David Miller purchased a home owned by respondents Linda Lankow and Jim Betz. The home had previously been extensively remediated because of moisture intrusion damage. Respondents Donnelly Brothers and Total Service Company and defendant Diversified Contractors, Inc. did the remediation work. After discovering and notifying respondents and defendants of additional moisture intrusion damage, buyer began to repair the home. Buyer then commenced an action against respondents and defendant to recover damages. The district court excluded buyer's expert witness evidence as a sanction for the spoliation of evidence that resulted from buyer starting to make repairs to his home. The court then granted respondents' summary judgment motion on the basis that buyer could not make a prima facie case without the expert evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the duty of a custodial party to preserve evidence may be discharged when the custodial party has a legitimate need to destroy the evidence and gives the noncustodial party notice sufficient to enable the noncustodial party to protect itself against the loss of the evidence.

Employee was injured while working in Minnesota for Wisconsin-based Employer. Employee applied for Wisconsin and Minnesota workers' compensation benefits. Employer's insurance company, Travelers Insurance, covered the Wisconsin benefits but denied the claim for Minnesota benefits based on an exclusion of Minnesota coverage in Employee's policy. Employee then filed a claim for Minnesota benefits with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry. After settling the claim, the Department pursued a petition for reimbursement it had filed against Employer. A compensation judge found that Employer was not insured for Minnesota workers' compensation liability and ordered Employer to reimburse the Department. The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that Employer was entitled to coverage from Travelers under the reasonable expectations doctrine. On review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of a recent Court decision clarifying that the doctrine should not be used to provide coverage in contravention of unambiguous policy terms. On remand, the WCCA again reversed the compensation judge. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the WCCA had no authority to declare unambiguous language of an insurance contract to be invalid and unenforceable because the exclusion conflicted with Wisconsin statutory provisions and public policy.

While Timothy Allen worked as a sales associate for respondent Burnet Realty, he executed agreements to participate in respondent's legal administration program (LA Program). Under the LA Program contracts, Allen and respondent agreed to an allocation of expenses should a dispute arise related to Allen's work for respondent. In litigation commenced after he stopped working for respondent, Allen claimed that respondent violated Minn. Stat. 60K.47 because the LA Program contracts were insurance, and, as a result, respondent was required to be, but was not, authorized to engage in the business of insurance in Minnesota. Allen also claimed other relief on the basis that the contracts were insurance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of respondent, concluding that the contracts were not contracts of insurance. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to respondent, holding that the LA Program was not "insurance" under statutory definitions on statute or case law.

Plaintiff, a natural gas supplier, and defendants, a natural gas distributor and its executive, had a written contract. The relationship unraveled in the face of a failed acquisition, several million dollars' worth of unpaid invoices, and frequent disputes over pricing, inflamed by allegations that natural gas suppliers were manipulating the indices on which natural gas price quotes are based. The district court granted plaintiff summary judgment and ultimately issued a Rule 54(b) judgment on contract and guaranty claims and rejecting counterclaims. The court awarded $8,929,449 in pre-judgment interest on top of its damages of $13,693,943. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning exclusion of an affidavit submitted by defendant, the alleged existence of additional oral contracts, an implied agreement to waive interest, and the sufficiency of evidence. Without something linking defendant's downfall to plaintiff's divulgence or inappropriate use of information in violation of the confidentiality agreement, there was no issue warranting trial on that claim. There was insufficient evidence of price discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(a).

The insurance company sought a declaratory judgment that a plane crash that killed five people did not trigger coverage under a fleet insurance policy issued to an aircraft maintenance and charter company. The policy identifies the company's clients (including Wyndham) as "named insureds" and as "insured owners," but Wyndham did not participate in its negotiation. Wyndham filed a counterclaim seeking coverage. The crash involved a plane rented by a Wyndham employee to attend a work-related meeting, but did not involve the charter company in any way. The court held that Wyndham was entitled to coverage. The Third Circuit reversed. New Jersey law allows reformation, on the basis of mutual mistake, against a party that did not participate in negotiation of a contract and the insurance company sufficiently pled mutual mistake. Although the contract appears to provide third parties with coverage when using aircraft without the charter company's involvement, both contracting parties believed that the language did not expand coverage to entities unaffiliated with the charter company, such as Wyndham. The premium went down with the addition of the language at issue because the intent was to limit coverage for to aircraft owned, used by, or at the direction of the charter company.

