In 2003, the Division of Highways (DOH) let out a public highway construction contract to Nicewonder Contracting. The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation (ACT) filed a declaratory judgment action against the DOH and Nicewonder, alleging that the construction contract violated state and federal law because the DOH did not seek public bids for the project and there was no prevailing wage clause in the contract. Upon remand from the district court, the circuit court granted Nicewonder's motion for summary judgment, finding ACT lacked standing. The Supreme court reversed, holding that the appropriate standard to determine if an organization has representative standing to sue on behalf of its members is when the organization proves that (1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The Court found that ACT met all three prongs and thus had representative standing to seek the declarations contained in its petition.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Doug Zink and Ted Keller appealed a district court judgment that dismissed their complaint, denied their motions, and awarded Enzminger Steel attorney's fees and costs. Enzminger Steel contracted with Doug Zink to supply components for a new grain drying site. The contract listed Zink as the purchaser, but Zink and his son Jeremy signed the contract. Doug Zink and Keller contend that they had formed a partnership for the purposes of constructing and operating the site. They further alleged that it was this partnership and not the Zinks separately, that entered into the contract with Enzminger Steel. Sometime after construction began, Zink and Keller learned that certain unsuitable components had been used in the site's construction. Zink and Keller refused to make payments under the contract. Two separate breach of contract actions followed, one brought by Enzminger Steel and one brought by Zink and Keller. At trial, the district court repeatedly questioned whether the alleged partnership between Zink and Keller was a ruse to allow Keller to practice law without a license. Keller later told the court that he and Zink had entered into an unwritten partnership agreement to share profits and losses. The court replied, "[T]he agreement that you are in is to share profits off this lawsuit which is not allowed." Neither Zink nor Keller produced any documents to prove the partnership. The district court entered an order denying all of the motions in this case and dismissed the action brought by Zink and Keller with prejudice. On appeal, Zink and Keller argued that the district court abused its discretion by denying the various motions in this case, ordering them to prove that a partnership existed, and awarding attorney's fees and costs to Enzminger Steel. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that while the district court had the power to dismiss a case in the absence of a party's motion, it must provide the parties with adequate notice and an opportunity to respond. Because Doug Zink did not have adequate notice or an opportunity to respond, the dismissal of his case with prejudice was reversed. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Kurt R. Ward, Attorney at Law, LLC, appealed the district court's order denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting the Plan Parties' (the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, the Retirement Board of the Plan, and the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation) cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. Both parties' motions sought a declaration about whether the Plan Parties had to pay the disability benefits of two of the Ward Firm's retired NFL player clients into the firm's client trust account pursuant to state court jurisdiction for unpaid attorney's fees despite a provision in the Plan prohibiting any "benefit under the Plan" from being assigned or reached by creditors through legal process. The court held that its prior panel precedent held that bargained-for provisions barring assignments in ERISA welfare benefits were valid and enforceable and that the Ward Firm had not directed the court's attention to any such intervening en banc or Supreme Court decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and held that the district court did not err in declaring that the spendthrift provision in the Plan prevented the Plan Parties from depositing the disability benefits owned by two retired NFL players into the Ward Firm's trust account.

This case stemmed from an asset purchase transaction where defendants and plaintiff entered into an allocation agreement that included an arbitration clause. Defendants appealed from the district court's order enjoining arbitration and denying their motion to stay judicial proceedings under section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. 3. Defendants contended that the arbitration clause reserved the question of arbitrability for the arbitrators, and that the district court erred in determining that the dispute was not subject to arbitration. The court held that the arbitration clause in the agreement clearly and unmistakably expressed the parties' intent that the arbitrators determine questions of arbitrability, and that the district court therefore erred in permanently enjoining the arbitration and failing to stay judicial proceedings under section 3 of the FAA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to stay proceedings under section 3 and dissolve the permanent injunction.

Ohio State University entered into an agreement for construction-management services with Turner Construction Company for a construction project. Later, Ohio State selected Turner to serve as construction manager at risk through a qualifications-based selection process rather than going through a traditional competitive bidding process. Ohio State did not require Turner to furnish a surety bond to secure the performance of Turner and its subcontractors. Three trade associations, two that advance the interests of subcontractors (ASA and ASA-Ohio) and one that advances the interests of sureties (SFAA), filed an action for a writ of mandamus to compel Ohio State to require that Turner furnish a bond as construction manager at risk. The Supreme Court dismissed the claims of ASA and ASA-Ohio and denied SFAA's mandamus claim, holding that (1) because ASA and ASA-Ohio did not establish that any of their members had been injured by Ohio State's decision, they lacked standing to raise their mandamus claim; and (2) because the applicable legislation does not require a bonding requirement, SFAA was not entitled to the requested relief in mandamus.

The Board of County Commissioners of Cecil County voted to grant a water services and wastewater franchise to two related companies, after which it approved an agreement providing for the sale and transfer to the companies of county-owned water and wastewater facilities. County residents filed petitions for judicial review of the decisions. The circuit court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment on the issue of its right to award the franchise agreements and ultimately concluded that the Board had a right to sell the county-owned property. The residents appealed, arguing that Md. Code Ann. art. 25, 8(a) prohibits the Board from conveying the property. At issue was whether Md. Code Ann. art. 25, 8(a) prohibited the Board from selling facilities that will continue to provide essential services to county citizens. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Board was not prohibited from entering into the asset purchase agreements at issue.

