Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their complaint challenging a number of agreements entered into by the City of New York with respect to labor conditions on certain City construction projects. Plaintiffs argued that the agreements regulated the labor market and were therefore preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151-169. The court found the project labor agreements in this case materially indistinguishable from agreements the Supreme Court found permissible under the market participation exception to preemption in Building and Construction Trades Council of Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders and Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island Inc. Because the City acted as a market participant and not a regulator in entering the agreements, its actions fell outside the scope of NLRA preemption. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant-Appellant Rodney Brossart appealed a default judgment entered against him in a collection action brought by Plaintiff-Appellee Raymond J. German, Ltd. for legal services allegedly rendered to him. On appeal, Appellant argued the district court erred in granting German a default judgment, and German failed to prove the existence of an attorney-client agreement between itself and Appellant, precluding the default. Upon review, the Supreme Court modified the default and affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in entering a default in favor of German, because Appellant "appeared" under N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a) and German provided him with notice of the motion for a default judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a)(3). Furthermore, the Court held that it was reasonable for the trial court to ask for written proof of the attorney-client relationship prior to entering the default judgment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court concerning whether an "early termination fee" (ETF) in a broadband internet service contract constituted an "alternative performance provision" or as a liquidated damages clause. Appellants are all customers who either incurred this ETF for canceling early or were threatened with this ETF for attempting to cancel early. All Appellants were dissatisfied with Clearwire’s service, alleging that instead of the fast and reliable service promised, they received inconsistent and painstakingly slow speeds. Plaintiff Chad Minnick sued Clearwire in King County Superior Court in April 2009, claiming that Clearwire was committing false advertising and was imposing ETFs unlawfully. He then filed the first amended complaint in May, which added the other 11 plaintiffs through class certification. In July, Clearwire removed the case to the federal district court where it filed a motion to dismiss all of Appellants' claims. The district court granted Clearwire's motion. Appellants then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the ETF was a liquidated damages provision and not an alternative performance provision as the trial court found. Under Washington law, an alternative performance provision is distinguishable from a liquidated damages provision because it provides a "real option" to the promisor and the alternatives are reasonably equal to each other. Here, the ETF provided a "real option" at the time of contracting because Appellants wanted to retain the control and flexibility that the early cancellation allowed them. Further, the ETF was less expensive than the remaining payments for the majority of the contract's life, thereby indicating the options were reasonably related. The ETF also allowed Appellants to benefit from reduced monthly premiums under the fixed-term contract but also enjoy some of the flexibility of the month-to-month subscription. Therefore, the ETF is an alternative performance provision that is not subject to a penalty analysis.

HOP Energy appealed from the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Local 553 Pension Fund. The district court held that HOP Energy was not exempt from withdrawal liability under the Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA), 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461, because the purchaser of HOP Energy's New York City operating division lacked an obligation to contribute "substantially the same number of contribution base units" to the pension fund post-sale by HOP Energy had contributed pre-sale. The court agreed and held that the "contribution base units" were hours of employee pay. Although the purchaser of HOP Energy's New York City operating division had an obligation to contribute to the pension fund at the same contribution base unit rate, it had no obligation to contribute substantially the same number of hours of employee pay. Therefore, HOP was not exempt from withdrawal liability.

Dr. Shailendra Kumar sued Dr. Anand Dhanda, alleging breach of contract and breach of a covenant not to compete. The contract at issue provided for disputes to be initially addressed through mandatory, non-binding arbitration. Dhanda filed a motion to dismiss the action, asserting that the suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Kumar opposed dismissal, arguing that the complaint was timely because his cause of action had either not accrued or that limitations was tolled until the completion of arbitration. The trial court dismissed the action as time-barred, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while non-binding arbitration may have been a condition precedent to litigation, it neither affected the accrual of the underlying breach of contract claims, nor otherwise tolled the statute of limitations applicable to maintaining an action in court.

Plaintiffs appealed an order of the district court granting in part and denying in part the motion of defendant to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs contended that the IRS wrongfully withheld tax refunds to which plaintiffs were entitled as the result of the IRS's misinterpretation of contractual language in Offer-in-Compromise (OIC) agreements that plaintiffs entered into with the IRS. The principal issue on appeal was whether specialized tax terms in an OIC agreement derived their meaning from the Internal Revenue Code or from ordinary "plain English." The court held that, when used in IRS standard form documents, specialized tax terms such as "refund" and "overpayment" were interpreted in light of the Internal Revenue Code. Further, tax refunds made pursuant to the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, I.R.C. 6428, related to the 2007 tax year, and so those refunds fell with the OIC agreements' temporal limitation. Finally, plaintiffs' agreement to forfeit their interest in "any" tax refund for the 2007 tax year encompassed anticipated as well as unanticipated tax refunds. Based on these holdings, the court concluded that the IRS correctly withheld the tax refunds at issue in this action from plaintiffs under the express terms of the OIC agreements.

Petitioners, a pair of adult children, sued Griffith Energy Services, an energy company that spilled heating oil in Petitioners' parents' home, and its attorneys for fraud and negligent supervision. Petitioners' parents (Parents) had previously sued Griffith and won a judgment after a jury trial. The circuit court dismissed Petitioners' lawsuit, holding, inter alia, that Petitioners' claims were barred by res judicata. The court of special appeals affirmed, reaching only the res judicata issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners were in privity with Parents, and (2) thus, the intermediate appellate court did not err in holding that Petitioners' claim was barred by res judicata.

Plaintiffs sued Juno under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSFDA), 15 U.S.C. 1701, seeking rescission of their purchase agreement in a lot at Creighton Farms, claiming that Juno misrepresented its involvement with the Ritz-Carlton in regards to the Creighton Farms development. The court held, among other things, that plaintiffs established that they merit equitable rescission and that the district court properly determined that the equitable remedy was to return the property title to Juno and return the purchase price, plus interest, to plaintiffs. The court held, however, that the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiffs pre-judgment interest on the debt portion of their purchase funds. Therefore, the court reversed the district court and awarded plaintiffs prejudgment interest on the funds at issue at 7 percent. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

This case arose when a real estate developer hired HOD to act as general contractor for the construction of two multi-family residences. HOD entered into a subcontract with Well Built for the masonry work. At issue was whether a general contractor acted as a joint employer of masonry workers, who were employed by one of its subcontractors, thereby owing unpaid wages to the subcontractor's workforce. The court held that the Board erred as a matter of law in relying on the federal six-factor test in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., Inc. in reaching its determination of joint employment. Because the Board's factual findings indicated nothing more than that the usual contractor/subcontractor relationship existed between HOD and Well Built during the three-month period that Well Built's principal, Martin Bruten, was on the job, the court need not resort to federal precedent to resolve the issue. In any event, even if the court were to apply the Zheng test, the court would hold that HOD was not a joint employer of Well Built's employees. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the matter remitted with directions to remand to the Board for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from a dispute between Ghana and Balkan Energy Company where Balkan contracted with Ghana to refurbish and recommission a 125 megawatt power barge. Ghana filed an application for discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782, seeking documents exchanged in a separate lawsuit between the current defendants. The district court granted Ghana's application and ordered the Missouri companies (collectively ProEnergy) to produce documents. ProEnergy produced some documents and discovery materials from its lawsuit with Balkan, but it refused other documents related to the settlement of that lawsuit. Because ProEnergy had already produced most of the documents, depositions, and interrogatory answers from its lawsuit with Balkan, and because ProEnergy was not party to the foreign litigation, the court was not persuaded that any fundamental unfairness was caused by the district court declining to compel production of the settlement documents. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision.