Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Arbitration & Mediation
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In 2013, the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima (Lima) and Rutas de Lima S.A.C. (Rutas) entered into a Concession Contract for the construction and operation of urban roads in Lima, Peru. Rutas agreed to finance and manage the project in exchange for toll revenue, while Lima was responsible for preliminary infrastructure activities. Subsequent agreements transferred these preliminary responsibilities to Rutas in exchange for toll rate increases. Social protests erupted in response to these increases, leading Lima to close a toll unit and refuse further rate hikes. Rutas initiated two international arbitrations, claiming Lima breached the contract. Lima argued the contract was void due to bribery by Rutas’s parent company, Odebrecht S.A.The District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after two arbitration tribunals ruled in favor of Rutas, finding insufficient evidence of corruption linked to the Concession Contract. Lima sought to vacate the arbitration awards, citing violations of U.S. public policy against corruption, fraud by Rutas in discovery, and misconduct by the second tribunal in excluding evidence. The District Court denied Lima’s petitions and confirmed the awards, concluding that Lima failed to prove the contract was obtained through bribery and that any alleged discovery misconduct did not prejudice Lima’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The court held that the arbitration tribunals’ findings were supported by the record and that there was no sufficient evidence linking Odebrecht’s bribes to the Concession Contract. The court also found no merit in Lima’s claims of discovery fraud and tribunal misconduct, noting that Lima suffered no prejudice from the exclusion of evidence. The court concluded that enforcing the arbitration awards did not violate U.S. public policy. View "Metropolitan Municipality of Lima v. Rutas De Lima S.A.C." on Justia Law

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Following the September 11 attacks, Kellogg Brown & Root International (KBR) contracted with the U.S. Army to provide logistics support in Iraq and Kuwait. KBR subcontracted with First Kuwaiti General Trading & Contracting W.L.L. (First Kuwaiti) to provide trailers for troops. First Kuwaiti incurred significant unanticipated costs and sought additional payment from KBR. Disputes arose, leading to arbitration before the International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR). The ICDR Panel issued a final award denying First Kuwaiti’s claim for payment and resolving all disputes. First Kuwaiti’s request for changes to the award was rejected by the ICDR Panel.First Kuwaiti filed a motion in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to vacate the arbitration award, which KBR opposed as untimely. KBR also filed a cross-motion to confirm the award. The district court denied First Kuwaiti’s motion to vacate as untimely and granted KBR’s motion to confirm the award. Additionally, the district court denied First Kuwaiti’s request for prejudgment interest on two other claims unrelated to the trailer damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that First Kuwaiti’s motion to vacate was untimely as it was filed more than three months after the final arbitration award was delivered. The court also held that the district court had the authority to confirm the arbitration award under Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act, which applies to arbitrations involving foreign parties and does not require consent for judicial confirmation. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest, as the stipulations did not explicitly provide for such interest and the circumstances did not warrant it. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. View "First Kuwaiti General Trading & Contracting W.L.L. v. Kellogg Brown & Root International, Incorporated" on Justia Law

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Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. (Cashman) was contracted by Cardi Corporation, Inc. (Cardi) to construct marine cofferdams for the Sakonnet River Bridge project. Cashman then subcontracted Specialty Diving Services, Inc. (SDS) to perform underwater aspects of the cofferdam installation. Cardi identified deficiencies in the cofferdams and sought to hold Cashman responsible. Cashman believed it had fulfilled its contractual obligations and sued Cardi for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. Cardi counterclaimed, alleging deficiencies in Cashman's construction. Cashman later added SDS as a defendant, claiming breach of contract and seeking indemnity and contribution.The Superior Court denied SDS's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine disputes of material fact. The case proceeded to a jury-waived trial, after which SDS moved for judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice granted SDS's motion, finding Cashman failed to establish that SDS breached any obligations. SDS then moved for attorneys' fees, which the trial justice granted, finding Cashman's claims were unsupported by evidence and lacked justiciable issues of fact or law. The trial justice ordered mediation over attorneys' fees, resulting in a stipulated amount of $224,671.14, excluding prejudgment interest.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's amended judgment. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law, as Cashman failed to provide specific evidence of justiciable issues of fact. The Court also upheld the award of attorneys' fees, finding no abuse of discretion. Additionally, the Court determined that the attorneys' fees were not barred by the Bankruptcy Code, as they arose post-confirmation and were not contingent claims. View "Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. v. Cardi Corporation, Inc." on Justia Law

