Petitioner Edeltraud Elter-Nodvin appealed a superior court order that dismissed her claims against Respondents (her daughters) Leah and Madeline Nodvin. The claims sought to impose a constructive trust on insurance and retirement account proceeds that would otherwise pass to her daughters. Petitioner was married to Stephen Nodvin in 1986, and had Respondents. In 2009, Stephen filed for divorce, the couple separated, and Petitioner moved abroad. In October of that year, the family division issued an anti-hypothecation order instructing the parties to refrain from, among other things, disposing of marital property while proceedings were pending. Sometime thereafter, Stephen changed the beneficiaries of certain life insurance policies and retirement accounts from Petitioner to the couple’s daughters. After changing the beneficiaries, Stephen died. In 2011, Petitioner sued her daughters for the insurance and retirement account proceeds. She argued that the circumstances under which her husband changed his beneficiaries justified the imposition of a constructive trust. The daughters, one of whom was still a minor and represented by guardians, moved to dismiss the petition. They argued that Stephen’s change of beneficiaries did not violate the anti-hypothecation order, and, therefore, their status as the named beneficiaries entitled them to the proceeds of their father’s insurance policies and retirement accounts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Stephen's action did not violate the plain language of the anti-hypothecation order. Further, the Court held that the superior court properly dismissed Petitioner's breach of contract and constructive trust claim because she failed to allege facts to establish a contract or a confidential relationship at the time Stephen changed beneficiaries: "while the divorce action was pending, Petitioner could not rely upon Stephen to provide for her based on a spousal obligation. Rather, if she wished to remain beneficiary of the insurance policies, she should have asked the court to order Stephen not to alter them."

Plaintiff-Appellant Flying Phoenix Corporation appealed a district court’s dismissal of its claims against Defendants North Park Transportation Company and R&L Carriers Shared Services (the carriers), with prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Flying Phoenix purchased a machine designed to package fireworks for sale to end users from Defendant Creative Packaging Machinery, Inc. The machine arrived severely damaged. Creative Packaging was responsible for shipping the machine to Flying Phoenix. Creative Packaging used R&L Carriers Shared Services to ship from North Carolina to Wyoming. The bill of lading limited the period for filing claims with a carrier to nine months, and limited the time for filing civil suit to two years and one day following denial of a claim. At some point during the delivery, R&L Carriers transferred the machine to North Park Transportation Company to complete delivery to Flying Phoenix. Three days after the machine was delivered, Flying Phoenix filed a claim with North Park based on damage to the machine. Roughly two weeks later, North Park inspected the machine and confirmed that it was damaged. A little less than a month later, North Park and R&L Carriers notified Flying Phoenix that its claim was denied, citing evidence that the shipment was issued with insufficient packaging or protection. Flying Phoenix renewed its claim approximately six months later, in November 2007, and the carriers again denied the claim, asserting that the machine was "used" and inadequately packaged. On appeal, Flying Phoenix argued that the district court erred by holding that (1) its claims were based on the bill of lading, and (2) it was bound by the terms of the bill of lading even though it was not a party and did not consent. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Flying Phoenix's claims: "Flying Phoenix claim[ed] that, although it was listed as consignee on the bill of lading, it never saw the bill of lading until after the limitations period lapsed. It argue[d] that, since it did not know the terms of the carriage, it should not be bound. [The Court found] no precedent for Flying Phoenix’s position, and Flying Phoenix [did] not direct [the Court] to any. There is no suggestion in the record that Flying Phoenix ever sought a copy of the bill of lading but was denied access, and it is well-established that a party may not sit idly by, making no effort to obtain obviously necessary documents, and then claim ignorance. Lack of diligence precludes equitable intervention."

The underlying action in this case concerned real property located in the City of Warwick that Defendant, Felix Carlone, dedicated to the City in 1979. Plaintiffs, Warwick Sewer Authority (WSA) and the City, brought a complaint for a declaratory judgment concerning the City's ownership of the property. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant appealed, contending that he dedicated the property on the condition that it be used as open space, that he maintained a reversionary interest in it, and that, therefore, genuine issues of material facts should have precluded the hearing justice from granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because no ambiguity existed on the face of the writings in this case, the parol evidence that Defendant presented rightly was not entertained by the hearing justice to vary the writings' terms; and (2) the property restrictions filed by Defendant with the City did not operate to restrict WSA from rezoning the dedicated land from open space to residential.

Plaintiff Thomas DePetrillo filed suit against Belo Holdings, Inc. and Citadel Broadcasting Company, challenging the validity of Citadel's right of first refusal to purchase a broadcasting tower and surrounding real estate owned by Belo. The superior court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff, as a stranger to the original lease agreement between Belo and Citadel, had no standing to challenge Citadel's right of first refusal or the effectiveness of its exercise. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff lacked authority to challenge the validity of the right of first refusal; and (2) Citadel's right of first refusal was enforceable as a matter of law.

