Patterson Enterprises hired Archie Johnson Contracting (AJC) to perform blasting on a road construction project. During the project, an entire section of rock above one of Patterson's excavators collapsed, crushing it. Patterson filed suit against AJC, asserting various claims, including negligence and strict liability. AJC asserted various affirmative defenses, including contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. AJC also filed a counterclaim, asserting breach of contract. The jury (1) returned a verdict finding that AJC's blasting caused the damages sustained by Patterson and that Patterson and its employees assumed the risk of harm; (2) allocated fifty-one percent of the fault to AJC and forty-nine percent to Patterson, and awarded damages to Patterson in the amount of $50,000; and (3) returned a verdict in favor of AJC on its breach of contract claim, awarding damages to AJC in the amount of $19,255. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) when it permitted the defense of assumption of the risk to go to the jury; and (2) in failing to instruct the jury regarding the subjective knowledge requirement set forth in Lutz v. National Crane Corp.

Plaintiffs Greenwood Products, Inc. and Jewett-Cameron Lumber Corp. obtained a jury verdict in their favor on a breach of contract claim against Defendants Forest Products, Dovenberg, and LeFors. They appealed the Court of Appeals' decision that reversed the judgment entered on that verdict. The contract in question required Defendants to sell, and Plaintiffs to buy all of Defendants' inventory, for a certain percentage over Defendants' cost for that inventory. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had breached the contract by erroneously accounting for their cost of inventory, causing Plaintiffs to pay $820,000 more for the inventory than they should have. Defendants moved for a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim, but the trial court denied the motion and sent the claim to the jury, which returned a verdict for Plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court should have granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict because the contract did not impose any obligation on defendants to accurately account for the cost of the inventory. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court in this case properly rejected each of the grounds that Defendants' raised at trial for granting their motion for a directed verdict. The Court also concluded that the additional argument that the Court of Appeals relied on in reversing the trial court was not preserved, and therefore reversed the appellate court's decision overturning the trial court.

After both plaintiff and her employer purported to terminate plaintiff's employment contract, the employer sought a declaratory judgment in the court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, concerning a release that it wanted plaintiff to sign. While the case was pending, plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The district court dismissed without prejudice. After the declaratory judgment action was resolved in favor of the employee, the court denied a motion to set aside the dismissal. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the case does not present the extraordinary circumstances required under the Colorado River doctrine to justify surrender of federal jurisdiction.

Landlord leased commercial real property to Tenant. Landlord granted Tenant permission to renovate the property on the condition that Tenant would pay for the renovations. Tenant thereafter contracted with Contractor to perform the work. When Tenant defaulted on its payments to Contractor, Contractor filed a lien against Landlord's property. Contractor thereafter filed a complaint against Landlord and Tenant, asserting various claims and seeking to foreclose on its lien. The district court granted Landlord's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, pursuant to Wyoming's lien statutes, a valid mechanic's lien did not exist because Landlord did not agree to pay for the renovations to the property and that Tenant was not acting as Landlord's agent in contracting for the improvements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-2-105(a)(ii) to require a finding of agency between the landlord and tenant before a mechanic's lien may attach to the landlord's property for work performed at the tenant's behest; and (2) in this case, that relationship did not exist.

Amber Williams and Frederick Ormsby, who were not married, lived together in a house Amber received through her divorce settlement. Frederick eventually paid the remaining mortgage balance, and Amber gave him title to the property by executing a quitclaim deed. As a result of a later separation, Amber and Frederick signed a document in March 2005 to sell the house and allocate the proceeds. The couple subsequently tried to reconcile and, in June 2005, they signed a second document, purportedly making themselves equal partners in the house and providing for property disposition in the event that their relationship ended. After their relationship ended, the parties filed suit against each other. The trial court determined that the March 2005 agreement was supported by consideration but that the June 2005 agreement was not and held that title to the property was vested in Frederick exclusively. The federal court of appeals reversed, concluding that moving into home with another and resuming a relationship can constitute consideration sufficient to support a contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that merely moving into a home with another while engaging in a romantic relationship is not consideration for the formation of a contract.

