In Alabama, RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC contracted Construction Services LLC, d/b/a MCA Construction, Inc. ("MCA") to build infrastructure for a proposed housing subdivision. The relationship between the two parties deteriorated, leading to a lawsuit by RAM-Robertsdale against MCA for various claims including breach of contract, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation, among others. MCA counterclaimed and also filed third-party claims against Retail Specialists, LLC, a member of RAM-Robertsdale, and Rodney Barstein, a corporate officer for Retail Specialists and RAM-Robertsdale, for breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, and defamation. The RAM defendants moved for summary judgment on MCA's counterclaims and third-party claims, arguing that MCA was not properly licensed when it signed the contract, thus making the contract void for public policy. The circuit court granted the RAM defendants' motion for summary judgment and certified its judgment as final.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama found that the circuit court had exceeded its discretion in certifying its judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., because the claims pending below and those on appeal were closely intertwined, arising from the same contract and the parties' performance under that contract. The Court noted that if the contract was indeed void for public policy, then neither party would be able to enforce it, impacting the remaining claims pending in the circuit court. As the Court found that deciding the issues at this stage would create an intolerable risk of inconsistent results, it dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Construction Services, LLC v. RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between a group of individuals and companies associated with John Logan and a mix of investors and former investors in medical clinics that Logan has run. The parties attended a mediation to resolve five separate but related lawsuits. Following the mediation, RedMed believed there was an enforceable settlement agreement, while Logan believed the mediation only created a framework for further negotiations. The trial court granted RedMed’s Motion to Enforce Settlement, finding that a binding settlement agreement had been reached. Logan appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding a binding settlement agreement. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reverses the trial court's ruling. The court found that the proposed settlement agreement lacked material terms required by Mississippi contract law, such as the interest rate and term of a promissory note, and therefore no meeting of the minds occurred. The court further found that the conduct of the attorneys and mediator at the conclusion of the mediation indicated that mutual assent to the terms of a contract was lacking. As a result, the court concluded that no enforceable contract was formed at the mediation. Therefore, the case is remanded back to the trial court. View "Logan v. RedMed, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the central issue was whether a contract for the inspection and repair of lifeboats on an oil platform, located on the Outer Continental Shelf, could be considered a maritime contract. The relevance of this classification was that it would determine whether indemnity might be owed by one corporate defendant, Palfinger Marine USA, Inc., to another, Shell Oil Company, for payments to third parties. The lower district court had ruled that the contract was not maritime. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the contract was indeed a maritime one. The case was related to a tragic accident in 2019 when a lifeboat detached from an oil platform, resulting in the deaths of two workers and injury to another. The platform was owned and operated by Shell Oil Company and its affiliates. The lifeboats were serviced by Palfinger Marine USA, Inc. under a contract which included indemnity provisions. After the accident, lawsuits were filed against both companies by the injured worker and the families of the deceased workers. These claims were settled separately, but Palfinger's claim for indemnity from Shell under the contract was preserved for appeal. The decision of the district court to classify the contract as non-maritime was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the contract was maritime, as it was related to the repair and maintenance of lifeboats facilitating offshore drilling and production of oil and gas, which constituted maritime commerce. The lifeboats were found to play a substantial role in the contract, making it a traditionally maritime contract. View "Palfinger Marine U S A v. Shell Oil" on Justia Law

In this case heard by the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming, the plaintiff, Scherri Hacker, made a conversion claim against Hacker Oil, Inc., which had paid premiums on a whole life insurance policy on her husband, James Hacker. The policy was executed as a split-dollar arrangement, with the intention that upon Mr. Hacker's death, Hacker Oil would be reimbursed for the paid premiums, and the remaining death benefits would be distributed to Mrs. Hacker. After Mr. Hacker's death, Hacker Oil received $125,000 and half the interest accrued under the policy, which exceeded the $55,048 it had remitted in premium payments.The defendant, Hacker Oil, appealed the district court's decision, arguing that Mrs. Hacker had failed to mitigate her damages by withholding her signature from a letter agreement and by asserting a conversion claim against Hacker Oil. The court, however, upheld the district court's ruling, finding that Mrs. Hacker did not have a duty to mitigate her damages. The court determined that Mrs. Hacker's failure to sign the letter agreement prior to Hacker Oil's signing and submission of a claim to the insurance company did not constitute a failure to mitigate damages. The court further concluded that once Hacker Oil committed the conversion, Mrs. Hacker rightfully brought a claim and asserted her rights. Thus, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Hacker Oil had wrongfully converted $70,372.68, the difference between the amount it received and the amount it was entitled to receive. View "Hacker Oil, Inc. v. Hacker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho ruled on a dispute between TCR, LLC, a developer, and Teton County. The developer had sought to record a condominium plat for a planned unit development, but the County refused to do so, arguing that the developer had not submitted final site plans, architectural designs, or landscape drawings for review. The developer filed suit, alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the County to record the condominium plat. The district court granted the developer's motion for summary judgment on its declaratory and injunctive relief claim and denied the County's motion for summary judgment on the same claim. The court also denied all motions to reconsider. