (Franklin), and the vehicle manufacturer (American Suzuki), claiming negligent misrepresentation. Franklin and JF Enterprises moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement. The trial court overruled the motion, finding that the installment contract did not refer to or incorporate the arbitration agreement and contained a merger clause stating that it contained the parties' entire agreement as to financing. The Supreme Court reversed after noting that contemporaneously signed documents will be construed together and harmonized if possible, holding that because the separate arbitration agreement was a dispute resolution agreement, not an additional financing document, it could be harmonized with the installment contract and was not voided by operation of the merger clause. View "Johnson v. JF Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

After receiving an arbitral award against MatlinPatterson, VRG filed a petition in the district court seeking confirmation of the award in accordance with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention), 9 U.S.C. 201-08. On appeal, VRG argued that the district court usurped the Arbitral Tribunal's role when it decided that the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement - assuming there was one - did not extend to the dispute at hand. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded so that it could decide, in the first instance and on the particular facts of this case, who - the court or the Arbitral Tribunal - had the power to determine the scope of the alleged arbitration agreement between VRG and MatlinPatterson. This power - to determine the scope of any agreement to arbitrate - was to remain with the district court unless the parties agreed to an arbitration clause that clearly and unmistakably assigned such questions to arbitration. View "VRG Linhas Aereas S.A. v. MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners II L.P." on Justia Law

Guardian Builders, LLC, and Wayne Tackett (collectively "Guardian") appealed an order that denied its motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award entered in favor of Randy and Melissa Uselton. In April 2010, the Useltons sued Guardian alleging several claims arising from Guardian's construction of a house. Guardian subsequently filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the circuit court granted that motion. The arbitrator entered a final award in favor of the Useltons in the amount of $452,275.20. Upon review, the Supreme Court construed Guardian's motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award of as a notice of appeal under Rule 71B, thus effectuating the appeal of the award to the circuit court. However, because the clerk of the circuit court never entered the award as the judgment of that court, the circuit court's order denying Guardian's motion to vacate or modify was void. "Essentially, Guardian's appeal remains pending in the circuit court, awaiting further procedures under Rule 71B. Further, because Guardian has appealed from the arbitration award under Rule 71B, that award could not be entered as the judgment of the court under 71C. Thus, the circuit court lacked authority to enter a judgment on the award under Rule 71C and to award Better Business Bureau fees and facility costs in connection with the entry of that judgment." View "Guardian Builders, LLC v. Uselton " on Justia Law