This consolidated appeal arose from a dispute regarding a purchase option within a lease agreement. Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC, and its manager and registered agent, Brandon Paine (collectively “Bronco Elite”), operated a gymnastics facility in Garden City, Idaho. The gymnastics facility was located on property that Bronco Elite leased from 106 Garden City, LLC (“106 Garden City”), and Tricon Properties, LLC (“Tricon”). The lease agreement provided Bronco Elite the option to purchase the Property five years into the initial ten-year lease term. However, when Bronco Elite attempted to exercise its option, 106 Garden City and Tricon refused to honor the option. Bronco Elite sued 106 Garden City and Tricon, seeking specific performance. 106 Garden City and Tricon argued that Bronco Elite was precluded from exercising its purchase option because Bronco Elite had breached the lease agreement by consistently failing to pay rent on time and the lease terms only permitted Bronco Elite to exercise the purchase option if it was not in breach. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bronco Elite and ordered 106 Garden City and Tricon to convey the Property to Bronco Elite. The specific performance ordered by the district court was stayed pending appeal. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Bronco Elite, however, the Court found the trial court erred in setting the purchase price of the Property in the way that it did. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC v. 106 Garden City, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court in favor of Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company in this action seeking a declaration that BAS Holding Corporation breached a condition of the parties' insurance contract, holding that the district court's findings providing grounds for summary judgment were insupportable.After an arsonist destroyed a building owned by BAS and purportedly insured against loss by Philadelphia, the insurer sought an examination under oath (EUO) of George Carney, BAS's president and owner. Philadelphia then denied coverage on the grounds that BAS refused to provide Carney for an EUO, in violation of its obligations under the relevant insurance policy. Philadelphia then brought this action. The district court granted summary judgment for Philadelphia on the ground that BAS failed to cooperate by refusing to submit to the EUO. The First Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that where the evidence unequivocally showed the BAS never willfully and inexcusably refused to provide Carney for the EUO, and therefore summary judgment was improper. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. BAS Holding Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that an injury settlement agreement between the married couple in this case and a third party did constitute a valid and binding property settlement or postnuptial agreement, thus reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings.Husband and Wife sued the manufacturer of Husband's pacemaker, among other parties, claiming medical malpractice. The couple were awarded $2 million in compensatory damages and $5.4 million in punitive damages. Thereafter, the couple entered into a written settlement agreement with the pacemaker manufacturer requiring, for purposes of this appeal, Husband and Wife to use $5.4 million of the settlement to fund a series of annuity payments. Later, the parties separated, and the trial court entered a dissolution decree finding that the parties had agreed to the allocation of the settlement funds. Wife appealed, arguing that the punitive damages portion of the agreement was a community asset that should have been equitably divided. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's determination that the annuity payments were not community property based on the settlement, holding that the agreement was not a valid postnuptial agreement. View "Sowards v. Sowards" on Justia Law

On a  Mesa Airlines flight from Birmingham to Dallas Fort Worth International Airport, a flight attendant grew concerned about two passengers, Plaintiffs.  She alerted the pilot, who, despite the reassurance of security officers, delayed takeoff until the flight was canceled. The passengers were told the delay was for maintenance issues, and all passengers, including the two in question (Plaintiffs), were rebooked onto a new flight that reached DFW. After learning the real reason behind the cancellation, Plaintiffs sued Mesa under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The airline countered that it had immunity under 49 U.S.C. Section 44902(b) and 49 U.S.C. Section 44941(a).     Given the unusual facts that all passengers had their flight canceled, the primary issue on appeal whether such conduct constitutes disparate treatment under Section 1981, whether a Section 1981 claim can exist without a “breach” of contract, and whether Section 44902(b) grants immunity to airlines for allegedly discriminatory decisions, thereby negating Section 1981’s application against airlines in this context.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Section 1981 prohibits discrimination in contracting. Section 44902(b) provides immunity to airlines in their decision to remove passengers they feel are “inimical to safety.” There is a straightforward way to reconcile these two statutes: If a passenger’s protected status is the but-for cause of the airline’s decision to remove them (such that the passenger has made out a Section 1981 claim), then Section 44902(b) does not grant immunity to the airline because the decision is not based on a fear that the passenger was inimical to safety. View "Abdallah v. Mesa Air Group" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting United States Liability Insurance Group's (USLI) motion to dismiss this lawsuit brought by Nahant Preservation Trust, Inc. to secure insurance coverage in connection with defense costs and indemnification arising from a state court action brought by Northeastern University, holding that there was no error.Northeastern sued Nahant in state court seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its rights concerning certain land. Nahant, which carried liability insurance through USLI, did not notify USLI of the suit until it wrote to USLI seeking coverage for defense costs. USLI refused to provide coverage on the grounds that Nahant had provided untimely notice of the claim. Thereafter Nahant sued USLI seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment regarding USLI's duty to defend and indemnify. The First circuit granted USLI's motion to dismiss, concluding that the "exclusion agreement" signed by the parties excluded coverage. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly accepted USLI's plausible reading of the exclusion amendment. View "Nahant Preservation Trust, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Allstate Insurance Company and several of its affiliates (collectively, Allstate) brought qui tam actions on behalf of the State of California alleging insurance fraud under the California Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA) (and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) against three medical corporations, a medical management company and its parent company, four physicians, and Sattar Mir, an individual. The trial court found the complaints failed to state causes of action under the IFPA and the UCL because they were not pled with requisite specificity, the business models alleged were lawful, and one of the actions was time-barred.   The Second Appellate District reversed the orders sustaining the demurrers and judgments of dismissal. The court explained that the trial court found the complaints failed to state causes of action under the IFPA and the UCL because they were not pled with requisite specificity, the business models alleged were lawful, and one of the actions was time-barred. The court concluded that the operative complaints adequately plead causes of action under both statutes. View "P. ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery Radiology etc." on Justia Law

