Defendants-Appellants Dakota Sanitation Plus, Inc. (DSP) and Peggy Becker appealed a district court judgment that awarded Plaintiff-Appellee Mark Rickert the value of his shares in DSP at the time the corporation was dissolved in December 2007. Prior to his death in 1998, Harvey Rickert operated an unincorporated trash removal business called Dakota Sanitation which had a contract to provide residential trash removal for the City of Mandan. Becker lived with and was engaged to Harvey Rickert, and she worked in the trash removal business with him. Becker, Mark Rickert, and Kim Rickert thereafter incorporated DSP, with each owning one-third of the shares. Becker was the president of the corporation and was in charge of its daily operations. The three stockholders shared the corporate profits equally. DSP provided residential trash removal under the existing contract with Mandan and, when that contract expired in October 2007, DSP was awarded a new contract for trash removal in Mandan through October 2012. Becker contended the shareholders had entered into an unwritten agreement which provided that, after expiration of the original Mandan contract in 2007, the corporation would be dissolved, Becker would receive all the assets of DSP, and Becker would acquire "the sole and exclusive right to the City of Mandan contract." At a special shareholders' meeting in December 2007, Becker and Kim Rickert voted to dissolve DSP. Mark Rickert voted against dissolution. All of the corporate assets, including the new Mandan contract, were subsequently transferred to Armstrong Sanitation and Rolloff, Inc., a separate corporation solely owned by Becker. Mark Rickert made a written demand for payment of the fair value of his shares as a dissenting shareholder. When DSP and Becker failed to comply with Mark Rickert's demand, sued for recovery of the fair value of his shares on the date of dissolution and damages for fraud. DSP and Becker answered and counterclaimed, with Becker seeking damages against Mark Rickert for unjust enrichment. DSP and Becker argued that Mark Rickert was not entitled to payment for the value of his shares because of the alleged unwritten shareholder agreement that DSP would be dissolved in 2007 and Becker would receive all of the corporate assets, with no compensation to Mark Rickert or Kim Rickert. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in its judgment against Mark Rickert. The Court affirmed the district court.

Husband and wife Emmett and Debra Jackson appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. in their action against the bank and trustee. The Jacksons challenged a foreclosure sale of their property. The Jacksons refinanced an existing home loan; in so doing, they gave a mortgage on the property which was subsequently assigned to Wells Fargo. Although the mortgage was, in turn, assigned to the trustee, the bank continued to function as the "servicer" of the loan. By 2007, the Jacksons were in arrears on their mortgage payments. While the Jacksons and the bank were engaged in negotiations for forbearance, the Jacksons did not make certain scheduled payments. During the negotiations, a debt-collection representative of the trustee sent the Jacksons a "NOTICE OF ACCELERATION OF PROMISSORY NOTE AND MORTGAGE." The house was put up for sale, and a foreclosure deed was issued to a third party. The Jacksons then sued the bank, the trustee, and the purchaser of the property alleging negligent or wanton foreclosure and breach of contract. The bank and trustee moved for summary judgment, contending that the Jacksons lacked any basis from which to contest the foreclosure sale. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Jacksons presented no basis on which to reverse the summary judgment as to their claim of negligent or wanton foreclosure, however, the Court agreed that the acceleration letter was fundamentally flawed. The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This case involved a dispute between plaintiff and other class members (insureds) and Pioneer, which was succeeded in this action by Washington National. The controversy was over the proper interpretation of certain similar insurance contracts under Florida law. Washington National appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the insureds. The court agreed with the district court and held that the policies in question were ambiguous, but concluded that Florida law was unsettled on the proper way to resolve the ambiguity. To establish the proper approach to take under Florida law in interpreting ambiguity, the court certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: In this case, does the Policy's "Automatic Benefit Increase Percentage" apply to the dollar values of the "Lifetime Maximum Benefit Amount" and the "Per Occurrence Maximum Benefit"?

John Doe filed a lawsuit arising from the termination of his enrollment as a medical student at the University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC) against the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska and several faculty members (Defendants). During the pendency of the case, all causes of action except the claim for breach of contract were dismissed. The district court determined that Doe's dismissal was not in violation of a contract between Doe and UNMC regarding the conditions of Doe's continued enrollment. The court then sustained Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing Doe's cause of action for breach of contract and thereby dismissing the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that UNMC did not breach its contract with Doe when it terminated his enrollment, and although the Court's reasoning differed from that of the district court, the court did not err when it sustained Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Defendant was injured in 2007 while driving an automobile insured under an ASIC policy that indemnifies against injuries caused by negligent uninsured or underinsured motorists. After determining that the tortfeasors were underinsured, defendant received authorization from ASIC to settle pursuant to Rhode Island's UM/UIM insurance statute, R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.1. Within three months, defendant and the tortfeasors agreed to a settlement of $1 million. ASIC refused to pay under the UM/UIM provisions and sought a declaratory judgment that the claim did not comply with a policy requirement that a claim be made within three years after the date of the accident. The district court granted ASIC judgment on the pleadings. The First Circuit certified to the state supreme court the question of whether the policy limitation is enforceable under state law. The court noted that, by requiring the three-year limitations period to run from the date of the accident, the policy may require some insureds to file suit before their claims are ripe--before the insurer determines whether it will cover the claim. The limitations period may even require some insureds to file suit before it becomes clear that the tortfeasor is underinsured.

