This case concerns a foreclosure proceeding related to a property in Bristol, Rhode Island. The plaintiff, Steven Serenska, obtained a mortgage from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and defaulted on his payments. Wells Fargo and HSBC Bank USA, National Association as Trustee, initiated foreclosure proceedings. The plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging that there was an ambiguity in the mortgage document and that he had not received proper notice before the foreclosure.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that there was no ambiguity in the mortgage contract. The court found that the notice of default sent to the plaintiff strictly complied with the requirements of the mortgage agreement. The court noted that the plaintiff's alleged prejudice (claiming he would have paid the sum due had he received notice of the deadline for reinstating the mortgage) was irrelevant in this context. The court also found that an issue raised by the plaintiff on appeal (concerning additional language in the notice of default) was not properly presented before the lower court and was therefore waived.The court thus affirmed the order of the Superior Court granting the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. View "Serenska v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that the Pacific Life Insurance Company did not owe benefits to Katie Blevins, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy taken out by her late fiancé, Dr. Travis Richardson. Richardson applied for a life insurance policy and paid the first month's premium three days before he died. He did not sign the received policy or any required amendments. Blevins claimed that the policy was in effect at the time of Richardson's death, despite the policy not being physically delivered or formally accepted. Blevins also brought claims of bad faith, promissory estoppel, and apparent authority against the insurance company. In its decision, the court stated the policy was clear in its conditions, which required physical delivery and acceptance before the policy was in force. The court found these conditions were not met, as the policy was neither delivered nor accepted by Richardson before his death. Therefore, no death benefit was owed. As a result, Blevins' bad faith claim was also dismissed, as the insurer could not have acted in bad faith if there was no obligation to pay out the policy. View "Pacific Life Insurance Company v. Blevins" on Justia Law

In this case, a doctor, Dr. Gabriel Fine, sued the University of Utah School of Medicine, alleging that the University deprived him of his clinical privileges without following the procedures required by its bylaws. The University moved for summary judgment, pointing to a provision in its bylaws where Dr. Fine had agreed not to sue "for any matter relating to appointment, reappointment, clinical privileges, or the individual’s qualifications for the same." The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the University, agreeing that Dr. Fine had released his claims against the University.Dr. Fine appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in interpreting the release to apply to his case. He asserted that the release only applied to actions taken during a formal review process and his claims arose from actions taken during an informal process.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah disagreed with Dr. Fine's argument. The court interpreted the release using its traditional tools of contract interpretation and found no textual justification for limiting the release's application only to actions taken during the formal review process. The court held that Dr. Fine’s claims against the University fell within the scope of the release and therefore affirmed the district court's decision. View "Fine v. University of Utah" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Ryan Kratz, who had entered into a purchase agreement to buy a business and building from Donald and Carol McIlravy, failed to make the agreed-upon payments. The McIlravys initiated two eviction actions, and a separate action seeking damages, cancellation of the contract, and release of funds held in a trust account. The district court initially dismissed one of the eviction actions, but eventually ruled in favor of the McIlravys, awarding them damages and ordering release of the trust funds. Several years later, Kratz filed a motion under Rule 60(b), alleging the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction actions and seeking to vacate or void all findings, conclusions, and orders, except the dismissals of the eviction actions. The district court denied this motion and awarded attorney’s fees to the McIlravys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Kratz's appeal was limited to the judgment denying his Rule 60(b) motion and that the motion was timely. The court determined that the district court had jurisdiction over the eviction cases and that any violation of N.D.R.Ct. 7.1(b)(1) was harmless error. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. View "Don's Garden Center v. The Garden District" on Justia Law