A Mississippi statute empowers boards of supervisors to contract “by the year” for legal counsel. The Hinds County Board of Supervisors hired Plaintiff and his law firm to perform legal work for the County. Plaintiff’s contracts with the County were each for a one-year term. But before the year was up, an election flipped the board’s composition, and the new board terminated both contracts. Plaintiff sued, arguing that the contracts required the County to pay him a fixed sum for the full year—even if the County no longer wanted his legal services. The district court granted the County’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that no statute expressly authorized the old board to bind the new one. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the statutory phrase “by the year” gave the old board “express authority” to bind the new board.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s final judgment and remanded. The court held that Section 19-3-47 expressly authorized the board to bind successors. The court explained that the court’s research has revealed no statutes that would satisfy the standard that the district court relied on for express authorization. The court wrote that the Mississippi statute books are rife with laws that apparently would allow individual officers to bind their successors under Cleveland’s test but apparently would not allow officers to bind successors under the district court’s test. The court found that the phrase “by the year” is the kind of express authorization that Cleveland calls for. Any other reading leaves the phrase “by the year” as surplusage. View "Teeuwissen v. Hinds County, MS" on Justia Law

Following an investigation, Rollins determined that Plaintiff- John Doe violated its sexual misconduct policy. Doe was able to graduate and receive his undergraduate degree but was not allowed to participate in commencement/graduation ceremonies. Rollins imposed a sanction of dismissal, resulting in permanent separation of Doe without the opportunity for readmission; privilege restrictions, including a prohibition on participating in alumni reunion events on or off campus; and a contact restriction as to Roe. Doe sued Rollins in federal court, asserting two claims under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681—one for selective enforcement and one for erroneous outcome—and a third claim under Florida law for breach of contract. Following discovery, the district court excluded the opinions proffered by Doe’s expert as to Rollins’ purported gender bias. Then, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court (a) entered summary judgment in favor of Rollins on the Title IX claims and (b) entered partial summary judgment in favor of Doe on the breach of contract claim.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Doe’s expert from presenting opinions about Rollins’ purported gender bias and that it correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Rollins on Doe’s two Title IX claims. On the breach of contract claim, the court wrote that it cannot review Doe’s challenge to the district court’s partial denial of summary judgment because materiality is not a purely legal issue under Florida law and was later resolved by the jury. View "John Doe v. Rollins College" on Justia Law

The Day family and Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust appealed a district court’s decision to grant the Idaho Transportation Department’s (“ITD”) motion for involuntary dismissal. ITD cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying its request for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). In 1961, the Days learned that access to their property via public highways would be affected when the state highway converted to a controlled-access federal interstate highway, then known as Interstate 80. The Days entered into a preliminary agreement with the Idaho Department of Highways (“IDH,” predecessor to ITD) that allowed IDH to take possession of approximately nine acres of the Day Property for construction of the interstate. In 1967, the Days entered into a right-of-way contract with IDH in furtherance of the 1961 Agreement. The 1967 Contract included an agreement for IDH to provide access to a future frontage road from I-80 to the Day Property. In the 1990s, the State began construction on the Isaacs Canyon Interchange near the Day Property. The Interchange Project eliminated a portion of the original 50-foot right of way that provided access to the Day Property under the 1967 Contract. Because of this, ITD provided replacement access easements to the Day Property. These replacement access easements were located southwest of the Interstate. The Days informed ITD the family was dissatisfied with the replacement easements and did not think they afforded the Days equivalent access to what they had prior to the construction of the Interchange. The Days sold the property to Edmonds Groves Land Holdings Inc. (“Groves”) in 2005, with the purchase price secured by a mortgage held by the Day Family. Groves later defaulted in its mortgage agreement with the Days during the recession in December of 2008. As a result, ownership of the Day Property reverted to the Day Family by way of deed in lieu of foreclosure. After the Days reacquired the property, they had difficulty obtaining title insurance because of concerns that “the access easement was owned by ITD and [the Days] did not have any statement that the easement was for the benefit of the Days.” They sued alleging inverse condemnation, and breach of contract. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Day v. Idaho Transportation Department" on Justia Law

Two companies filed a lawsuit in federal court against two of their former employees, who had served in executive positions. The former executives responded by suing the companies in Florida state court. They later moved for summary judgment in the federal action. While that motion was pending, the companies moved for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of their federal action, which the executives opposed. The district court granted the companies’ motion for voluntary dismissal, and it denied the executives’ request for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending the federal lawsuit to that point. On remand, the district court again granted the voluntary dismissal. The executives moved to alter or amend that judgment and be awarded fees and costs immediately, which the court denied. The executives appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court sufficiently protected the executives from the prejudice of duplicative litigation by essentially inviting them to move for payment of their costs and fees if the companies ever refiled their federal lawsuit. The court adequately explained its reasoning for granting the dismissal without prejudice on that condition. In all aspects of the decision, the court acted within its discretion. View "Emergency Recovery, Inc., et al v. Bryan Hufnagle, et al" on Justia Law