Appellant was physically injured as a result of an accident caused by an underinsured motorist. Prior to the accident, Appellant purchased a Dairyland Insurance Policy through his insurance agent, Jonathan Schrack. Although Appellant requested full coverage, the policy did not include underinsured motorist coverage. When the other driver's insurance did not fully cover Appellant's damages, Appellant sued Dairyland and Schrack (Defendants), raising numerous theories as to why he should recover under the Dairyland policy. The district court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) Wyoming's uninsured motorist statutes unambiguously do not require insurers to provide underinsured motorist liability coverage; (2) Appellant's failure to read the policy was available as a defense to Defendants as to Appellant's negligence and contract claims against them and barred application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel; and (3) the doctrine of reasonable expectations was not available to alter the unambiguous terms of the policy.

For over twenty-five years, the State required certain employees to work forty-hour weeks while requiring other employees to work only 37.5-hour weeks. Through the employees received the same biweekly paycheck, the effect of the State's policy was a disparity in actual hourly wage. The State ended the policy in 1993, but this class action was brought on behalf of those forty-hour employees. The court of appeals found (1) the merit employees were owed back pay on their statute-base claims from the day they filed their complaint or grievances until the day the State eliminated its split-pay system; and (2) the non-merit employees were owed back pay on their constitutional claims from the day the State eliminated its split-pay system and extending back approximately twenty years. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that, under the doctrine of laches, the back pay recovery of the non-merit employees should be limited in the same manner as the court of appeals set forth for that of the merit employees.

Defendant-Appellant KPMG already was in the process of auditing Papel Giftware's 1998 and 1999 financial statements when merger discussions began with Plaintiff Cast Art. In a November 1999 letter to Papel’s audit committee, KPMG explained that the audit was planned "to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. Absolute assurance is not attainable . . . ." The letter cautioned that there is a risk that "fraud" and "illegal acts may exist and not be detected by an audit performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards," and that "an audit is not designed to detect matters that are immaterial to the financial statements." In September 2000, KPMG delivered completed audits to Papel. KPMG's accompanying opinion letter, addressed to Papel's audit committee, stated that the audits were conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. The letter concluded by observing that as of December 31, 1999, Papel was not in compliance with certain agreements with its lenders, which raised "substantial doubt" about Papel's "ability to continue as a going concern." Three months later, Cast Art and Papel consummated their merger. Soon, Cast Art had difficulty collecting accounts receivable that it had believed Papel had outstanding prior to the merger. Cast Art investigated and learned that Papel's 1998 and 1999 financial statements were inaccurate and that Papel had accelerated revenue. Cast Art sought to recover from KPMG for the loss of its business. Cast Art alleged that KPMG was negligent; that if KPMG had performed a proper audit, it would have uncovered the fraudulent accounting activity that was taking place at Papel; and that Cast Art would not have proceeded with the merger if it had been alerted to the fraud. KPMG argued, among other things, that Cast Art had not retained KPMG and was not its client, and thus Cast Art's claim was barred by the Accountant Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-25. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because Cast Art failed to establish that KPMG either "knew at the time of the engagement by the client," or later agreed Cast Art could rely on its work for Papel in proceeding with the merger, Cast Art failed to satisfy the prerequisites of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-25(b)(2).

Plaintiff contracted for satellite TV service. Equipment costs are amortized in monthly payments; a customer who discontinues service owes a fee to cover the unpaid portion of equipment cost. Plaintiff authorized a charge to her debit card should that occur. Plaintiff stopped paying the monthly charge. Defendant collected the termination fee via the debit card. Plaintiff argued that the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 407(a), provides that benefits may not be assigned or subject to attachment or garnishment at the behest of creditors, and that, unbeknownst to defendant, all funds in her account came from Social Security benefits. The district court ruled in favor of defendant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's arrangement was consensual, unlike "legal process." The statute does not authorize private parties to sue for damages based on assignments of Social Security benefits.

In 2006, BP began converting company-operated gas and convenience stores into franchisee-operated stores. From 2006 to 2008, plaintiffs purchased gas station sites and entered into long-term contracts with BP for fuel and use of BP's brand name and marks. In 2009 plaintiffs sued under the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act. Consolidated cases were removed to federal court when plaintiffs added claims under the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. They later added price discrimination claims under the Robinson-Patman Act. Before trial, all federal claims were withdrawn. The district judge relinquished supplemental jurisdiction and remanded to Illinois state court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A district court has broad discretion and the general presumption in favor of relinquishment was particularly strong because the state-law claims are complex and raise unsettled legal issues.