Pursuant to a contract with the State of New York, defendant agreed to provide various courier services via air and ground transportation. Plaintiffs own a trucking company and served as an independent contractor to defendant, providing ground shipping services to defendant within the state. In this qui tam action, the court was asked to consider whether plaintiffs' claims on behalf of the State of New York, pursuant to the New York False Claims Act (FCA), State Finance Law 187 et seq., were federally preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), 49 U.S.C 47173[b][1]. The court held that they were and that the market participant doctrine was inapplicable. Plaintiffs' remaining contentions were deemed without merit.

Lynne Swartzbaugh purchased motor vehicle insurance with Encompass Insurance Company. The policy named Lynne, her husband, and their daughter Kelly (Petitioners) as drivers. Lynne executed a waiver of higher uninsured motorist (UM) coverage on the standard Maryland Insurance Administration form. Immediately beneath the signature line below the waiver appeared the legend: "Signature of First Named Insured." By its terms, consistent with Maryland law, the waiver remained in effect until withdrawn, and the waiver was never withdrawn. Later, Kelly was injured in an accident involving an under-insured driver. Kelly was unable to collect further damages from Encompass under that policy's UM coverage. Petitioners sought a declaration that the waiver was ineffective because Lynne was not in fact the "first named insured" on the policy. The circuit court ruled that the waiver signed by Lynne was valid and enforceable. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in the context of a motor vehicle insurance policy, the phrase "first named insured" refers to a person insured under the policy and specifically named in the policy who acts on behalf of the other insured parties and is designated as "first named insured" in the policy documents.

Debtor appealed an order of the Bankruptcy Court directing that a third party receive a portion of a check made payable jointly to the third party and debtor for rent of debtor's property. At issue was whether the third party had a right to funds for rent of debtor's property when the rent check was made payable jointly to debtor and the third party. The court held that the third party had an interest in the funds by virtue of a contract between the parties and, therefore, the third party was entitled to the portions of the funds that the bankruptcy court required debtor to remit to him.

This case concerned the applicability of a standard "no-action clause" in a trust indenture governing a company's notes. The clause at issue stated that a noteholder could not "pursue any remedy with respect to this Indenture or the Securities" unless the noteholder fell within one of two exceptions. At issue was whether noteholders who did not fall within a stated exception to the clause could nonetheless bring fraudulent transfer claims against the issuer of the securities and its directors and officers. Although the district court found the no-action clause inapplicable to the claims, the court disagreed and held that the language of the no-action clause controlled, barring noteholders from bringing suit.

V&M filed suit against Centimark alleging breach of contract and negligence after metal roof sheeting panels being installed at its steelwork facility fell into an electrical substation, causing loss of power for more than 30 hours. Damages for repairs and lost profits were around $3 million The district court granted Centimark summary judgment, ruling that V&M failed to produce sufficient evidence of causation to sustain either legal claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that genuine issues of material fact exist.

Regent Investments sued Earline Waddle and Lorene Elrod alleging that Regent contracted to purchase real property from Waddle, but that afterwards Regent discovered Waddle had conveyed one-half of her interest in the property to Elrod. Waddle filed a cross-claim against Elrod, alleging that Elrod had acquired her interest in the property through undue influence. Regent later dismissed its claims. Waddle subsequently agreed to settle the case against Elrod by way of emails sent by the parties' attorneys. Elrod, however, refused to sign the settlement documents. The trial court entered an order enforcing the settlement agreement. Elrod appealed, arguing that the Statue of Frauds precluded enforcement of the settlement agreement. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the Statute of Frauds applies only to contracts for the sale of lands. The Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) the Statute of Frauds applies to settlement agreements requiring the transfer of an interest in real property; but (2) the Statute of Frauds did not bar enforcement of the settlement agreement at issue in this appeal because the emails that the parties' counsel exchanged and the legal description of the property included in the cross claim satisfied the Statute of Frauds.

Oliver Arlington was employed by Miller's Trucking as a log truck driver and loader operator pursuant to an oral employment agreement. For his work, Miller's paid Arlington twenty-five percent of the "load rate" as calculated by Miller's. Arlington, however, asserted that according to the parties' oral agreement, he should have been paid a salary in the form of annual wages. Arlington filed a wage claim, seeking the pay he alleged he was owed in regular and overtime wages. The Department of Labor and Industry's bureau dismissed Arlington's claim for lack of merit and lack of sufficient evidence. On appeal, a bureau hearing officer dismissed Arlington's claim. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing officer acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to require Miller's to produce material requested by Arlington and in refusing to admit tendered evidence, prejudicing the substantial rights of Arlington, and the district court erred in affirming the hearing officer's judgment; and (2) the hearing officer and district court incorrectly determined that Arlington engaged in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of the operation of motor vehicles in interstate commerce and thus was exempt from overtime requirements. Remanded.

This appeal arose from a dispute between two neighboring property owners regarding a workshop addition to the home of Appellants, Neil and Seth Milner (Milner). The addition violated the city's setback requirement, and Appellee Gary Olsen reached an agreement with Milner to sell strip of his property so the building would be in compliance. The parties disagreed, however, about the terms of the agreement. Milner filed suit, and the district court rescinded and set aside the agreement. Olsen was ordered to return Milner's money and costs, and Milner was required to deed the land back to Olsen. After Olsen discovered that Milner's addition encroached past the boundary line of his property, Olsen filed suit alleging trespass and nuisance. The district court found in favor of Olsen and ordered Milner to remove the addition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining (1) Olsen's claims were not barred by res judicata; (2) Olsen's claims were not barred by equitable estoppel or waiver; and (3) Milner was liable to Olsen for trespass.

This case involved a challenge to certain issuances of preferred units and convertible debt by a start-up medical products company. The founder, former CEO, and current common member of the company challenged the issuances, claiming they were self-interested transactions designed to benefit the company's directors and venture capital sponsors by unfairly diluting its common members. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts. The court found that plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that defendants' actions in approving the challenged issuances were grossly negligent or reckless. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's duty of care claims. As for the duty of loyalty claims, the court found that defendants failed to establish that the transactions were not self-interested or that they warranted protection under the safe harbor provisions of the company's operating agreement. Therefore, the court denied summary judgment on these claims. Finally, because the court found the operating agreement ambiguous on the issue of whether defendants were permitted to authorize additional common units or new series of units without approval by a majority of the common members, the court denied summary judgment on plaintiff's breach of contract claim under Count VI.

This was a class action brought on behalf of the common unit holders of a publicly-traded Delaware limited partnership. In March 2011, the partnership agreed to be acquired by an unaffiliated third party at a premium to its common units' trading price. The merger agreement, which governed the transaction, also provided for a separate payment to the general partner to acquire certain partnership interests it held exclusively. The court concluded that defendants' approval of the merger agreement could not constitute a breach of any contractual or fiduciary duty, regardless of whether the conflict committee's approval was effective. The court also found that the disclosures authorized by defendants were not materially misleading. Therefore, plaintiffs could not succeed on their claims under any reasonable conceivable set of circumstances and defendants' motion to dismiss was granted.