This case arose when the University told Daniel A. Moore, an artist who painted famous football scenes involving the University since 1979, that he would need permission to depict the University's uniforms because they were trademarks. Moore contended that he did not need permission because the uniforms were being used realistically to portray historic events. The parties could not reach a resolution and the University subsequently sued Moore for breach of contract, trademark infringement, and unfair competition. The court held that, as evidenced by the parties' course of conduct, Moore's depiction of the University's uniforms in his unlicensed paintings, prints, and calendars was not prohibited by the prior licensing agreements. Additionally, the paintings, prints, and calendars did not violate the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), because these artistically expressive objects were protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment by the district court with respect to the paintings and prints, and reversed with respect to the prints as replicated on calendars. With respect to the licensing agreements' coverage of the mugs and other "mundane products," the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment because disputed issues of fact remained. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Plaintiff brought suit against Deerbrook for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by Deerbrook's insured and after plaintiff received a judgment against the insured, the insured assigned his bad faith claim to plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that Deerbrook breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to its insured when Deerbrook did not attempt to reach a settlement of plaintiff's claims after the insured's liability in excess of the policy limit became reasonably clear. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's rejection of his request to instruct the jury that it could consider Deerbrook's failure to effectuate a settlement in determining whether Deerbrook breached the implied covenant. The court concluded that plaintiff's proposed jury instruction was consistent with the law but that there was no evidentiary basis for the instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

MT Technology Enterprises, LLC filed an amended complaint against Cristol, LLC, several members of Cristol's board of managers, and an employee of Cristol, Cristol's attorney, and the attorney's firm, alleging, inter alia, statutory conspiracy, tortious interference with economic expectancy in MT technologies, and breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court imposed sanctions against Cristol, its board, and its employee (Defendants) for discovery violations. The case proceeded to a jury against Defendants, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of MT. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in its interpretation of Va. Code Ann. 13.1-1057(A) and in concluding that MT satisfied the registration requirements of the statute; (2) the trial court did not err in imposing a sanction for discovery abuses; but (3) the trial court abused its discretion by forbidding cross-examination of witnesses regarding damages. Remanded for further proceedings on damages only.

The Jared and Donna Murayama 1997 Trust sought damages arising from a settlement agreement between the Trust, its trustee Jared Murayama, and two of the defendants, NISC Holdings, LLC and Omen LLC, which transaction included NISC's repurchase of the Trust's voting stock in NISC (the "settlement agreement"). The Trust claimed it was damaged from selling the stock to NISC for substantially less than its fair market value as a result of the Trust's reliance on fraudulent omissions and misrepresentations of Defendants. The circuit court found that the Trust's allegations established that, as a matter of law, the Trust did not reasonably rely upon Defendants' alleged fraudulent omissions and misrepresentations regarding the value of the NISC stock at the time of the settlement. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment sustaining Defendants' demurrer, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment based upon both the language of the settlement agreement and the allegations regarding the adversarial relationship between Murayama and the defendants that precipitated the settlement.

Perot Systems Government Services filed an amended complaint against Defendants, 21st Century Systems, Inc, and several individuals, alleging that Defendants, all of whom were former Perot employees, conspired for the purpose of willfully and maliciously attempting to destroy Perot and steal away Perot business by unfairly and improperly using Perot's confidential and proprietary information. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Perot on all claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defense motions to strike testimony regarding lost goodwill damages, and accordingly, the court erred when it refused to set aside the jury's award of lost goodwill damages based upon that testimony; (2) the court did not err when it refused to set aside the jury's award of both punitive and treble damages in favor of Perot; and (3) the court did not err when it refused to set aside the jury's award of computer forensics damages.

This action arose from an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit wherein plaintiff appealed the dismissal of insurance coverage claims under section 627.701(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and the denial of a motion to enforce execution of the judgment, and defendant cross-appealed the denial of motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. In answering five certified questions, the court concluded that, under Florida law: (1) first-party claims were actually statutory bad-faith claims that must be brought under section 624.155; (2) an insured could not bring a claim against an insurer for failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established by section 627.701(4)(a); (3) an insurer's failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established in section 627.701(4)(a) did not render a noncompliant hurricane deductible provision in an insurance policy void and unenforceable as the Legislature had not provided for this penalty; and (4) a contractual provision mandating payment of benefits upon "entry of a final judgment" did not waive the insurer's procedural right to post a bond and stay the execution of a money judgment pending resolution of appeal.