In 1989 Dominguez was arrested and in 1990 he was convicted of home invasion and sexual assault. In 2002 he was exonerated by DNA; in 2005 he received a pardon. Under Illinois law, his claim for malicious prosecution accrued in 2002. Under federal law, constitutional claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) accrued in 1989 and 2002. Wrongful arrest claims accrue on the date of arrest, but wrongful conviction claims accrue when conviction is invalidated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of about $9 million for malicious prosecution and concealment of exculpatory evidence. The city has been insured by different companies and each asserted that the policy for another year applied. None provided a defense. The district court held that the issuer of the "occurrence" policy in force at exoneration must defend and indemnify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The city's misconduct occurred in 1989 and 1990, but the policy does not define the "occurrence" as misconduct by a law-enforcement officer. It defines the occurrence as the tort under state or federal law, and, in both, the tort occurs witn its last element, exoneration. Until then, Dominguez could not establish "malicious prosecution" or "violation" of section 1983.

In 2009, fire severely damaged the insureds' home. They submitted a claim to under their homeowners’ policy the next day. The insurer began requesting documents, authorizations, and interviews and learned that the insureds had at least two businesses, held numerous personal and business accounts, and were involved in several lawsuits. A fire investigator concluded that the fire was intentionally set. The insurer requested additional documents: detailed phone records, bank histories, tax returns, and mortgage information and reminded the insureds that proof of loss was due by May 2. The insurer granted extensions; on the day of the final deadline the insureds delivered almost 1,000 pages of documents. Several months later, the insurer had not received most of the requested documents or an explanation why they could not be produced. After initially acknowledging their failure to produce the documents, the insureds attempted to impose a deadline for settlement of the $2.6 million claim. The district court entered summary judgment for the insurer in the insureds' breach of contract suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The insureds failed to perform the specific "duties after loss" listed in the policy.

Richard and Elaine Benson, Bill and Mary Bliven, Don and Annette Feist, Pat Lynch, and Lloyd and Donna Tribitt ("Bensons") appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed their claim that SRT Communications, Inc.,was contractually obligated to provide them post-retirement health and medical benefits. The Bensons are four retired employees of the Minot telephone business, their spouses, and Pat Lynch, the widow of a deceased retiree, Thomas Lynch. Richard Benson, Bill Blevin, Don Feist, Lloyd Tribitt, and Thomas Lynch worked for NSP before it sold its telephone business to Minot Telephone in 1991, and they all retired from Minot Telephone between 1991 and 1994, before Souris River purchased Minot Telephone from Rochester. With the exception of Don Feist, the retired employees belonged to Local Union No. 949 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers when the labor union and NSP entered into a collective bargaining agreement in 1991. Feist previously had been a member of the labor union, but did not belong to the union when it entered into the 1991 collective bargaining agreement with NSP. The district court concluded the 1991 collective bargaining agreement expired on December 31, 1993, and although SRT Communications continued to provide post-retirement health benefits to the Bensons for over fourteen years after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, it did so as a matter of business discretion and not because of a contractual obligation. The district court dismissed the Bensons' claims against SRT Communications. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the Bensons' action was governed by federal law and they failed to raise a disputed issue of material fact.

In an insurance coverage dispute, the court was required to determine, under Florida law, what constituted "property damage" under a post-1986 standard form commercial general liability (CGL) policy with products-completed operations hazard (PCOH) coverage. Specifically, whether such a policy issued to a general contractor for damage to the part of the completed project performed by a subcontractor, but not to any other project component, caused by a subcontractor's defective work. In light of Florida precedent addressing the scope of similar CGL policies, the court concluded that the policy provided no coverage in this case. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the damage at issue was not covered under the policy.

