After being diagnosed with fibromyalgia, chronic pain, anxiety, and depression, plaintiff was awarded long-term disability benefits under an employee benefit plan issued and administered by defendant. Benefits were discontinued about 24 months later, when defendant determined that plaintiff had received all to which she was entitled under the planâs self-reported symptoms limitation. Because plaintiff had retroactively received social security benefits, defendant also sought to recoup equivalent overpayments as provided by the plan. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part and remanded for reinstatement. The self-reported symptom limitation violates ERISA, 29 U.S.C., 1022; the policy sets out that long-term benefits will be discontinued after 24 months if disability is due to mental illness or substance abuse, but does not mention that the time limitation applies if a participantâs disability is based primarily on self-reported symptoms. The Social Security Act does not bar recovery of overpayments occasioned by receipt of social security benefits.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint against his former employer, seeking monetary and equitable relief for alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621, et seq., and state law. At issue was whether the separation agreement between the parties was unenforceable because its provisions did not comply with the requirements of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), 29 U.S.C. 626(f), and applicable Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations, that the separation agreement be written in a manner calculated to be understood. The court held that the separation agreement was written in a manner calculated to be understood by the relevant employees of defendant. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that summary judgment should have been denied because there were genuine issues of fact to be tried and that the separation agreement was unenforceable because plaintiff was not advised in writing to consult with an attorney. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

One of the subsidiaries of Annett Holdings was a trucking company that employed Michael Vititoe as a driver. Vititoe was given a Comdata credit card to purchase fuel. Comdata had a written contract with Kum & Go that enabled the Kum & Go truck stop from which Vititoe purchased fuel to handle Comdata transactions. For four years, Vititoe used the Comdata credit card at the Kum & Go truck stop to obtain cash while reporting purchases of fuel. After the fraud was discovered, Vititoe was arrested and convicted of theft. Annett Holdings sued Kum & Go for negligence and breach of contract as an alleged third-party beneficiary of the contract between Kum & Go and Comdata. The district court granted summary judgment to Kum & Go, (1) finding the negligence claim was barred by the economic loss rule; and (2) rejecting the breach of contract claim on the ground that Annett was not an intended beneficiary of the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Kum & Go on both claims.

George Sonnett, Jr. and Wendy Burgers-Sonnett purchased twenty acres of land and improvements from Elk Ridge Lodge, which Elk Ridge conveyed by warranty deed. The Sonnetts financed part of the purchase price by giving Elk Ridge a promissory note secured by a mortgage on the property. After the Sonnetts defaulted on the note, Elk Ridge filed suit against the Sonnetts seeking judgment and foreclosure on the property, and the Sonnetts filed counterclaims alleging breach of warranty. Both parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Elk Ridge on its foreclosure claim and denied Elk Ridge's request for attorneys' fees. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions in both appeals, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Elk Ridge and in denying summary judgment to the Sonnetts on their counterclaim of breach of warranty; (2) the record did not support the applicability of the Sonnetts' equitable defenses of equitable estoppel, waiver, or laches; and (3) the district court reasonably concluded that Elk Ridge was not entitled to attorneys' fees.

Plaintiff ClearOne Communications, Inc. (ClearOne) filed suit against Defendants Andrew Chiang, Jun Yan, Lonny Bowers, WideBand Solutions, Inc. and Versatile DSP, Inc. (collectively the WideBand Defendants), alleging misappropriation of trade secrets. Mssrs. Chiang, Yan and Bowers are all former engineers of ClearOne who had a hand in developing "acoustic echo cancelling" technology. The court ordered an injunction against the former engineers for their part in transferring the assets of WideBand to a "new, sham company" under the control of Donald Bowers. In this case, Donald Bowers as an Interested Nonparty appealed from an order of contempt issued against him by the district court for violation of the injunction. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Mr. Bowers made no attempt to explain how the court abused its discretion in issuing the contempt order. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.

