Sellers entered an alleged contract with Buyer for the sale of property. After the parties failed to complete the sale, Buyer sued Sellers, seeking specific performance of the alleged contract. Buyer filed an amended complaint that added as a defendant Attorney, who had served as counsel for Sellers in the failed transaction, alleging fraud and other tortious conduct. Attorney filed a motion to substitute the district court judge, which the district court denied after finding Attorney's motion was untimely. At issue on appeal was whether Attorney qualified as a third-party defendant who possessed an independent right of substitution as opposed to a subsequently joined defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Attorney and Buyer qualified as adverse parties, and therefore, Attorney was a third-party defendant; and (2) Attorney timely filed his motion of substitution. Remanded.

Plaintiff, which owned a nuclear power plant, entered into the standard U.S. Department of Energy contract, under which DOE agreed to collect spent nuclear fuel (SNF) no later than 1998. DOE never began collecting SNF and has breached contracts nationwide. Massachusetts restructured the electric utility industry and, in 1999, the plant sold for $80 million; buyer agreed to accept decommissioning responsibilities for $428 million. The district court awarded $40 million for the portion of the decommissioning fund corresponding to projected post-decommissioning SNF-related costs attributable to DOEâs continuing breach. The court awarded the buyer $4 million in mitigation damages, including direct and overhead costs for new spent fuel racks and fees paid to the NRC. The Federal Circuit reversed in part and remanded. Plaintiff cannot recover damages under a diminution-of-value theory in a partial breach setting. The sale of assets does not alter the principle that when the breaching party has not repudiated and is still expected to perform, anticipated damages are not recoverable until incurred. A non-breaching party may recover from the government indirect overhead costs associated with mitigation and the costs of financing those activities.

Respondent Atlantic Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC brought an action against Petitioner Laura Lewis for negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract.  In 2003, Petitioner, acting through a leasing agent, entered into a commercial lease whereby Respondent would lease from Petitioner property located in Beaufort County.  Although Petitioner represented in the lease that the property could lawfully be used for a building and construction office, the property was zoned "rural," meaning virtually all commercial uses were prohibited. Respondent occupied the property and made numerous alterations to it. A few months later, a Beaufort County zoning official served Respondent with notice and warning of two violations for Respondent's failure to obtain a certificate of zoning compliance before occupying the premises and its failure to obtain a sign permit before erecting a sign.  Respondent vacated the property, relocated its business, and ceased making rental payments. Respondent then instituted this action. Petitioner denied the allegations and made a counterclaim for breach of contract.  The master in equity entered judgment in favor of Respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the master properly granted judgment in favor of Respondent. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner did not appeal all grounds on which the master's judgment was based.  Namely, she did not challenge the determination that Respondent was entitled to recover based on unjust enrichment.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the master-in-equity's and appellate court's decisions in favor of Respondent.

This appeal arose from the settlement of a class action where defendant paid substantial sums for res judicata protection from the claims of persons assertedly injured by the toxic emissions of an industrial plant. The monies were allocated among three subclasses, one of which was to receive medical monitoring. Upon the monitoring program's completion, substantial sums remained unused. The district court denied the settlement administrator's request to distribute the unused medical-monitoring funds to another subclass of persons suffering serious injuries. Instead, the district court repaired to the doctrine of cy pres and ordered that the money be given to three charities suggested by defendant and one selected by the district court. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a cy pres distribution in the teeth of the bargained-for-terms of the settlement agreement, which required residual funds to be distributed within the class. The court reversed the district court's order distributing the unused medical-monitoring funds to third-party charities and remanded with instructions that the district court order that the funds be distributed to the subclass comprising the most seriously injured class members.

Two brothers had a dispute over an alleged oral agreement relating to the care of their mother by which one brother agreed to give up part of his inheritance if the other brother would care for their mother. The trial court found that a valid agreement between the brothers had been reached. The court of appeals reversed on an issue that had not been raised at the trial court but which the court reached as part of its overall examination of the validity of the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals cannot reverse the judgment of the trial court on an issue that was not specifically raised at the trial court, but (2) the court of appeals nevertheless reached the correct result because the parties' agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, and thus, no action on it could be maintained.

