Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Arbitration & Mediation
Hamilton Park Health Care Ctr., Ltd.v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers E.
Hamilton Park, a long-term care facility, belonged to a multi-employer bargaining group, Tuchman. Tuchman and the employees' union agreed to a CBA beginning in 2008 and extending through February 28, 2013, giving the union the option to reopen negotiations in November 2011 to bargain for new terms for the CBA’s last year and to submit any unresolved items to binding interest arbitration, and allowing the arbitrator to “determine his jurisdiction” and grant “all appropriate remedies.” In 2011, the union invoked its right to reopen negotiations. The parties agreed to arbitrate unresolved issues, including the cost to maintain the existing health benefits. The arbitrator, Scheinman, suggested a multi-year award to spread increased contributions over a longer period. Scheinman claims that “[b]oth sides [orally] agreed my jurisdiction permitted a multi-year Award, at my discretion.” In 2012, Scheinman issued an award that extended through June 2016, dealing with wages and health benefits contributions, and allowing the union to reopen negotiations for the contract’s last year. Scheinman did not address why he included a second generation interest arbitration provision, nor did he claim that the parties consented. Hamilton Park petitioned to vacate the award, arguing that Scheinman exceeded his authority. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Hamilton Park agreed to expand Scheinman’s jurisdiction to a multi-year award, but did not agree to inclusion of a second generation interest arbitration provision. View "Hamilton Park Health Care Ctr., Ltd.v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers E." on Justia Law
Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc.
As a condition of her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff signed an agreement to resolve any employment-related disputes through arbitration. After Plaintiff resigned, she filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging that she suffered harassment, discrimination, and retaliation during the course of her employment. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that it was unconscionable. The trial court agreed with Plaintiff and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court of appeal reversed. The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because of a clause in the agreement providing that, in the event a claim proceeds to arbitration, the parties are authorized to seek preliminary injunctive relief in the superior court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable because the clause did no more that restate existing law. View "Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc." on Justia Law
Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp.
Sgouros purchased a “credit score” package from TransUnion. Armed with the number TransUnion gave him, he went to a car dealership and tried to use it to negotiate a favorable loan. The score he had bought, however, was useless: it was 100 points higher than the score pulled by the dealership. Sgouros filed suit, asserting that TransUnion violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681g(f)(7)(A); the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1; and the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.010, by misleading consumers by failing to inform them that the formula used to calculate their purchased credit scores was materially different from the formula used by lenders. TransUnion moved to compel arbitration, asserting that the website through which Sgouros purchased his product included an agreement to arbitrate. The district court concluded that no such contract had been formed and denied TransUnion’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed after evaluating the website and concluding that TransUnion had not put consumers on notice of the terms of agreement, as required by Illinois law, but actually distracted them from noticing those terms. View "Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp." on Justia Law
Beck v. Park West Galleries, Inc.
Brian Beck, Audrey Mahoney, David and Felice Oppenheim, Patty Brown, and others brought an action in the Oakland Circuit Court against Park West Galleries, Inc., and others, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and fraud. Defendant Park West Galleries, Inc. (Park West) sold art on various cruise ships traversing international waters. Plaintiffs purchased art from Park West on multiple occasions over the course of several years while on different cruise ships in different locations. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether an arbitration clause included in invoices for plaintiffs’ artwork purchases applied to disputes arising from plaintiffs’ previous artwork purchases when the invoices for the previous purchases did not refer to arbitration. The Court agreed with plaintiffs that the arbitration clause contained in the later invoices could not be applied to disputes arising from prior sales with invoices that did not contain the clause. Each transaction involved a separate and distinct contract, and the facts did not reasonably support a conclusion that the parties intended for the arbitration clause to retroactively apply to the previous contracts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed that part of the Court of Appeals judgment that extended the arbitration clause to the parties’ prior transactions that did not refer to arbitration. The case was remanded back to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues raised in plaintiffs’ appeal that the Court did not address to the extent those issues relate to claims that are not subject to arbitration. In all other respects, leave to appeal was denied because the Court was not persuaded that it needed to review the remaining questions presented. View "Beck v. Park West Galleries, Inc." on Justia Law
Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker
At issue in this case were three different versions of an account agreement between Appellees, who are customers of Bank of the Ozarks, and Ozarks, which holds the accounts. The agreements included an arbitration provision. Appellees filed a class-action complaint against Ozarks, and Ozarks filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration provision in the account agreement was unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a determination as to whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate. On remand, the circuit court determined that there was not a valid agreement to arbitrate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the agreement lacked mutuality of obligation and in thus denying Ozarks’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker" on Justia Law
Beverly v. Abbott Labs., Inc.
