Timothy C. Allsopp appealed a trial court's denial of his motion for relief from a judgment entered in favor of James and Kisha Bolding. The Boldings sued Naysa Realty and Investments, LLC, Deleana Davis, Keller-Williams Realty Co., and Allsopp. The Boldings alleged breach of fiduciary duty, and three counts of fraud arising out of real-estate transactions in Madison County. Davis was a principal in Naysa Realty and was employed by Keller-Williams as a real-estate agent. Davis advised the Boldings, who were purchasing property, to give Allsopp power of attorney to sign certain closing documents on their behalf. A default judgment was entered against Allsopp, with leave for the Boldings to prove damages against him later. Allsopp argued on appeal that the evidence against him was insufficient to support the judgment against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's decision and affirmed the judgment in the Boldings' favor.

Alabama Psychiatric Services, P.C. (APS) appealed a grant of summary judgment by the circuit court in favor of 412 South Court Street, LLC (Court Street). SRS Group, LLC, owned by Eugene Sak, began substantial renovations to the Court Street building, including gutting and rebuilding the interior of the structure. Sak entered into negotiations with Make Believe, LLC, to lease space in the building for use as a gym and exercise facility. While he was negotiating with Make Believe, Sak entered into discussions with APS about leasing office space. During the negotiations, APS voiced concerns about having a discreet entrance for APS's clients and about potential noise from a gym facility in the building and that there would not be sufficient parking for APS patients and staff because of the use of the parking lot by members of the gym. Sak assured APS that the noise problem would be solved, that parking would be sufficient for both the gym members and APS, and that when construction of the addition was complete, the gym would have its own separate entrance. Sak sold the building before construction was complete. The new ownership assumed AFS' lease but the discreet entrance was not built. On appeal, APS argued that it was fraudulently induced to sign a lease agreement for space in the building. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court record contained substantial evidence to support APS's claim that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether, through misrepresentation and the suppression of material facts, Sak fraudulently induced APS to enter into the lease agreement. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Cindy Tolle sued Peter Lev for damages for failing to transfer ownership of a cabin situated on land owned by the government in a national park. Tolle also sued Lev for tortious interference with a business relationship she claimed with an employer. The circuit granted granted summary judgment in favor of Lev on both claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the tortious interference claim, but (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Lev on the claim for damages for failure to transfer the cabin, as (i) the statute of frauds did not bar the claim because an email from Lev confirming his agreement to transfer ownership of the cabin to Tolle was a sufficient writing and because the cabin agreement was for the sale of personal property, not real estate, (ii) neither the doctrine of merger nor the integration clause defeated Tolle's claim to enforce the oral agreement, and (iii) the parol evidence rule did not bar Lev's email.

For almost twenty years, Lincoln Neugebauer rented his mother Pearl Neugebauer's farm under an oral lease. In 2008, Lincoln purchased the farm by contract for deed. Pearl later brought an action to rescind the contract on the ground of undue influence. The circuit court found that Lincoln had exerted undue influence, and the court rescinded the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding (1) Pearl was susceptible to undue influence, (2) Lincoln had the opportunity to exert undue influence over Pearl, (3) Lincoln was disposed to exert undue influence, and (4) the resulting contract for deed clearly showed the effects of undue influence.

In December 2007, Kjerstad Realty brought suit against Bootjack Ranch for breach of a realty contract. In October 2009, the case was remanded. After remand, the assigned judge retired and a temporary judge presided over the case for six months. In the interim, Kjerstad pursued discovery. Once a new judge was appointed, Kjerstad requested a trial date within the one-year statutory deadline, which the judge did not grant. In November 2010, Bootjack moved to dismiss for Kjerstad's failure to commence trial within one year from the date of remand pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 15-30-16. The trial court granted Bootjack's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed Kjerstad's suit against Bootjack because good cause existed to extend the deadline under section 15-30-16.

Appellees, members of the Barbee family, were involved in an automobile accident. Appellant, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, insured the automobile. The policy contained a provision that required an action for underinsured motorist coverage be brought against the insurer within three years of the date of the accident. After receiving a judgment against the tortfeasors and more than four years after the accident, the Barbees filed suit against Nationwide to recover the outstanding amounts on their judgments. Nationwide filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Barbees' claims were barred for failure to bring the claims within the three-year period required by the policy's limitation period. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a conflict between Nationwide's limitation provision and other provisions in the policy, which required that proceeds from any other available insurance be exhausted, rendered the limitation provision unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the three-year limitation provision was unambiguous and enforceable, and (2) the provision did not conflict with co-existing policy provisions because exhaustion of the tortfeasor's liability limits was not a precondition to filing suit by the insured against his insurer within the limitation period.