This appeal arose from a dispute between incumbent local exchange carriers that provide service in rural areas of North Carolina (RLECs) and commercial mobile radio service providers (CMRS Providers) in North Carolina. The CMRS Providers filed a complaint in the district court against the RLECs and the Commissioners of the NCUC in their official capacities, seeking review of several determinations made by the NCUC and, ultimately, the approval of portions of the interconnection agreements (ICA). The district court subsequently denied the CMRS Providers' motion for summary judgment and granted the RLECs' and the NCUC's motions for summary judgment. The district court also affirmed the NCUC's Filing of Composite Agreements (FAO) and approval order. Because the court ultimately agreed with the arguments advanced by the RLECs and the NCUC, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This case arose out of a dispute between two telecommunications carriers over their interconnection agreement (ICA) under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq. Plaintiff Western is a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider and Defendant Qwest is a local exchange carrier (LEC). The court concluded that Western has failed to exhaust the prudential requirement that it first present its claim, that Qwest violated its statutory duty to negotiate the ICA in good faith, to the Public Utility Commission (PUC) before bringing that claim in federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision dismissing that claim. The court also concluded that the ICA's provision (1) requiring Western to interconnect with Qwest's network via at least one point per Local Access and Transport Area (LATA); and (2) providing Western with the signaling systems of its choice only where such systems were available, did not violate the Act. However, the court concluded that the ICA, as approved, did violate the Act insofar as it applied to access charges, rather than reciprocal compensation, to calls exchanged between a CMRS provider and a LEC, originating and terminating in the same LATA, when those calls were carried by an interexchange carrier (IXC). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision upholding the PUC's approval of the ICA to that extent, and remanded to the PUC for further proceedings.

Noble Energy and other lessees sued in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that application of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1451-1464, suspension requests constituted a material breach of their lease agreements to drill for, develop, and produce oil and natural gas on submerged lands off the coast of California. The Court of Federal Claims agreed; on appeal the Federal Circuit affirmed. One year after the Federal Circuit's decision in the breach-of-contract litigation, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), sent a letter to Noble ordering it to plug and abandon Well 320-2 permanently. The district court ruled that the common law doctrine of discharge did not relieve Noble of the regulatory obligation to plug its well permanently, an obligation that the lease did not itself create. Resolution of the dispute depended on what the plugging regulations meant. The court held that it was up to MMS's successor to interpret its regulation in the first instance and to determine whether they apply in situations like Noble's. If they do, the agency must explain why. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to vacate Interior's order and to remand to the Secretary for further proceedings.

Appellants, homeowners, filed suit against Centex Homes, alleging various causes of action, including breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranty, and failure to perform in a workmanlike manner. Centex Homes moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellants had waived all warranties except the specific limited warranty that Centex Homes provided in the sales agreements. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for a trial on Appellants' tort claims that Centex Homes breached its duty to construct their homes in a workmanlike manner using ordinary care, as (1) in Ohio a duty to construct houses in a workmanlike manner using ordinary care is imposed by law on all home builders; and (2) a home buyer cannot waive his right to enforce the home builder's duty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner. Remanded.

Appellants, Leland and Ilene Haugen and Haugen Nutrition and Equipment, defaulted on promissory notes held by respondent United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake (UPB). The various loan agreements between the parties contained provisions in which Appellants agreed to pay UPB's reasonable costs and attorney fees associated with the protection of UPB's security interests and the enforcement of Appellants' obligation to repay the loans. The district court denied Appellants' motion to submit the question of reasonable attorney fees to the jury and subsequently awarded UPB over $400,000 in attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that UPB's claim for the recovery of attorney fees was equitable in nature and thus did not give rise to a jury trial right under the Minnesota Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Appellants were constitutionally entitled to a jury determination on UPB's claim for attorney fees because the nature of the claim was contractual and the remedy sought was legal.

Insured held a life insurance policy issued as part of a federal employee benefit plan. When Insured divorced from his first wife, the divorce decree and property settlement required Insured (1) to maintain the life insurance policy, and (2) to designate the first wife and their grandchildren as equal beneficiaries. Subsequently, Insured remarried, designated his second wife as the sole beneficiary to the life insurance policy, and increased the insurance coverage. Insured and second wife later divorced. When Insured died, the second wife remained the sole beneficiary on the life insurance policy. The first wife and grandchildren filed suit, asserting equitable claims over the life insurance proceeds. The trial court granted summary judgment to the second wife, determining that federal employee benefit law preempted the equitable state law claims and that the policy proceeds accordingly belonged to the second wife. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act did not preempt the equitable claims and that the first wife and grandchildren were entitled to a constructive trust over at least a portion of the proceeds. Remanded.