In 2001, Plaintiff Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. and Defendants the Kootenai County Sheriff and Board of Commissioners entered into a settlement agreement setting forth procedures for how inmates at the county jail would be informed of and obtain bail bonds. Allied brought suit alleging several claims including breach of the settlement agreement. The district court dismissed Allied's claims. Principal among them was Allied's contention that the Sheriff wrongfully diverted Allied's potential customers away from Allied, toward credit card companies, with the intent to harm Allied's business. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Allied ran afoul of the technical pleading requirements of the legal authorities it used to support its claims. As such, the Court held that the district court properly dismissed Allied's claims against Defendants.

Defendants Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon, Mid-Century Insurance Company and Truck Insurance Exchange (Farmers) petitioned the Supreme Court to reconsider an opinion that affirmed a trial court's judgment against it for approximately $8.9 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Farmers contended that the Court's resolution of certain state law issues violated its federal due process rights. Farmers was required by statute and contract to provide personal injury protection to its insureds by covering all reasonable and necessary medical expenses within a year of the insured's injury. Plaintiff Mark Strawn filed a class action suit against Farmers, alleging that Farmers' claims handling process breached its contractual obligations to its insureds. According to Farmers, the Court, in its prior decision, created an "irrebuttable presumption" that altered what was required under state law to prove a fraud claim in a class action in a way that violated due process. The Court held that "Farmers's argument misses the mark" by characterizing the Court's conclusion in its prior holding as "novel" by "assuming the answer to one of the legal questions that [the] Court had to resolve." The Court concluded that Farmers' premises on appeal were incorrect, and that "Farmers's legal arguments therefore fail."

This case stemmed from a collective bargaining agreement executed in 1998 by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the American Federation of Government Employees, Council of Prison Locals No. 33. The Bureau petitioned for a review of a decision of the Federal Labor Relations Authority holding that the Bureau had a duty to bargain over its implementation of a "mission critical" standard for staffing federal correctional institutions. The court held that because the Authority unreasonably concluded the mission critical standard was not "covered by" the collective bargaining agreement between the Bureau and its employees' union, the court granted the petition and vacated the Authority's decision.

Appellant charged his former employer, the Small Business Administration (SBA), with discrimination and the parties subsequently entered a settlement agreement where one of the terms of the settlement agreement required the SBA to provide neutral references when potential employers inquired about appellant. Appellant claimed that the SBA materially breached that requirement and sued the SBA in district court. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for the SBA, concluding that there was no material breach of the settlement agreement. The court held that, although the SBA employee's comment at issue could have constituted a breach because he did not simply refer the potential employer to Human Resources, the court agreed with the district court that the breach was not material because the employee's description of appellant was positive, or at worst, neutral. Accordingly, summary judgment for the SBA was affirmed.

This appeal stemmed from an action filed by nine professional football players and one prospective football player (Players) against the National Football League and its 32 separately-owned clubs (NFL or League). On March 11, 2011, a collective bargaining agreement between the League and a union representing professional football players expired and the League made known that if a new agreement was not reached before the expiration date, then it would implement a lockout of players, during which athletes would not be paid or permitted to use club facilities. The Players, aware of the League's strategy, opted to terminate the union's status as their collective bargaining agent as of 4:00 p.m. on March 11, just before the agreement expired. Later that day, the Players filed an action in the district court alleging that the lockout planned by the League would constitute a group boycott and price-fixing agreement that would violate Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and alleging other violations of the antitrust laws and state common law. The League proceeded with its planned lockout on March 12, 2011 and the Players moved for a preliminary injunction in the district court, urging the court to enjoin the lockout as an unlawful group boycott that was causing irreparable harm to the Players. The district court granted a preliminary injunction and the League appealed. The court held that the injunction did not conform to provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. 101 et seq., where Section 4(a) of the Act deprived a federal court of power to issue an injunction prohibiting a party to a labor dispute from implementing a lockout of its employees. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order and declined to reach the other points raised by the League on appeal.