In 2000, plaintiff sold 6600 acres of farmland for $16.35 million to an environmental organization, which wanted to restore it as an ecologically functional floodplain for the Illinois River. Plaintiff expressly warranted that there was no petroleum contamination. The organization discovered such contamination and sued. The district court awarded $800,000 in damages, some for a separate breach, failure to clean up livestock waste from lagoons. Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed and filed suit against the local drainage district, which had a right of way and equipment on the land to pump surface waters into the river. The district stored petroleum in tanks; at least one was on the organization's land. The organization, wanting to restore the land as wetlands, turned off the pumps. The district court entered summary judgment for the district. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A blameless contract breaker cannot invoke noncontractual indemnity to shift risk that he assumed in a contract. The suit is also barred by the economic-loss doctrine, based in part on concern with liability for unforeseeable consequences.

American Suzuki Motor Corporation petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant its motion to dismiss the claims filed against it by John Burns and Jill S. Hearn. Plaintiffs sued Defendants American Suzuki, several local dealerships and the dealerships' owner, alleging breach of contract based on Suzuki vehicle warranties, diminution in value of their vehicles, fraudulent misrepresentations, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs purported to bring the action on behalf of themselves and all members of a class composed of individuals who had purchased Suzuki vehicles from Defendants and had active warranties or service contracts on those vehicles. According to the complaint, new Suzuki vehicles carried a manufacturer's warranty, and that Defendants also sold purchasers of Suzuki vehicles extended warranties and maintenance agreements. In early March 2009, "the defendants closed dealerships ⦠and [that] there are no other Suzuki dealerships closer than Nashville, Tennessee, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, or Birmingham, Alabama, to perform service work on the warranted vehicles." As a result of the dealerships being closed, Plaintiffs alleged they were "constructively barred from obtaining warranty work on their vehicles." The complaint did not allege that Plaintiffs needed or sought service under the warranties on their vehicles or that any of the Defendants refused to honor the warranties on vehicles. American Suzuki filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of American Suzuki's motion to dismiss, and remanded the case to the trial court to enter an order granting American Suzuki's motion.

Appellants, three individuals, filed an initiative and referendum petition to refer a proposed ballot measure, which would have amended a city ordinance imposing an occupation tax, to the electorate of the City. The City filed a declaratory judgment action to have the proposed measure declared invalid. The district court ruled that the petition proposed a referendum measure that violated Neb. Rev. Stat. 18-2528(1)(a), which prohibits referendums that interfere with a city's contractual obligations. The electors voted on the proposed amendment. The district court subsequently ordered the county clerk not to count the votes cast and not to report or certify the results. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and vacated, holding (1) the district court lacked the authority to block the count of the votes cast because the City failed to comply with the statutory requisites that would allow a court to take that action; (2) the district court erred in ruling that the proposed referendum violated section 18-2528(1)(a); and (3) the proposed referendum violated a common-law single subject rule, which invalidates proposed ballot measures that ask voters to approve independent and distinct measures in a single vote.

Petitioner Joel Harrington appealed a superior court order in favor of Respondent Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc. (Metropolis). On May 27, 2005, Petitioner entered into a residential lease for an apartment at Hollis Commons Apartments in Concord. The lease agreement required the petitioner to pay a security deposit of $875 to be held "until the termination of Lessee's occupancy." Petitioner entered into two lease renewals, the first in May 2006 renewing the lease for one year, and another in June 2007. The second renewal called for a term commencing on July 1, 2007, and ending "60 days after written notice has been given." The original lease agreement and both lease renewals identified "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor. The parties had a dispute over the lease agreement and return of the security deposit. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in finding that Metropolis was not a party to the lease agreement, and in dismissing his contract claims. Although the lease agreement and renewals all show "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor and either Petitioner or the Petitioner and his wife as the lessees, Petitioner contended that Metropolis must be considered a party to the agreement. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Petitioner's case.

Two men bought an island. After a dispute, they agreed that one would keep the island, while the other would receive a one-time payment and an option to buy the island at a fixed price, adjusted for inflation, if the owner ever chose to sell it. Years passed, the value of the island rose, far outpacing inflation. But the owner never elected to sell. Instead, he eventually conveyed the island to his sister, as a gift. The option holder sued. The superior court held on summary judgment that the option remained viable, but that the gift was not improper. The option holder appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's interpretation of the option agreement, but because material facts were in dispute concerning contractual claims and allegations that the option holder's conveyance was fraudulent, the Court reversed and remanded the superior court's grant of summary judgment on those claims.