Beverly, a former Abbott employee whose employment was terminated on October 20, 2010, filed suit against Abbott. She alleged that during her employment, Abbott had discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis of her German nationality in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as well as on the basis of her disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court denied Abbott’s motion for summary judgment and the parties engaged in a private mediation. During mediation, the parties signed a handwritten agreement stating that Beverly demanded $210,000 and mediation costs in exchange for dismissing the lawsuit. Abbott later accepted Beverly’s demand and circulated a more formal settlement proposal. After Beverly refused to execute the draft proposal, Abbott moved to enforce the original handwritten agreement. The court found that the parties entered into a binding settlement agreement and granted Abbott’s motion to enforce. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the handwritten agreement was valid and enforceable, since its material terms were clearly conveyed and consented to by both parties, and the existence and content of the draft proposal do not affect enforceability. View "Beverly v. Abbott Labs., Inc." on Justia Law
Casa del Caffe Vergnano v. ItalFlavors, LLC
ItalFlavors filed suit against Caffe Vergnano, blaming the failure of an Italian cafe venture on Caffe Vergnano's failure to offer support. The parties had entered into an agreement, the Commercial Contract, which appears to be a franchise agreement setting forth the rights and responsibilities of the parties. The second agreement is the Hold Harmless Agreement. Caffe Vergnano filed a petition to compel arbitration and the district granted the petition. The court concluded that the declaration in the Hold Harmless Agreement signed contemporaneously with the Commercial Contract proves that the latter was a mere sham to help Hector Rabellino obtain a visa. Therefore, the court concluded that the Commercial Contract was not a contract and is thus unenforceable. Because the court found that the document the parties described as the Commercial Contract was a sham, the arbitration clause is no more enforceable than any other provision in that document. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Casa del Caffe Vergnano v. ItalFlavors, LLC" on Justia Law
Gross v. GGNSC Southaven, LLC
After Pauline Tillman Wagner and Ida Roberson died in Mississippi nursing homes run by Golden Living Southaven and Golding Living Center Batesville, Wagner's son (Sammy Gross) and Roberson's daughter (Shirley Cotton) filed suit against the nursing homes. After removal to federal court, the district court subsequently denied Southaven and Batesville's motion to compel arbitration based on arbitration agreements that the adult children had signed for their mothers when admitting them to the homes. The court held that the Mississippi Supreme Court would not adopt the district court’s formal device requirement and would instead permit parties to establish the existence of an agency relationship with other types of evidence. The court concluded that Gross's sworn testimony is competent evidence on the question of Gross’s agency and its scope. Because the existence and scope of an actual agency relationship is a question of fact the district court did not reach, the court could not decide the actual agency issue as a matter of law. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court for a factual finding on this issue in the first instance. Likewise, the same situation applies to Cotton, and the court remanded for the district court for a factual finding on this issue in the first instance. The court rejected defendant's estoppel argument. Finally, the court concluded that Batesville's apparent authority argument fails because it failed to put forth evidence of detrimental reliance; the district court properly rejected Batesville's ratification theory based on insufficient evidence; and the court declined to address the forum issue. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Gross v. GGNSC Southaven, LLC" on Justia Law
GGNSC Holdings, LLC v. Lamb
Appellees, former residents of certain nursing homes and special administrators, guardians, or attorneys-in-fact of former residents, filed a class action complaint against Appellants, GGNSC Holdings, LLC and related entities and employees. GGNSC moved to compel arbitration of claims asserted by five particular residents who, at the time of their admission into nursing homes, entered into arbitration agreements. The circuit court ultimately denied arbitration, finding that three of the five arbitration agreements were invalid because they were signed by individuals who lacked authority to agree to arbitrate and that the remaining two agreements were not enforceable to compel arbitration based on the defenses of impossibility of performance and unconscionability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by refusing to enforce the valid arbitration agreements based on the defenses of impossibility of performance and unconscionability. Remanded for the entry of an order compelling arbitration. View "GGNSC Holdings, LLC v. Lamb" on Justia Law
Katz, Nannis & Solomon, P.C. v. Levine
Plaintiffs and Defendant, members of an accounting firm (Firm), were parties to a stockholder agreement (Agreement) that contained an arbitration clause. The parties’ agreement to arbitrate was governed by the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act for Commercial Disputes. When Plaintiffs voted to require the withdrawal of Defendant as a director and stockholder in the Firm, Defendant opened his own accounting firm. The nature and terms of Defendant’s withdrawal from the Firm and his subsequent competition with the Firm were the bases of a dispute between the parties. The dispute was submitted to binding arbitration. The arbitrator issued a final award awarding the Firm $1.7 million plus interest. The superior court confirmed the arbitration award. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the arbitrator fundamentally misinterpreted the agreement, and (2) he was entitled to have a court consider the merits of his claim because, in the arbitration clause of the agreement, the parties specifically provided for judicial review of an award to determine if there was flagrant error by the arbitrator. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the motion judge’s confirmation award, holding (1) the grounds of judicial review in this case were limited to those delineated in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 215, 12 and 13; and (2) Defendant’s claim was not reviewable by the Court. View "Katz, Nannis & Solomon, P.C. v. Levine" on Justia Law