Plaintiff a law school faculty member living in Ohio, contracted with defendant (Nevada corporation, doing business in California) for publication of his manuscript, giving a Virginia address. Based on delays in publication, plaintiff sued for breach of contract, interference with contract and prospective advantage, defamation, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress; misrepresentation, and fraud. After several motions, including default judgment and reinstatement, and discovery, defendant successfully moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Defendant waived the personal jurisdiction defense and voluntarily submitted to the district courtâs jurisdiction, when its attorney entered a general appearance on its behalf.

Liberty Mutual sued Pella in the district court for declaratory judgment where the suit was sought to determine the scope of Liberty Mutual's obligation, under general commercial liability (GCL) policies issued to Pella, to reimburse Pella's defense costs in two underlying lawsuits. Both parties appealed the judgment of the district court. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that Liberty Mutual's duty to reimburse Pella's defense costs should be determined by looking at the allegations in the complaint to determine if they stated a covered claim where Liberty Mutual would still have no duty to defend even if it had to reimburse defense costs in a suit where an "occurrence" was alleged but not yet an established fact. The court also held that because the underlying suits did not allege an "occurrence," Liberty Mutual did not owe Pella a duty to reimburse its costs in defending either action. Therefore, the court need not address Liberty Mutual's alternative argument. The court further held that the district court did not commit reversible error in granting summary judgment to Liberty Mutual. The court finally held that, in light of its conclusion that Liberty Mutual had no duty to reimburse Pella's defense costs in the underlying suits, the court need not address the issue of defense costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Liberty Mutual on Pella's bad-faith counterclaim. The court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Pella on Liberty Mutual's claim for declaratory judgment and remanded with instructions to enter declaratory judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual.

Appellants Samantha Young and Rebekah Alley were injured while riding in a vehicle driven by Joshua Weeks. Appellants appealed from a judgment entered in the superior court in which the court held Weeks liable but permitted North East Insurance Company to rescind its automobile insurance policy on the vehicle Weeks was driving. Specifically, Young and Alley challenged the court's entry of summary judgment in favor of North East on its complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the driver because Weeks' mother had made material, fraudulent misrepresentations in applying for the automobile insurance. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Weeks' mother made a material, fraudulent misrepresentation to North East in obtaining the insurance policy. Remanded.

Defendant began working for plaintiff in 2006 and entered into agreements that contained restrictive covenants and an arbitration provision. In 2009 defendant left the company and allegedly began acting in violation of the covenants. The company filed suit, but did not mention the arbitration clause. The district court denied the company's request for a preliminary injunction; months later, it denied the company's motion to stay pending arbitration and enjoined arbitration. The company made the demand under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2, more than 10 months after it initiated suit. The Third Circuit affirmed. The company waived the right to enforce the arbitration agreement. The existence of a contractual "no waiver" provision did not require a court to disregard the company's conduct; its failure to notify defendant of its intent to seek arbitration substantively prejudiced defendant's approach to the case. In addition to substantive legal prejudice, defendant spent considerable time and money to educate his attorney in preparation for a trial.

Sanpete America purchased 110 acres of farmland and water rights from Christian Willardsen pursuant to a land purchase agreement and a warranty deed. After discovering problems with respect to the conveyance of the water right at issue, Sanpete America filed a complaint against Willardsen and Douglas Neeley, Willardsen's attorney, asserting various causes of action and seeking damages. Two successive district court judges issued judgments dismissing Sanpete America's claims against Willardsen and Neeley. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed both judges' conclusion that Sanpete America was entitled to no damages and judgment dismissing Sanpete America's claims, holding (1) Willardsen conveyed his portion of the water right to Sanpete America under a warranty deed, (2) Willardsen breached no covenants in the deed, and (3) Neeley's actions were not the cause of Sanpete America's alleged damages.