In a contractual dispute between Blueacorn PPP, LLC and Paynerd LLC, Paynerdier LLC, Matthew Mandell, and Taylor Hendricksen, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware denied the defendants' motion to dismiss Blueacorn's complaint for negligent misrepresentation. The defendants argued that there was no equity jurisdiction because there was no fiduciary or special relationship between the parties, and the relationship was governed by commercial contracts negotiated and performed at arms' length. However, Blueacorn claimed that Pay Nerd had a pecuniary duty to provide accurate information which they breached by supplying false information, and Blueacorn suffered a pecuniary loss due to reliance on that false information.The court found that Blueacorn had sufficiently alleged misrepresentation by claiming that the defendants' false statements were made with the intention of inducing a buyer to form a new company to engage in business with the seller. The court also noted that Blueacorn's claim of negligent misrepresentation had been pled with enough particularity as required by Rule 9(b). However, the court also expressed reservations about whether Blueacorn had pled a pecuniary interest strong enough to invoke equity jurisdiction based on negligent misrepresentation, noting that nearly every party involved in a business contract dispute would have a pecuniary interest in the transaction. Despite this, the court decided not to dismiss the claim at this stage, citing the interest of judicial economy. The court left open the possibility of revisiting the motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the trial. View "Blueacorn PPP, LLC v. Pay Nerd LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered an appeal and cross-appeal related to a dispute over three contracts for deed between LAWC Holdings, LLC, and Vincent Watford, L.L.C. The court affirmed the lower court's findings that Vincent had breached the contract for deed on one of the parcels of land, and that specific performance was an appropriate remedy. The court also affirmed the lower court's decision that LAWC was the prevailing party and was thus entitled to attorney’s fees. However, the court denied LAWC's claim for damages as LAWC was not entitled to both performance of the contract through specific performance and damages for Vincent's breach of contract. The court also concluded that LAWC was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. The case was remanded to the lower court to determine a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees on appeal. The court did not address LAWC's cross-appeal regarding title to the other two parcels as it was determined that LAWC had waived this cross-appeal. View "LAWC Holdings, LLC v. Vincent Watford, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals considered an indemnification case between Nissan, an automobile manufacturer, and Continental, a brake parts supplier. Nissan sought indemnification from Continental for a $24 million jury award and $6 million in attorney fees and costs resulting from a products liability lawsuit in California. The lawsuit arose after an accident involving a Nissan vehicle, with the jury finding that the design of the vehicle’s braking system caused harm to the plaintiffs. Nissan argued that a provision in their contract with Continental obligated Continental to indemnify them for the jury award and litigation costs. Both the district court and the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the contract required Nissan to show that a defect in a Continental-supplied part caused the injury, which Nissan failed to do. The Appeals Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Continental. View "Nissan North America, Inc. v. Continental Automotive Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

In a dispute between ORP Surgical, LLC (ORP), and Howmedica Osteonics Corp., also known as Stryker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's ruling. ORP and Stryker, both involved in medical device sales, had a successful business relationship under two sales contracts, the Joint Sales Representative Agreement (JSRA) and the Trauma Sales Representative Agreement (TSRA). The relationship soured when Stryker terminated the JSRA and hired one of ORP's sales representatives, and later, when ORP terminated the TSRA, Stryker hired a dozen of ORP's representatives. The district court ruled in favor of ORP, finding that Stryker breached the sales contracts and owed ORP damages, attorneys’ fees, sanctions, and costs. On appeal, Stryker challenged the rulings on the breach of contract claims, the attorneys’ fees award, and the nominal damages award. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s holdings on the breach-of-contract claims but reversed its award of attorneys' fees under the indemnification provision. It also affirmed the award of nominal damages for Stryker's breach of the non-solicitation/non-diversion provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "ORP Surgical v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp." on Justia Law

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Court of Appeals, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying an order as a final partial judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The case arose from a dispute between the City of Elk River and Bolton & Menk, Inc. over a large construction contract for a wastewater treatment plant improvement project. The City sued Bolton for alleged breach of contract and professional negligence. Bolton responded by filing a third-party complaint against three other parties involved in the contract. The district court dismissed Bolton's third-party complaint and Bolton sought to have the dismissal order certified as a final judgment for immediate appeal. The district court granted this certification, but the Court of Appeals dismissed Bolton's appeal, determining that the district court had abused its discretion in certifying the order as a final judgment. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the district court had offered valid reasons for its certification, including that the third-party claims presented distinct issues from the principal claims and that the case was in its early stages at the time of certification. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Elk River vs. Bolton & Menk, Inc." on Justia Law

Two online fundraising companies, Snap! Mobile, Inc. ("Snap") and Vertical Raise, LLC ("Vertical Raise"), were involved in a dispute. Snap accused Vertical Raise and its CEO, Paul Landers, of poaching its sales representatives and customers, which violated non-compete and confidentiality provisions in the former sales representatives’ employment agreements with Snap. The trial court granted Snap a preliminary injunction to prevent further violations and partially ruled in Snap's favor on some claims. A jury trial on damages resulted in an award of $1,000,000 to Snap. However, the trial court increased the award to $2,310,021. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the trial court's award of discretionary costs for expert witness fees but reversed the trial court’s order granting an additur or new trial. The Supreme Court ordered the trial court to enter a judgment consistent with the original jury award. The Supreme Court also reversed the trial court’s decision granting Snap a permanent injunction. In a separate contempt proceeding, the Supreme Court affirmed the contempt court's decision to dismiss contempt charges against Vertical Raise and Paul Croghan, a former Snap employee. The contempt court had determined the preliminary injunction was vague, overbroad, and unenforceable. View "Snap! Mobile v. Vertical Raise" on Justia Law