Shipping Point Marketing (SPM), an independent shipper, and three other independent shippers engaged Western Brokerage (Western) to arrange for he transportation of produce from Arizona to Pennsylvania and New York. Hotfoot Logistics (Hotfoot), a transportation broker in Arkansas, agreed to transport the produce through Freight Ambulance (Freight), its carrier. Freight delivered the produce, but Hotfoot allegedly was not paid for the freight charges. Hotfoot and Freight filed suit against SPM, the other shippers, and Western for breach of contract and David and Louis Fishgold for fraud. Western and other shippers were dismissed on various grounds. The circuit court then dismissed the complaint on the basis that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed Hotfoot's and Freight's appeal without prejudice for lack of a final, appealable order, as a named defendant, one of the independent shippers, was never dismissed from the case.

In this appeal the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the parties' indemnity agreement clearly and unequivocally indemnified the Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation (doing business as Community Transit) for losses resulting from its own negligence. Upon review, the Court concluded that the language of the agreement, and in particular language providing that indemnity would not be triggered if losses resulted from the sole negligence of Community Transit, clearly and unequivocally evidenced the parties' intent that the indemnitor, FirstGroup America, Inc. (doing business as First Transit) indemnify Community Transit for losses that resulted from Community Transit's own negligence. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Following published stories about an investigation of their business practices, principals of a waste-management company improved their chances of winning a bid for a contract to refurbish garbage carts for the City of Chicago by slashing their bid. They encouraged other companies to bid in hopes of being hired as a subcontractor if another company won the bid. Each bidder had to certify that it had not entered into any agreement with any other bidder or prospective bidder relating to the price, nor any agreement restraining free competition among bidders. The company won the bid, and after a Justice Department investigation for antitrust violations, the principals were convicted of mail and wire fraud. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the purpose of "colluding" with other potential bidders had not been to prevent them from underbidding but to provide insurance against the bid being rejected based on the earlier investigation. There was no harm as a result of the company encouraging additional bidders.

Defendant Junior's Pizza, Inc. appealed a superior court decision that confirmed an arbitration award and awarded attorney's fees to Plaintiff UniFirst Corporation. The Superior Court held that Junior's waived its right to object to arbitration by failing to challenge the award within thirty days of receiving notice. In June 2009, pursuant to the arbitration clause in the parties' contracts, UniFirst filed a demand for final and binding arbitration. Junior's declined to submit to arbitration, stating that it would reconsider if UniFirst produced a valid agreement. UniFirst subsequently provided copies of the contract provision to both Junior's and the arbitrator. In July 2009, the arbitrator notified the parties that UniFirst had met all filing requirements and arbitration would proceed absent a court order staying the matter. Junior's never sought a court order staying arbitration. UniFirst did not seek a court order compelling Junior's to participate. Notice of the arbitration hearing was provided to both parties, and the hearing took place. Junior's did not participate. UniFirst was awarded damages and attorney's fees, and Junior's was ordered to reimburse UniFirst in administrative fees associated with conducting the arbitration. The next day, the arbitrator notified Junior's of the award by email and certified mail. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Junior's argued (1) it did not waive its right to object to the arbitration award, (2) UniFirst was required to petition to compel arbitration prior to engaging in arbitration without Junior’s participation, and (3) the arbitration was not conducted in strict accordance with the terms of the contracts. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the arbitration award.

Robert Laux and Cynthia Moran-Laux (collectively Laux) appealed, and Ralph Harrington cross-appealed, from a judgment of the superior court declaring the continued existence and location of a road easement in favor of Harrington over Laux's property and awarding Harrington nominal damages for Laux's interference with the use of the easement. Laux asserted that a 1990 quitclaim deed given by Harrington's predecessor-in-title to Laux's predecessor-in-title extinguished the easement, or, alternatively, that construction on the site of its original entry point resulted in its abandonment. Harrington contended that the court erred in excluding certain evidence at trial, resulting in its miscalculation of his damages and failure to award punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding, inter alia, that the superior court did not err in (1) finding that the 1990 quitclaim deed was not intended to release Harrington's easement over the land now owned by the Lauxes; (2) concluding that Harrington did not abandon his easement; (3) calculating damages; and (4) finding that Laux's conduct did not rise to the level of actual ill will or outrageousness required to award punitive damages.