This appeal and cross appeal concerned the authority of the named defendant, the city of Waterbury, under its city charter to offset the pension benefits of Plaintiffs, several individuals who had worked for the city, by the heart and hypertension benefits they received. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part and directed judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims except Nicolas Russo's claim for breach of contract, and remanded the case for a new trial on that claim, holding (1) the trial court improperly concluded, with respect to all of Plaintiffs except Russo, their respective collective bargaining agreements conflicted with the Waterbury city charter, which allowed the city to offset Plaintiff's pension benefits based on their heart and hypertension benefits; and (2) although the trial court properly interpreted Russo's collective bargaining agreement to permit the city to offset his pension benefits by his heart and hypertension benefits, the court improperly failed to determine whether Russo's combined pension and heart and hypertension benefits exceeded the cap set forth in the agreement, thus permitting an offset.

David Caron purchased a majority membership in Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle, LLC without having obtained the written consent of Goodhall's, Inc. (Goodhall's), in violation of Goodhall's lease with Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle. The lease idenitified Goodhall's as the landlord and Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle as the tenant. After a dispute arose concerning the party responsible for remediating certain environmental conditions on the property, Plaintiffs, David Caron and David Caron Chrysler Motors, filed suit against Defendants, Goodhall's and others, claiming that Defendants had violated provisions of its lease regarding Goodhall's responsibility for preexisting environmental conditions and Goodhall's warranty of fitness and habitability. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that no contract existed between the parties to this action because the assignment of the majority interest in the tenant to Caron was invalid. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court improperly failed to consider Plaintiffs' claim that the trial court had improperly concluded that no contract existed between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's; and (2) the trial court was incorrect in finding that, because Goodhall's did not consent to the assignment, there was no contract between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's.

This insurance-coverage dispute arose after a driver of a leased vehicle struck and seriously injured a pedestrian. The vehicle, a BMW, was owned by BMW Financial Services. The pedestrian and her family sued the driver and BMW Financial for damages. Citizens Insurance Company provided a personal automobile policy listing the driver as an insured and BMW Financial as an additional insured lessor. A separate business auto insurance policy was issued by Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Companies to BMW Financial. The case settled, with Citizens and Empire paying their policy limits. Citizens reimbursed Empire for a portion of the costs Empire expended in legal expenses defending BMW Financial in the civil action but refused to provide Empire with any further reimbursement. Empire subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a determination that Citizens was liable for reimbursement of all attorneys' fees it incurred. The superior court granted Empire's motion for summary judgment. Citizens appealed, arguing that Empire was entitled only to a pro-rata apportionment of defense costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it would be improper to resort to a pro-rata apportionment of liability.

This case arose when plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident, entered into an executive employment contract with defendant. A forum selection clause dictated that all disputes arising out of the contract or the employment relationship were to be resolved in courts situated in Erie County, New York, defendant's principal place of business. The court concluded that a forum selection clause operated as a special contract only when three conditions were met: the employer's claim was covered by the Massachusetts Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, sections 148, 150; the court of the forum state, applying its choice-of-law principles, would choose a law other than that of Massachusetts to govern the dispute; and application of the foreign law would deprive the employee of a substantive right guaranteed by the Wage Act. Under modern choice-of-law doctrines, these conditions rarely coincided. On the facts alleged in the case, a New York court, applying New York's choice-of-law doctrine, would certainly apply the Wage Act to this dispute. Therefore, the court held that because enforcement of the forum selection clause would not deprive plaintiff of the protections of the Wage Act, dismissal of the action was affirmed.

A group of residential tenants (collectively, Tenants) alleged claims of negligence against Canyon Cover Properties, LLC and Apartment Management Consultants, LLC (collectively, AMC). AMC argued that it was relieved from liability because Tenants signed a residential lease agreement (Agreement) that included a limited liability provision (Exculpatory Clause) waiving the right to bring an action for negligence against AMC. The district court concluded that the Agreement and Exculpatory Clause did not violate public policy and were therefore valid and enforceable, and accordingly, granted summary judgment for AMC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because AMC failed to respond meaningfully to Tenants' claim that the Exculpatory Clause was unenforceable because it violated public policy, AMC's brief was rejected and Tenants' claim was accepted that the Exculpatory Clause in the Agreement was unenforceable. Remanded.