This case stemmed from the replevin actions filed by Klein Bank against debtors. Klein Bank appealed from the Orders of the Bankruptcy Court denying its motions to remand its replevin actions which had been removed from the state court to the bankruptcy court. In denying the motions, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that replevin actions were core proceedings. While this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court clarified that core proceedings were limited to those "arising under or arising in" a bankruptcy case. Based on that, the court now concluded that the matters involved in the replevin actions were not core proceedings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for further findings on the question of whether the court was required to abstain under 28 U.S.C. 1334(c)(2).

Appellant, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, sued appellee, a Spanish corporation with its principal place of business in Barcelona, Spain, for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. At issue was whether the district court properly granted appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, declined to reach the forum-non-conveniens argument, and denied the motion for failure to state a claim. The court held that the proper application of the five-factor test set forth in Johnson v. Arden supported hearing the present case in Missouri. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings. As a preliminary matter, the court held that it would address the forum-non-conveniens argument because no additional facts were needed to resolve the issue. The court held, however, that because the plaintiff's choice of forum was entitled to significant deference and because the public-interest factors favor deciding the case in Missouri, the court did not find that the present case presented the exceptional circumstances necessary to invoke the doctrine of forum-non-conveniens. Therefore, the court denied appellee's motion to dismiss based on this ground. The court further held that in denying appellee's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the district court did so without analysis and without prejudice. Therefore, the issue should be left for the district court to consider on remand.

The underlying dispute in this case involved a contract and tort action brought by homeowners in a subdivision against certain homebuilders, including the Kerckhoff defendants. The trial court ordered that the case be referred to mediation. The parties were unable to agree to terms in a written settlement agreement at the conclusion of the mediation. The homeowners and some defendants then filed motions to enforce settlement and motions for sanctions against the Kerckhoffs, alleging the Kerckhoffs acted in bad faith during the mediation. The trial court entered an order denying the motions to enforce settlement but granted the motions for sanctions. The Kerckhoffs filed a motion with the trial court requesting that its order be certified as final and appealable, and the court entered an order finding that its prior ruling imposing sanctions was final for purposes of appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. The Supreme Court granted transfer and dismissed the appeal, holding that because the trial court's order imposing sanctions did not dispose of a "claim for relief," the trial court certification of its order as final and appealable under Mo. R. Civ. P. 74.01 was ineffectual.

This case involved a dispute between Companion Property (Companion) and Casualty Insurance Company and Triple H Debris Removal, Inc. (Triple H) over the cancellation of a workers' compensation insurance policy based on an unpaid premium. The case was tried to a jury and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Companion. On appeal, Triple H claimed that the district court erred in denying its motion to take judicial notice of an agency relationship, that the district court erred in denying Triple H's motion for a directed verdict, that the district court erred in instructing the jury, and that the jury's verdict and the district court's order in favor of Companion were not supported by sufficient evidence. The court held that due to the nature of the summary judgment proceedings and the district court's cautionary belief that the agency issue remained a litigated issue for the jury's determination, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Triple H's motion to take judicial notice. The court also held that the district court properly instructed the jury concerning the issues of agency, breach of contract, and ambiguity of contract and that any error, if present, was harmless. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Companion properly canceled Policy Two and that Triple H failed to raise a bona fide dispute as to the premium owed. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

In 2007, Massachusetts Defendant No. 1 Steel Products, Inc. (No. 1 Steel) was a subcontractor on a construction project at a health rehabilitation center in Massachusetts (Cape Regency project). While working on the project, No. 1 Steel determined that it needed to hire out some of the steel fabrication for which it was responsible. No. 1 Steel found Alabama Plaintiff Garrison Steel Fabricators, Inc. (Garrison). No. 1 Steel was dissatisfied with Garrison's work and refused to pay Garrison anything beyond what it had previously paid. In an attempt to collect the remaining amount owed, Garrison sent No. 1 Steel notice that it intended to file mechanic's liens on the project unless it was paid. Upon receiving the notice, No. 1 Steel filed a motion in Massachusetts court to discharge and release the not-yet-filed-lien, arguing that Garrison was not registered to do business in Massachusetts and that no written contract of the parties' agreement existed. The Massachusetts court granted the motion without stating a rationale. In 2009 Garrison sued No. 1 Steel in Alabama court, asserting claims of open account, implied contract and labor and work performed. No. 1 Steel moved to dismiss, arguing a lack of personal jurisdiction. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found the "specific contacts" No. 1 Steel had were not sufficient enough that it should have anticipated being haled into court in Alabama; No. 1 Steel's relationship with Garrison was limited to a one-time purchase of customized goods. The Court directed the trial court to dismiss Garrison's case because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over No. 1 Steel.