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Docs of CT and Biotek Services entered into arbitration over a contract dispute in April 2018. The arbitrator found Docs of CT in default regarding liability, and a hearing was scheduled to determine damages. Docs of CT failed to provide required discovery, leading the arbitrator to prohibit them from presenting evidence at the damages hearing. Docs of CT's counsel withdrew, and no new counsel appeared. The arbitrator communicated directly with Docs of CT's representative, Dr. Sidana, who was not allowed to present evidence at the hearing. The arbitrator awarded Biotek over $1.7 million in damages and fees.Docs of CT moved to vacate the arbitration award in superior court, citing arbitrator partiality and misconduct, supported by emails between the arbitrator and Biotek's attorneys. The trial court denied the motion, finding no demonstrated misconduct or partiality. The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that while the ex parte emails were improper, Docs of CT failed to show resulting prejudice.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine the standard for assessing prejudice due to ex parte communications in arbitration. The court held that to vacate an arbitral award under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b), the party must show that the conduct in question affected or influenced the arbitration's outcome. Docs of CT did not demonstrate how the ex parte communications prejudiced the outcome, failing to provide evidence or arguments that the arbitrator's decisions would have been different without the ex parte communications. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, upholding the arbitration award. View "DOCS OF CT, LLC v. BIOTEK SERVICES, LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs created accounts on justanswer.com and paid to ask questions. According to JustAnswer's Terms of Service, paying for answers automatically enrolled plaintiffs in a recurring monthly subscription. Plaintiffs alleged that JustAnswer violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and various state consumer protection laws by enrolling them in the subscription service without their consent and making cancellation difficult. JustAnswer sought to compel arbitration based on a provision in its Terms of Service, asserting that plaintiffs were put on inquiry notice of those terms and agreed to arbitrate any claims arising from their use of the site.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied JustAnswer's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that plaintiffs did not receive sufficient notice of JustAnswer's Terms of Service containing the arbitration clause, and thus no contract was formed. The court found that the payment pages and other advisals presented to plaintiffs were not sufficiently conspicuous to put them on inquiry notice of the terms, and the advisals did not explicitly inform users that clicking a button would constitute assent to the terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit concluded that no contracts were formed between plaintiffs and JustAnswer under an inquiry theory of notice. The court held that the website did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms, and the advisals did not unambiguously manifest the plaintiffs' assent to those terms. Therefore, plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration provision in JustAnswer's Terms of Service, and the motion to compel arbitration was denied. View "GODUN V. JUSTANSWER LLC" on Justia Law

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Maria Wilson purchased an insurance policy from Union National Fire Insurance Company (UNFIC) through agent Robin Wilson. The policy covered personal property at 2170A Tillman Chapel Road, which included a house and a travel trailer. Maria, who is illiterate, relied on Robin's verbal description of the policy. After a fire destroyed the house and her personal property, Maria filed a claim, which was denied by UNFIC, citing that she did not live in the house, a purported requirement for coverage.Maria sued UNFIC, Kemper Corporate Services, Robin Wilson, and others in the Circuit Court of Claiborne County, Mississippi, alleging breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and other claims. The defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction and claiming that the non-diverse defendants were improperly joined. The district court agreed, denied Maria's motion to remand, and compelled arbitration based on the policy's arbitration clause. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the defendants, and the district court confirmed the arbitration award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in denying Maria's motion to remand because non-diverse defendant Robin Wilson was properly joined. The court found that the insurance policy did not clearly require Maria to live in the house for her personal property to be covered, thus her negligence claim against Robin Wilson was viable. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the motion to remand, vacated the order compelling arbitration and the confirmation of the arbitration award, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to remand it to state court. View "Wilson v. Kemper Corporate Services" on Justia Law