Come Big or Stay Home, LLC (CBSH) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of EOG Resources, Inc. dismissing its claims for refusing to provide it with oil and gas well information unless CBSH agreed to not disclose the information to third parties without EOG's consent. EOG owned and developed oil and gas interests in North Dakota and has drilled and operated numerous oil and gas wells in the state. CBSH owned mineral or leasehold interests in the state, including interests in spacing units where wells have been drilled and operated by EOG. In late 2008, EOG sent CBSH an invitation to participate in drilling a horizontal oil and gas well in Mountrail County, ending with a joint operating agreement (JOA) for that well. CBSH refused to execute subsequent JOAs for several additional wells. After each refusal by CBSH to execute a JOA, EOG sent letters to CBSH explaining it was willing to provide well information to CBSH if it would agree to the nondisclosure provision contained in the JOA. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, concluding as a matter of law that CBSH's theories of recovery were not viable under the circumstances.

Defendant-Appellee Barbara McDermott appealed a district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Kevin Pifer when the court concluded that Defendant's mother Dorothy Bevan, validly gifted Plaintiff an option to purchase land. In 2001, Ms. Bevan executed a durable power of attorney in favor of Plaintiff who was a distant relative. Thereafter, Plaintiff assisted Bevan with managing her farmland and performing miscellaneous other tasks. Ms. Bevan granted Plaintiff the option to purchase that land in 2004. Ms. Bevan died in 2010, and Plaintiff recorded a notice of his intent to exercise the option. Defendant rejected the attached cashier's check, questioning Ms. Bevan's capacity to execute the purchase option agreement. Plaintiff subsequently sued for specific performance of the purchase option. The district court granted Plaintiff partial summary judgment, concluding the purchase option agreement was valid and enforceable. In its judgment, the district court stated, "This Judgment shall be final for appeal purposes, and there is no just reason for delay." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court inappropriately certified the partial summary judgment under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court abused its discretion in directing an entry of final judgment. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendant's appeal and directed the district court to vacate its portion of the partial summary judgment certifying the judgment as final.

This matter involved allegations of breach of duty made by a common stockholder of a Delaware statutory trust against the trustee of that trust, as well as claims by the stockholder against those entities she alleged aided and abetted the breach. Plaintiff failed to make a pre-suit demand against defendant trustees, who she conceded were independent and disinterested when they took the actions complained of. The court found that plaintiff's claims were derivative and not direct. To survive a motion to dismiss in these circumstances under Section 3816 of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (DSTA), 12 Del. C. 3816, a plaintiff must plead particularized facts raising a reasonable doubt that the actions of the trustees were taken honestly and in good faith. Because a careful reading of the complaint disclosed that plaintiff failed to so plead, her complaint must be dismissed.

In this breach of contract case, the jury found that a contract existed between Erie Insurance Exchange and Best Price Plumbing but that Erie did not breach the contract. The circuit court granted Best Price's motion after verdict to change the jury's answer. The court then concluded as a matter of law that a breach occurred, and it entered judgment in favor of Best Price. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated the jury verdict. Best Price appealed, asserting that under State. v. Kenosha Home Telephone Co., it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the jury instructions was forfeited because the jury was not asked to answer any questions that would support the application of the Kenosha Home Telephone rule as a matter of law; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, and the circuit court was clearly wrong when it changed that answer to the verdict question.

In this appeal the Supreme Court considered whether the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), an act that governs the disposition of failed financial institutions' assets, divests a court of jurisdiction to consider any defense or affirmative defense not first adjudicated through FIRREA's claims process. The Supreme Court concluded that while FIRREA's jurisdictional bar divests a district court of jurisdiction to consider claims and counterclaims asserted against a successor in interest to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) not first adjudicated through FIRREA's claims process, it does not apply to defenses or affirmative defenses raised by a debtor in response to the successor in interest's complaint for collection. In this case, the Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Successor in Interest on its breach of contract and breach of personal guaranty claims against Debtor, as Debtor's affirmative defenses were not barred by FIRREA. Remanded.