These two consolidated appeals arose from the same underlying district court action in which the district court issued a final judgment against Appellants in consolidated civil cases alleging various tort, contract, and declaratory relief claims. Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment and paid the requisite filing fee. That appeal was docketed in the Supreme Court as docket number 55200. Docket number 55981 was an appeal from a subsequent award of attorney fees entered in the same district court case. Because the notice of appeal was not accompanied by the requisite filing fee, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Docket number 56473 was an appeal from a subsequent order denying a motion to set aside the judgment entered in the same district court case underlying the previous two appeals. The Supreme Court dismissed that appeal for failure to pay the filing fee. Appellants submitted the instant motions for reconsideration in docket numbers 55981 and 56473, asking the Court to permit them to pay the fees necessary to reinstate the appeals. The Supreme Court denied the motions, stating that due to limited judicial resources, failure to pay the requisite fee in a timely matter will result in dismissal.

Eric Spannbauer, a police officer with the North Las Vegas Police Department, was asked to resign by the City Police Department Association. Spannbauer resigned, signing a letter of agreement prepared by the Department. Spannbauer later filed a complaint with the Employee-Management Relation Board (EMRB) against the Association, the City, and the Department, alleging multiple prohibited practices in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 288, including gender discrimination. The EMRB found that the City and Department had committed prohibited labor practices and that the Association had breached its duty of fair representation. The City and the Department petitioned the district court for judicial review, which the district court denied. The City, on behalf of itself and the Department, filed an appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the EMRB's finding that the City and Department discriminated against Sannbauer on the basis of his gender in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 288.110(1)(f); and (2) the EMRB appropriately disregarded the resignation agreement, including the covenant not to sue, as there was substantial evidence that the agreement was a culmination of prohibited practices in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 288.270(1).

This litigation arose out of a contract between the parties in which PDNED agreed to transfer its rights to LHC to purchase shopping mall property from a third party. LHC alleged that, based on representations made by PDNED, LHC expected to lease the property to Lowe's Home Improvement. PDNED subsequently appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of LHC. As a preliminary matter, the court held that it need not resolve the choice-of-law question where the parties agreed that, with a few exceptions, no material differences existed between New Hampshire and Texas law with regard to the case and the court's conclusions would be the same under either state's law. The court held that the purchase and sale agreement (P&S Agreement) precluded LHC's promissory estoppel claim because the agreement itself controlled the extent of PDNED's binding promises with regard to the purchase and sale of the property. The court also held that the district court did not err when it denied PDNED's motion to dismiss LHC's negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations claims as a matter of law where the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support finding PDNED liable for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations. The court also held that the jury's out-of-pocket award was the appropriate measure to compensate LHC for reliance costs but that lost profits were not an appropriate measure of damages for the fraudulent misrepresentations in this case. The court finally held that PDNED could not be considered the prevailing party in this litigation for purposes of the P&S Agreement's attorneys' fees provision. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment against PDNED on LHC's promissory estoppel claim and the jury's award in lost profits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and the jury's award of out-of-pocket damages and the denial of PDNED's motion for attorney's fees.

Plaintiff owns 2,485 acres containing Indiana's only antebellum plantation and 2,000 acres of "classified forest," with endangered species habitats. A utility company has a lease for storing and extracting oil and natural gas on portions of the property. The Lease continues so long as "oil or gas is produced in paying quantities" or "the Property continues to be used for the underground storage of gas" and will terminate upon the utility's surrender or failure to make payments. The lease contains provisions to protect historic sites and to calculate damage to trees, requires notice of utility activity, and requires that the utility's use be "as minimally necessary." Plaintiff sought damages and to terminate the lease and evict the utility. The district court entered judgment for the utility, finding that a disagreement about the use of land was not an express reason for termination and that the lease specifically provided that damages were the proper remedy. Plaintiff dismissed the damages claim with prejudice to appeal the ejectment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not show that damages are inadequate to compensate for the harm to its property.