Tenant fell behind in its monthly rental payments to Landlord, after which Landlord obtained a summary eviction order in justice court. Landlord subsequently filed a complaint in district court against Tenant for damages for breach of the parties' lease agreement. Tenant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Landlord's claim for damages was precluded by the doctrine of claim preclusion and arguing that Landlord was required to seek summary eviction in unison with its claim for damages. The district court denied Tenant's motion. Tenant then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order denying Tenant's motion for summary judgment. The Court denied the petition, holding that the summary eviction scheme provided in Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.253 allows for an exception to claim preclusion in cases such as this one in that it permits a landlord to bring a summary eviction proceeding in justice court and subsequently bring a damages claim in district court.

Appellant Joseph Francis incurred a $2 million debt at Wynn Las Vegas, a casino. When unable to collect on the debt, Wynn sued Francis for, among other things, breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. When Wynn deposed Francis during discovery, Wynn invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to nearly every question. Wynn eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted after refusing to permit Francis to withdraw his invocation and denying his request to reopen discovery. At issue on appeal was how, in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the district court should proceed in order to prevent the opposing party from being unfairly disadvantaged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his privilege, the district court should balance the interests of the invoking party and the opposing party's right to fair treatment; and (2) after reviewing the particular considerations in the instant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Appellant to withdraw his invocation or in denying his request to reopen discovery.

This post-trial opinion determined the voting membership of GnB, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company. The parties disputed whether Firehouse Gallery, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, was a voting member of GnB. The parties also disputed whether GnB possessed an exclusive license to use the first-tier, generic domain name candles.com; held an option to purchase candles.com; and owned other assorted domain names relating to the candles business. The court held that Firehouse and plaintiff, who controlled GnB, each held a 50% voting membership interest; GnB owned the exclusive license and option to purchase candles.com and the other domain names; and plaintiff and defendant, the current principal of Firehouse, each breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to GnB and must account for the profits and personal benefits they received. The court held that defendant was not otherwise liable to GnB or plaintiff. Because all of the litigants engaged in misconduct that could support fee-shifting, the doctrine of unclean hands applied with particular salience. Accordingly, the court held that all parties would bear their own fees and costs.

This case arose when Cat Tech sought indemnification from its insurers after Cat Tech damaged several components of a hyrotreating reactor owned by Ergon Refining, Inc. and arbitrators entered an award against Cat Tech for the damage. Insurers subsequently denied the claim, contending, inter alia, that the "your work" exclusion found in the policies precluded coverage for damage to the reactor. The district court found that insurers had no duty to indemnify Cat Tech. The court held that the information contained in the arbitration award was insufficient to properly apply the "your work" exclusion. As such, the court concluded that the district court erred when it relied on the award in granting insurer's summary judgment motion. On remand, the district court should conduct any additional fact-finding necessary to determine whether the damage suffered by Ergon's reactor was limited only to those components upon which Cat Tech worked, or instead included other components unrelated to Cat Tech's operations. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought a class action against the Bank, alleging that the Bank breached its contract by charging interest in excess of the rate specified in the promissory note. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the Bank's motion to dismiss where the district court correctly concluded that the relevant provisions were clear, did not conflict with one another, and adequately disclosed the interest to be charged.

The underlying dispute in this appeal revolved around the issue of who was contractually obligated to pay workers' compensation benefits to an employee of Employer. The Supreme Court found that Employer's Insurer was required to pay workers' compensation benefits for all of Employer's employees and remanded the case. The district court entered a final judgment. Instead of filing a notice of appeal within thirty days of the district court's judgment, Insurer filed an "objection to judgment." Insurer then filed its notice of appeal within thirty days of the district court's order disposing of that motion. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to address the appeal as (1) Insurer did not file its notice of appeal within thirty days of the district court's final judgment, and (2) Insurer failed to file a postjudgment motion that would toll the time for appeal or one that the Court had jurisdiction to review.

Appellee was injured by a falling tree located near, but outside, an easement maintained by Utility Company. Utility Company had hired Service Contractor to inspect trees along its power lines and to remedy any situation in which trees or vegetation might affect the lines. Appellee filed suit against Appellants, Utility Company and Service Contractor, alleging that they were liable for Appellee's injuries based upon their failure to inspect, maintain, and remove the tree or to warn the landowner and the public of the danger raised by the tree. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, concluding that they owed no duty to Appellee and that Appellee was not a third-party beneficiary under the Appellants' contract. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the contract was ambiguous regarding whether Appellee had enforceable rights as an intended third-party beneficiary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for an injured party to qualify as an intended third-party beneficiary under a written contract, the contract must indicate an intention to benefit that third party; and (2) because the contract between Appellants did not indicate an intent to benefit Appellee, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Appellants.

Defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting and the falsification of a document. See No. 10-117 issued this date in defendant's criminal prosecution. With defendant's direct appeal pending, the government learned that he would be paid to settle unrelated civil litigation. The government moved the district court for, inter alia, a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining defendant and his attorney or agents from spending, dispersing, investing or otherwise placing the settlement amount beyond the reach of the United States while the issue was resolved. The court held that a sentencing court had jurisdiction to enforce its restitution order and could use the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), when necessary and appropriate, to prevent the restitution debtor from frustrating collection of the restitution debt. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining defendant and his agents from transferring liquid assets and in declining to dissolve the injunction until the amount to be applied to his restitution debt had been paid. As the court had vacated the restitution order in the criminal case, the payment order in this case was also vacated for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs appealed from a dismissal of their complaint, which sought a declaratory judgment that, inter alia, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) lacked the authority to bring court actions to collect disciplinary fines as imposed. The court held that the heavy weight of evidence suggested that Congress did not intend to empower FINRA to bring court proceedings to enforce its fines and that the 1990 Rule Change did not authorize FINRA to judicially enforce the collection of its disciplinary fines.

Wife appealed the trial court's final divorce decree, contending that the district court erred in enforcing a postnuptial agreement and in determining that child custody was governed by the postnuptial agreement. The court held that the trial court's authority to find full and fair disclosure from wife's extensive familiarity with husband's business dealings and personal financial condition was not altered, but was further supported, by the affirmation in the agreement that each party had "knowingly and voluntarily chosen to forego" formal discovery, investigation, and analysis of the other party's financial condition "and accept the provisions of this agreement on [the] basis of information acquired prior to this date without further such discovery." The court also held that the trial court did not base its custody decision solely on the postnuptial agreement, but expressly and properly based that decision on its alternative application of the "best interests" standard pursuant to OCGA 19-9-3. Therefore, pretermitting the postnuptial agreement's relevance and the applicability of OCGA 19-9-5, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's custody award.