Plaintiffs Michael Ashby and Randy O'Brien, inmates at the state department of correction, asserted professional malpractice complaints against attorney C. Bruce Davidson to The Bar Plan Mutual Insurance Company, Davidson's professional liability carrier. Bar Plan then intervened in consolidated actions for damages filed on behalf of plaintiffs against Davidson, asserting a cross-claim that it was not obligated to indemnify Davidson for the claims of plaintiffs because Davidson had failed to notify Bar Plan of any claims against him pursuant to Bar Plan's policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to Bar Plan. The Supreme Court held that Davidson's failure to comply with Bar Plan's policy was not dispositive because plaintiffs opposed summary judgment on grounds of waiver and estoppel. The Court then reversed summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of fact remained regarding whether Bar Plan's misrepresentation of valid coverage resulted in plaintiffs sustaining actual detriment. Remanded.

BancInsure, Inc. appealed a declaratory judgment in favor of Columbian Financial Corporation and a former director, Carl McCaffree (collectively the Insureds). The insurance policy at issue here was a "claims-made" policy covered any claim made to BancInsure against any Columbian officer or director for a "Wrongful Act" as defined by the policy. A disputed provision of the policy pertained to the scope of coverage if Columbian was placed in receivership or otherwise ceased to engage in active banking business. The parties interpreted the provision differently. The Insureds contended that if Columbian went into receivership, the policy covered all claims made through the end of the original policy period, although only for Wrongful Acts committed before the receivership. BancInsure contended that the policy covered only claims made before the receivership. The operation of the disputed provision became relevant in August 2008 when the Kansas State Bank Commissioner declared Columbian insolvent and appointed the FDIC as its receiver. Soon thereafter, Columbianâs management sent BancInsure a letter to notify it of potential claims by the FDIC and others. The parties disputed many of the claims against Columbian which led to Columbian filing suit to the district court to determine which claims were covered under the policy. The sole issue on appeal to the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court had jurisdiction. Though no party disputed jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit found that there was no actual controversy between the parties when the district court below rendered its judgment. The court therefore lacked jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower courtâs decision and remanded to case with instructions to the court to vacate its judgment.

Petitioner Brady Farr appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Respondents The Gulf Agency, Orange Beach Insurance Agency and Lexington Insurance Company. Mr. Farr finished renovating his house in 2003. In 2004, he decided to sell his property to a developer who wished to turn the property into condominiums. In anticipation of the sale, Mr. Farr obtained a $1 million loan, secured by a mortgage. As part of the loan process, the mortgage company ordered an appraisal of the property. The property was appraised at $1.3 million and the improvements were valued at $313,000. In 2004, Mr. Farr contacted Orange Beach to insure the property against "total loss." Lexington, acting as Orange Beach's agent, submitted an insurance application for policy limits based on the appraisal to The Gulf Agency, who ultimately served as underwriter for the policy. In the fall of 2004, Mr. Farr was concerned that the policy limits were not sufficient to adequately cover a total loss of the property. In September, Mr. Farr's concerns were realized when Hurricane Ivan destroyed the property. He filed a claim with Orange Beach. In November, Mr. Farr sold his property for $1.18 million. The sales agreement was amended to reflect the total loss he suffered as a result of the hurricane. Lexington's adjuster visited the property to determine the cause of Mr. Farr's loss. The adjuster found the hurricane was the "proximate cause". Lexington subsequently paid Mr. Farr $50,000 for the damage. Alleging that the policy did not provide adequate coverage and that Lexington failed to pay the proper benefits under the policy, Mr. Farr sued the insurance companies for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, conspiracy, and bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim. The trial court granted the companies' motion for summary judgment, finding that some of Mr. Farr's claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment pertaining to Mr. Farr's tort claims. The Court found that those claims were indeed barred by a statute of limitations. The Court however found that the breach of contract and bad faith claims should not have been dismissed through summary judgment. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) appealed a trial courtâs order that denied its "renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law" in its case against J-Mar Machine & Pump. J-Mar is a repair shop that held a commercial liability and property insurance policy with Nationwide. In 2004, in anticipation of its policy renewal, Nationwide sent an inspector to the shop. In his report, the inspector noted several safety hazards and a messy shop. The insurance policy was renewed in March but several months later Nationwide cancelled the policy. Nationwide cited the inspectorâs report as reason for the cancellation. J-Mar management was not aware of the cancellation until late that year when shop property was stolen. When it tried to file a claim, Nationwide declined J-Marâs claim. A jury trial was held on the disputed policy cancellation and coverage. At the close of J-Marâs case, Nationwide moved the court for a "judgment as a matter of law" which was denied. Nationwide unsuccessfully motioned again at the close of all evidence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the evidence J-Mar presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury verdict in its favor. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial courtâs judgment denying Nationwideâs motion and rendered a judgment in Nationwideâs favor.