This action arose from a final arbitration award made in favor of defendant where plaintiff sought to vacate the award. At issue was whether the Arbitration Award should be filed under seal. Also at issue was whether the arbitrator concealed material information about past adversarial relationships with plaintiff-related entities amounting to evident partiality requiring the court to vacate the Arbitration Award. The court held that the existence of a confidentiality order did not necessarily require, without regard for whether it applied to the Arbitration Award or not, the sealing of the award. Rather, Court of Chancery Rule 5(g) controlled the treatment of that award and mandated that plaintiff show good cause as to why the Arbitration Award should be sealed. The court also held that because plaintiff was entitled to limited discovery into the arbitrator's alleged adversarial relationship with it, the court denied defendant's motion for a protective order and held in abeyance the entry of a scheduling order on motions for summary judgment.

Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. and the Board of Trade of the City of New York, Inc. (collectively, defendants), merged in 2007. Plaintiff was a member of the Board of Trade before the merger and the merger agreement required that if a member, including plaintiff, wished to continue in the newly merged enterprise, the member had to submit an Election Form specifying that preference by a stated deadline. Plaintiff did not receive the Election Form until after the deadline had passed and thereafter, defendants learned that many members, including plaintiff, had failed to submit the Election Form. Defendants waived the deadline and then, in an ad hoc manner and without notice to any member, imposed a new deadline. Defendants subsequently decided that plaintiff's Form was untimely and, of all the post-deadline-filled Forms, plaintiff's Form was the only one that defendants deemed untimely and refused to honor. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an action alleging breach of contract and the Court of Chancery ruled in favor of defendants. The court concluded, however, that defendants waived the initial deadline and also failed to retract that waiver by providing reasonable notice of their new deadline. Because the retraction of the waiver was invalid as a matter of law, plaintiff's Election Form was timely. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Chancery was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Dawn Bunch brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that Defendant Independent School District No. I-050 of Osage County (Prue Public Schools) violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the District in which the court concluded Plaintiff had no protected property interest in her employment and failed to show her speech was a motivating factor for her termination. An internal investigation found that Plaintiff âeither [. . .] wasnât properly trained or she was not doing her job as required.â The School Board in an open session, but without holding a due-process hearing, terminated Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff's complaint claimed a property interest in her employment contract entitled her to a hearing before her employment was terminated. She also alleged the termination was in retaliation for her exercise of free speech rights because, earlier that fall, she had signed a state-court petition calling for a grand jury investigation into the activities of Board members, and she had complained to friends and family about the Board. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable authority, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff's proffered evidence of discrimination did not amount to the requisite proof that her civil and constitutional rights were violated. The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgement in favor of the District.

Plaintiffs filed this diversity action to foreclose a contractor's lien and an architect's and engineer's lien against Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC (Phoenix Land) and Phoenix Health, LLC (Phoenix Health), as owners of the property in dispute, and three financial institutions with recorded security interests in the property. Phoenix Land filed a counterclaim, asserting breach of contract, negligence, breach of implied warranty, breach of fiduciary relationship, and deceptive trade practices by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order denying their motion to compel arbitration of Phoenix Land's counterclaim. The court held that the district court did not err in finding plaintiffs' motion to compel arbitration on the ground that they had waived their right to arbitrate the dispute; they knew of the right and acted inconsistently with that right; and Phoenix Land suffered prejudice by plaintiffs' inconsistent actions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the court.

Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P. ("Brigham"), appealed a partial judgment that dismissed its action against Lario Oil & Gas Company ("Lario") and Murex Petroleum Corporation ("Murex") which sought oil and gas production payments based on a claimed leasehold interest in certain mineral acres in Mountrail County. The Triple T, Inc. ("Triple"), and Christine Thompson, as sole trustee of the Navarro 2009 Living Trust Agreement, appealed an order denying their motions to intervene and to vacate the judgment. The land that contained the oil and mineral rights at issue in this case were probated in 2008 and became a part of the Navarro Trust. Late that year, the Trust executed an agreement which purported to resolve an issue over ownership of the mineral rights. In 2009, Brigham commenced this action against Lario and Murex alleging that it was entitled to a percentage of the production from the oil and mineral interests from the 2008 agreement. Brigham argued the district court erred in determining that Lario had the controlling interest in the 2008 agreement and that Brigham had no interest in the oil and gas leasehold estate in the subject property. Upon review of the lengthy trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment and order.