This bankruptcy appeal involved parties that have a business history extending from at least April 27, 2005 where appellee and the Secretary of Lothian Oil signed two agreements which would lead to proofs of claim 164 and 171. At issue was whether the bankruptcy court could recharacterize a claim as equity rather than debt. The court held that because Texas law would not have recognized appellee's claims as asserting a debt interest, the bankruptcy court correctly disallowed them as debt and recharacterized the claims as equity interests. Moreover, because insiders and non-insiders alike could mischaracterize their claims in contravention of state law, the court declined to limit recharacterization to insider claims. The court further held that the other assertions of error were without merit.

Appellants challenged the denial of their claim for benefits arising from an underinsured motorists (UIM) policy issued by appellee. Appellants appealed the adverse grant of summary judgment and the denial of their request for certification of a question of law to the North Dakota Supreme Court. The court held that the negligent driver's excess-liability policy was relevant to determining the underinsured status of his vehicle. Thus, as a matter of law, the negligent driver's vehicle was not underinsured and appellants were not entitled to coverage under the UIM endorsement. The court also declined to certify the question where the case had been decided by summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Appellants sued appellee seeking insurance coverage for damages resulting from a pipe rupture in appellants' refrigerated warehouse. Appellants appealed the district court's grant of appellee's motion for summary judgment on appellants' first coverage theory and the dismissal of appellants' vexatious refusal to pay claim. Appellants also raised several claims of error with respect to the second theory of coverage submitted to the jury, including a claim of instructional error. The court held that the district court erred in adopting the restrictive definition of "collapse" discussed by the Missouri Court of Appeals in Williams v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., Eaglestein v. Pac. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., and Heintz v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., because none of those cases addressed the meaning of the term "collapse" when used in conjunction with the expansive definition of the term "buildings" used in this policy. As a result, the district court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. The court also held that the district court erred when it determined the weight of ice on the refrigerated pipes did not constitute a specified cause of loss under the terms of the policy. The court further held that it was unnecessary to address the claims appellants appealed with respect to alleged trial errors because the only theory of coverage submitted to the jury was appellants' "weight of ice" coverage claim and appellants were entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability under that theory. The court finally affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the vexatious refusal to pay claim where the district court correctly determined that appellee could insist upon a judicial determination of certain questions without being penalized for a vexatious refusal to pay claim.

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in Nevada state court against his employer, alleging that the employer failed to pay him and other similarly situated employees overtime and minimum wages, listing causes of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 216(b), under Nevada labor laws, and for breach of contract. At issue was whether a rejected offer of judgment for the full amount of a putative class representative's individual claim mooted a class action complaint where the offer preceded the filing of a motion for class certification. The court held that where a defendant made an unacceptable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer of judgment that fully satisfied a named plaintiff's individual claim before the named plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, the offer did not moot the case so long as the named plaintiff could still file a timely motion for class certification. Once filed, a timely motion for class certification related back to the time of the filing of the complaint. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion in finding that plaintiff could no longer file a timely motion of class certification; that it erred in refusing to allow plaintiff to abandon his FLSA claims; and that it erred in holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.100 abrogated plaintiff's breach of contract claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

The company sued, in New Jersey, for breach of contract, conversion, and embezzlement, based on defendant's retention of checks worth $587,775.05. Defendant asserted counterclaims based on termination of an employment contract. While the lawsuit was pending, the company brought an identical action in South Korea. In 2005, a South Korean court entered judgment for the company in an amount equivalent to $587,755.05 plus post-judgment interest. In 2006, the U.S. district court entered judgment for the company, $587,755.05 on the conversion claim, and for defendant, $910,000 on the counterclaim. The U.S. district court declined the company's request that a turnover order include a setoff, reasoning that setoff would result in double recovery. The Third Circuit affirmed, but remanded pending enforcement of the Korean judgment. Defendant paid the Korean judgment. The district court rejected an argument that the Korean judgment should be equalized with the American judgment in the amount of $205,540.05, the difference between the American judgment ($587,755.05) and actual payments adjusted by currency devaluation ($382,215). The Third Circuit affirmed, characterizing the claim as an attempt to satisfy the Korean judgment for a second time.

This case arose when Shoe Show, Inc. (Shoe Show) entered into a lease as lessee of a store space in a shopping mall in Houston, Texas. The lease expressly prohibited Shoe Show from operating another business under the name "The SHOE DEPT." or any "substantially similar trade-name," within two miles of the leased premises. Shoe Show subsequently opened a retail footwear store under the name "SHOE SHOW" in a commercial center located less than a quarter mile from the mall in which the leased premises was located. At issue was whether the two trade names were substantially similar. The court held that, under the uncontested facts of the case and the discrete provisions of the lease, the trade name SHOE SHOW was not substantially similar to The SHOE DEPT. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

CollegeSource, Inc. (CollegeSource), a California corporation with its principal place of business in California, sued AcademyOne, Inc. (AcademyOne), a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, in federal district court for the Southern District of California, alleging that AcademyOne misappropriated material from CollegeSource's websites. AcademyOne moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and the district court granted its motion. The court held that AcademyOne was subject to specific personal jurisdiction, but not general personal jurisdiction, in California with respect to CollegeSource's misappropriation claims. Under the doctrine of pendant personal jurisdiction, AcademyOne was also subject to personal jurisdiction in California with respect to the remainder of CollegeSource's claims. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of CollegeSource's complaint and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff ClearOne Communications, Inc. (ClearOne) filed suit against Defendant Biamp Systems (Biamp) alleging that Biamp misappropriated ClearOne's trade secrets by licensing a product from another company that incorporated those trade secrets. A jury found in ClearOne's favor on all of its claims against Biamp. The district court assessed damages for lost profits and unjust enrichment, and awarded ClearOne exemplary damages, attorneys' fees and nontaxable expenses. Biamp raised multiple issues on appeal pertaining to the trial court's application of the applicable statutory authority and in its award of damages. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed all aspects of the district court's judgment except for the lost profits and exemplary damages awards. The Court reversed and remanded the case for reconsideration of damages owed to ClearOne Communications.

This case arose when appellant alleged claims of tortuous interference with contract or business expectancy and violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ark. Code Ann. 4-88-101, et seq. Appellant subsequently sought a temporary retraining order and preliminary injunction after appellee terminated appellant's patient privileges at a residential nursing home. The court held that appellant did not meet the factors in the Dataphase Syst. Inc. v. C.L. Syst., which evaluated whether to issue an injunction. Consequently, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction and the judgment was affirmed.

This case arose when Associates First Capital Corporation (Associates) purchased integrated risk policies from Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's of London (Lloyd's), the primary insurer, and nine excess insurers. Pursuant to the integrated risk policies, Citigroup, Inc. (Citigroup), as successor-in-interest to Associates, timely notified the insurers of two actions filed within the policy period and made claims for coverage. Initially, all of the insurers denied coverage, but later, Lloyd's settled with Citigroup. After the parties filed motions for summary judgment, the district court dismissed Citigroup's claims for coverage. The court affirmed the denial of coverage and held that the plain language of the insurers' policies (Federal, Steadfast, S.R., and St. Paul) dictated that their coverage did not attach when Citigroup settled with Lloyd's and that Citigroup's claim against another insurer (Twin City) was time barred.