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Overhead Door Company of Indianapolis contracted with Blue Giant Equipment Corporation, a Canadian company, for the purchase of multiple dock levelers. After installation, Overhead experienced issues with the levelers and sued Blue Giant in federal court under diversity jurisdiction for breach of contract and warranty. Blue Giant moved to dismiss, citing a provision in its standard terms requiring arbitration in Ontario, Canada. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the standard terms were not incorporated into the parties' contract.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana reviewed the case and denied Blue Giant's motion to dismiss. The court found that the mere reference to standard terms on a website was insufficient to incorporate those terms into the contract between Overhead and Blue Giant. Blue Giant appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Blue Giant's reference to its Terms and Conditions on its website was sufficient to incorporate those terms into the contract. The court noted that the reference was conspicuous and provided Overhead with reasonable opportunity to take notice of the terms. The court concluded that the parties were obligated to resolve their dispute through arbitration in Ontario, Canada, as specified in the incorporated terms. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Garage Door Systems, LLC v Blue Giant Equipment Corp." on Justia Law

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Billy Ford worked as a full-time security guard for Parkwest Casino Lotus from September 2018 to December 2021. Upon hiring, Ford signed an arbitration agreement that excluded claims for workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, certain administrative complaints, ERISA claims, and "representative claims under [PAGA]." In February 2022, Ford filed a complaint against Parkwest under PAGA, alleging Labor Code violations, including mandatory off-the-clock health screenings and inaccurate wage statements. Parkwest moved to compel arbitration of Ford's individual PAGA claims and to dismiss the representative PAGA claims, citing Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied Parkwest's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration agreement specifically excluded all PAGA claims. Parkwest appealed, arguing that the agreement was ambiguous regarding the exclusion of individual PAGA claims and that such ambiguity should be resolved in favor of arbitration.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement unambiguously excluded all PAGA claims, including individual claims. The court reasoned that the language of the agreement and the circumstances under which it was executed indicated that the parties intended to exclude all PAGA claims from arbitration. The court affirmed the trial court's order denying Parkwest's motion to compel arbitration. View "Ford v. The Silver F" on Justia Law

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Three West Virginia residents, dissatisfied with their cable and internet service provided by Suddenlink, sued Cebridge Acquisition, LLC, Cequel III Communications I, LLC, Cequel III Communications II, LLC, and Altice USA, Inc. They alleged that Suddenlink failed to provide reliable services and sought damages for negligence, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. Suddenlink moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement in its 2021 Residential Services Agreement (RSA). The district court denied the motions, concluding that a 2017 arbitration agreement controlled, was unconscionable, and could not be enforced.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia found the 2017 arbitration agreement procedurally and substantively unconscionable, citing the unequal bargaining power between the parties, the adhesive nature of the contract, and the complexity of the terms. The court also noted that the 2017 agreement lacked an opt-out provision and included terms that were overly harsh and lacked mutuality. Consequently, the district court denied Suddenlink’s motions to compel arbitration in all three cases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the 2021 arbitration agreement, not the 2017 version, governed the disputes. The court found that the 2021 agreement was valid and enforceable, as it satisfied all elements of contract formation, including mutual assent and valuable consideration. The court also concluded that the 2021 arbitration agreement was not procedurally or substantively unconscionable. The court reversed the district court’s judgments and remanded the cases with instructions to compel arbitration. View "Meadows v. Cebridge Acquisition, LLC" on Justia Law

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Trista Carter entered into a contract with Johnny Mack Morrow and Martha Morrow to purchase a house and 245 acres for $1,600,000. The contract included provisions for earnest money and an arbitration clause. The sale did not close, and the Morrows sued Carter for breach of contract and sought damages, including the earnest money. They also named Crye-Leike, Inc., the company holding the earnest money, as a defendant.The Franklin Circuit Court reviewed the case and denied Carter's motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the arbitration clause did not apply to disputes arising under paragraphs 11 and 12 of the contract, which included the earnest money dispute. Carter filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, arguing that the breach-of-contract claim was not solely an interpleader action regarding the earnest money. The trial court denied Carter's postjudgment motions by operation of law.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the arbitration agreement in the contract specifically excluded disputes related to the earnest money, as outlined in paragraph 12. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the motion to compel arbitration for the interpleader claim. However, the court found that the breach-of-contract claim, which sought damages beyond the earnest money, was subject to arbitration under the contract's arbitration clause. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision regarding the interpleader claim but reversed the decision regarding the breach-of-contract claim and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Carter v. Morrow" on Justia Law