After Tenants failed to pay rent for the last four months of living in a home owned by Landlord, Landlord commenced a forcible entry and detainer action against Tenants. Landlord did not respond to Tenants' request for a return of their security deposit. Tenants subsequently commenced a small claims action against Landlord seeking to recover double damages for their security deposit. Landlord, in turn, filed a small claims action against Tenants seeking damages for unpaid rent and late fees. The district court awarded Landlord four months of unpaid rent and late fees and awarded Tenants the amount of their security deposit. The superior court affirmed. Tenants appealed, contending, inter alia, that Landlord's competing small claims action should not have been permitted to proceed until she returned their security deposit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because neither the security deposit statute nor the lease prohibited Landlord from bringing a separate claim for breach of other terms of the rental agreement, the district court did not err in considering Landlord's small claims action simultaneously with Tenants' claim; and (2) the district court did not err in refusing to impose double damages, attorney fees, and costs.

JB Mineral Services, LLC (JB), appealed the grant of summary judgment declaring an oil and gas lease terminated and awarding statutory damages, costs, and attorney fees to Dahn P. Beaudoin and J. Willard Beaudoin, as trustees of the William Beaudoin Irrevocable Mineral Trust (Beaudoins). JB sought to lease the Beaudoins' oil and gas interests, and sent a lease, a supplemental agreement and a document it alleged was a "120-say sight draft" for $165,000. Later, JB sent a revised lease and a 25-day sight draft to Beaudoins, reflecting JB's claim that Beaudoins owned 3.68 fewer mineral acres than covered in the original lease. The revised lease would also have extended the term of the lease approximately six months longer than a July 2009 lease. Beaudoins never executed or agreed to the revised lease and did not present the second sight draft for payment. Beaudoins claim that the "termination date" under the supplemental agreement was January 12, 2010, which was 120 business days after they signed the lease and supplemental agreement in July, 2009. JB's position was that it had until January 20, 2010, to pay a supplemental bonus payment by funding the July 2009 sight draft. Beaudoins' counsel responded by faxed letter dated January 20, 2010, reiterating that the lease had already terminated and was invalid. JB never authorized payment of the July 2009 sight draft, but recorded the original July 2009 lease on January 20, 2010. Beaudoins sued JB to have the lease declared invalid and for statutory damages, costs, and attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Beaudoins, finding the district court did not err in concluding JB failed to timely pay or tender the sum required to continue the 2009 lease and that the lease automatically terminated by its express terms.

Plaintiff Hansa Consult of North America, LLC (HCNA), appealed an order of the Superior Court that dismissed its complaint against Defendant Hansaconsult Ingenieurgesellschaft, mbH. HCNA, an American company based in Portsmouth, and hansaconsult, a German company, are both involved in the business of detecting fuel leaks at airports. The two companies began their relationship on cooperative terms, having entered into a distribution agreement in 2001 that made HCNA the exclusive distributor of hansaconsult's products and services throughout the United States and Canada. That relationship broke down, however, and the parties terminated their agreement on December 31, 2005. In 2006, hansaconsult commenced litigation against HCNA in New Hampshire and Germany. After years of fruitless settlement efforts, in January 2009 hansaconsult again sued HCNA for breaching the 2001 distribution agreement, but this time only in Germany. Believing this lawsuit to violate its settlement agreement protocol (SPA), HCNA moved in superior court, in June 2009, to enjoin hansaconsult's German lawsuit and to enforce the SPA. Before the superior court responded to that motion, apparently out of concerns that the statute of limitations would run on its claims, HCNA filed its own lawsuit against hansaconsult in New Hampshire asserting the same claims it had brought as counterclaims in its original 2006 New Hampshire action. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Plaintiff's misappropriation-based claims, but reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff's market representations-based claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

This case involved a breach of contract claim for the sale and service of an air combat maneuvering range for use by Iran's military. At issue was whether confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of the Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran was "contrary to the public policy" of the United States under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, known as the "New York Convention," 9 U.S.C. 201-208. The court held that confirmation of the award did not violate any public policy. The court also held that the district court's judgment was a "money judgment" subject to postjudgment interest, and that a district court had discretion to award prejudgment interest and attorney's fees in an action to confirm an arbitration award under the Convention. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in part, vacated it in part, and remanded to the district court for reconsideration of the Ministry's motions for prejudgment interest and attorney's fees.

For 20 years, GEMS has been taking groups of African American high school students on tours of historically black universities. In 2008, the organization reserved 41 rooms at hotel in Baton Rouge. A day or two later, the hotel canceled the reservation. The group had to drive through the night to their next destination in Texas. The organization filed civil rights and contract claims on behalf of itself and students. Throughout discovery, plaintiffs continually missed deadlines. The district court dismissed as a discovery sanction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 37(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument that it lacked jurisdiction. Given the willful nature and volume of the discovery violations, along with the warnings of dismissal that were issued, the district court was within its discretion in granting a motion to dismiss without having explicitly warned of that possibility.

Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants for breach of duty, improper taking in violation of international law, conversion, conspiracy to commit a tort, aiding and abetting an improper taking and fraudulent scheme, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The court held that, because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602 et seq., applied to all defendants and no exception to sovereign immunity existed in this case, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendants Sedo, Inc. ad its founder, president and sole shareholder Goran Lucic, appealed a district court ruling that held both the company and Mr. Lucic liable to Plaitiff Holloway Automotive Group d/b/a Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester for breach of contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's enforcement of a liquidated damages provision in the parties' contract, but concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to "pierce the corporate veil." Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's award against Lucic as well as the award of attorney's fees.

This was an interlocutory appeal from an order of the district court denying a motion to dismiss a suit seeking confirmation of an international arbitration award. Appellant contended that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens (FNC) in favor of an action in the courts of Peru. The court reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the petition, concluding that the underlying claim arose from a contract executed in Peru, by a corporation then claiming to be a Peruvian domiciliary against an entity that appeared to be an instrumentality of the Peruvian government, with respect to work to be done in Peru, and the public factor of permitting Peru to apply its cap statute to the disbursement of governmental funds to satisfy the award tipped the FNC balance decisively against the exercise of jurisdiction in the United States.

A construction company (Contractor) entered into a contract with the State to restructure an interstate interchange. The contract contained an incentive clause stating that no incentive payment would be made if work was not completed in its entirety by December 15, 2006. After the work was completed, Contractor filed a complaint alleging that the State had breached the contract by refusing to grant an appropriate time extension of the completion date, the disincentive date, and the incentive date. The claims commission (1) found that the contract contained a latent ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract, and (2) considered extrinsic evidence in concluding that Contractor was entitled to the maximum incentive payment and an extension of the contract completion date. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract was unambiguous and did not permit an extension of the incentive date, and (2) therefore, Contractor was not entitled to an incentive bonus. Remanded.

Gibraltar brought this action against Boston Private for specific performance of Boston Private's obligations under the tax allocation provision of the stock purchase agreement between the parties. Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings under Court of Chancery Rule 12(c) on the question of how the tax payment provided for in the Stock Purchase Agreement should be calculated. In support of their respective motions, both parties argue that Section 5.5(d) of the Stock Purchase Agreement was unambiguous and that their respective interpretation was the only reasonable interpretation. The court held that the relevant portion of Section 5.5(d) was ambiguous. Since each party had advanced a reading of Section 5.5(d) that was reasonable, neither party had met its burden of demonstrating that its interpretation was the only reasonable interpretation. Accordingly, judgment on the pleadings was denied.