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the County's refusal to record the condominium plat violated the Idaho Condominium Property Act and that the County did not have a valid reason for its refusal. The court also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the County on the developer's breach of contract claim, concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "TCR, LLC v. Teton County" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Brandenburg Telephone Company and Sprint Communications were in disagreement over the interest rate on an award that Sprint Communications conceded it owed to Brandenburg Telephone Company. The $2.2 million award was for unpaid fees that Sprint Communications owed for connecting local telephone calls. The dispute centered on Brandenburg's filed utility tariff which set the interest rate. Sprint argued that the tariff set the rate at 8%, and thus owed $4.3 million in interest, while Brandenburg claimed the tariff imposed a rate of 10.66%, which would result in $7.1 million in interest. The district court ruled in favor of Sprint, and the appeals court affirmed this decision.The court reasoned that the 8% rate set by the Kentucky usury statute was applicable. The court noted that while Brandenburg's tariff offered two alternatives for late payment penalty: (1) the highest interest rate (in decimal value) which may be levied by law for commercial transactions, or (2) a rate of .000292 per day (which works out to an annualized rate of 10.66%); the court interpreted the phrase "levied by law for commercial transactions" to refer to the default rate that Kentucky permits to be collected by law, which is 8%.The court rejected Brandenburg's argument that the 10.66% rate was applicable because the tariff could be viewed as an agreement between the parties and Kentucky law allows for parties to agree on higher interest rates. The court pointed out that tariffs are not freely negotiated contracts, but represent the judgment of regulators about what rates and conditions will prove reasonable and uniform for utility customers. Once regulators approve a tariff, the filed-rate doctrine prevents utilities and their customers from contracting around its terms. In this context, the court determined that the tariff's reference to the maximum rate levied by the General Assembly for general commercial transactions aligned with the filed-rate doctrine, and thus, the 8% default rule of interest applied. View "Brandenburg Telephone Co. v. Sprint Comm'ns Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota considered an appeal by Michelle Vetter against a district court judgment which found her liable for unpaid legal fees to Larson Latham Huettl LLP, a law firm she'd hired for her divorce proceedings. The firm had sued Vetter for a balance of $552 which exceeded an initial retainer of $6,000. Vetter disputed the claim, arguing that the firm had unilaterally altered the agreement's terms, breached the contract, and committed fraud or deceit. She alleged she'd been billed at $200 per hour instead of the agreed $180. The district court dismissed Vetter's counterclaim, upheld the validity and enforceability of the fee agreement (which included a provision that the hourly rate could increase during representation), and awarded judgment to the law firm for the unpaid fees, interest, costs, and attorney’s fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, finding that its conclusions were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous. The court ruled that attorney's fees were reasonable and enforceable under the contract. The court also remanded the case to the district court to determine a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees for the appeal, as per the North Dakota Century Code, which allows a prevailing plaintiff to be awarded attorney’s fees when the defendant elects to remove the action from small claims court to district court and appeals the district court judgment to the supreme court. View "Vetter v. Larson Latham Huettl LLP" on Justia Law

In a dispute between Jonathan H. Paul and Rockpoint Group, LLC, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied Rockpoint's motion to dismiss Count III and granted Paul's cross-motion for partial summary judgement. The case stemmed from a disagreement about how to divide the proceeds from a transaction involving the investment fund complex that Paul co-founded and later left. After Paul's departure, he and his former partners agreed to an amendment to the company’s limited liability agreement, which stipulated Paul would receive a share of the proceeds from certain future transactions. A dispute arose over the calculation of Paul’s share when a qualifying transaction occurred. The court determined that the dispute resolution mechanism in the agreement called for an expert determination, not a plenary arbitration. The court also affirmed that the third amended and restated LLC agreement, not the first, governed the dispute. The court ruled that the appraiser could not consider extrinsic evidence, such as legal arguments and affidavits, presented by Rockpoint in its valuation. The court further directed that Rockpoint's appraisal must be redacted to omit the offending material. View "Paul v. Rockpoint Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Randall Ewing and Yasmany Gomez entered into a contract with 1645 W. Farragut LLC (Farragut) to purchase a house. The house was in need of substantial renovations, but Ewing and Gomez proceeded with the contract based on Farragut's assurance that the house would be renovated and ready by closing time. Unbeknownst to Ewing and Gomez, the house was under a stop work order, which hindered their ability to secure a mortgage. When they requested their earnest money back, Farragut refused. They subsequently sued Farragut for breach of contract, common law fraud, and fraud under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found Farragut liable for fraud and breach of contract and awarded Ewing and Gomez $905,000 in damages. Farragut appealed the decision and Ewing and Gomez cross-appealed, seeking to add Farragut's principal, Erik Carrier, to the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decisions, finding that the record supported the damages awarded and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial and the motions to amend. View "Ewing v. 1645 W. Farragut LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Griggs & Browne Pest Control Co., Inc. (plaintiff), and its former employee, Brian Walls (defendant). Upon hiring Walls in 2011, the parties entered into a noncompetition agreement, which was updated in 2020. The agreement stipulated that, in return for his training and access to the company's client list, Walls would refrain from soliciting business from or performing services for the company's current or former customers for 24 months after ending his employment with the company.In 2021, the company introduced a new policy requiring all employees to receive the COVID-19 vaccination or terminate their employment. Walls vocally opposed the policy and was told he could no longer resume his employment. A month later, the company discovered that Walls was contacting their former clients and performing pest-control services for them, in violation of the noncompetition agreement. The company initiated a lawsuit to prevent Walls from further violating the agreement.The Superior Court of Rhode Island granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff, which Walls appealed. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the lower court's decision, determining that the noncompetition agreement was valid and enforceable. The court rejected Walls' argument that he had been improperly terminated due to his refusal to receive the COVID-19 vaccine, noting that the circumstances surrounding his departure were immaterial to the enforcement of the noncompetition agreement. The court also found that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm due to loss of customer goodwill if Walls were allowed to continue servicing the company's clients. The balance of equities favored the plaintiff, and the injunction was necessary to uphold the status quo. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff. View "Griggs & Browne Pest Control Co., Inc. v. Walls" on Justia Law