The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the extent of uninsured motorist coverage provided under an automobile insurance policy issued to a husband and wife who were both injured by an uninsured motorist while riding their motorcycle. The husband, Leo Fontaine, died as a result of his injuries. The motorcycle in question was not expressly identified in the policy at issue. Plaintiff-Insurer New London County Mutual Insurance Company (NLC) filed suit for declaratory relief seeking clarification of the rights and obligations of the parties pursuant to their policy issued to the couple. Arguing that the policy language unambiguously excluded the defendants' claim for uninsured motorist benefits, NLC filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the Superior Court. Defendants Karolyn Fontaine, individually and on behalf of the estate of her husband, Leo appealed the grant of summary judgment and contended that the pertinent policy provision was ambiguous and should have been construed in favor of coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the policy language explicitly excluded Defendants' claims from coverage. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment.

Petitioner, The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation (ACT), filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that a public highway construction contract awarded to Respondent, Nicewonder Contracting, Inc., by Respondent, West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH), violated state competitive bidding and prevailing wage laws. The circuit court dismissed ACT's action, finding it lacked standing to challenge the highway construction contract. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that ACT had representative standing to seek the declarations. On remand, the circuit court determined that the Court's opinion in ACT I did not completely decide the issue of ACT's standing and ordered that ACT join the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) as a defendant in the action. The Supreme Court subsequently granted ACT's requested writ of prohibition because the circuit court did not give effect to the mandate of the Court in ACT I, holding (1) ACT, as a matter of law, had standing to prosecute its lawsuit; and (2) FHWA was not an indispensable party to the lawsuit.

As the primary beneficiary under an insurance policy issued by Appellee Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, Appellant Roger Goff brought a cause of action under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, asserting that Penn Mutual had violated the statutory duty of good faith and fair dealing. After deciding that Goff did not meet the accepted definition of either a first- or a third-party bad faith claimant, the trial court dismissed Goff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a primary life insurance beneficiary may assert a statutory bad faith action upon the death of the insured. Remanded.

The circuit court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment in a partition action for the sale of jointly owned real estate, having found that the statute of frauds prevented enforcement of an alleged oral "buy/sell" agreement between the parties. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Appellants, as the party attempting to force the sale, were impermissibly using the statute of frauds as a "sword" and not a "shield" and because "no action" was brought by Appellees that might trigger the application of the statute. The court therefore remanded the matter for a determination as to whether the oral buy/sell agreement existed and its effect on the disposition of the property at issue. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that because there was no signed writing in this case, and because there was no evidence that the agreement was not reduced to writing because of fraud at the time of omission or evidence that the application of the statute of fraud would result in Appellants being unjustly enriched, summary judgment was proper.

This matter involved the ability to recover attorney's fees based on a contingency fee arrangement when an attorney withdraws from representation of the client for what the lawyer believes is a valid cause. The district court found Attorney was not entitled to recover his attorney's fees based on a quantum meruit claim but awarded him funds to cover calculated expenses from his representation of Appellee in a personal injury case with a contingency fee contract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a disagreement with a client over whether to accept a settlement offer is not good and sufficient cause for an attorney to withdraw with expectation of a quantum meruit fee.

This case presented the question of whether an automobile insurance policy's permissive user step-down provision was valid and enforceable. Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed whether the particular provision at issue was sufficiently conspicuous, plain, and clear to satisfy the doctrine of reasonable expectations. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, declaring the permissive user step-down provision enforceable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy's permissive user step-down provision was insufficiently plain and clear to defeat the reasonable expectations of the insureds, and therefore, the provision violated the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Remanded.

The parties to this appeal were former spouses, and the issue before the Supreme Court involved the marital settlement agreement they entered into in connection with their divorce. The dispute centered around the appraisal of certain real estate of the former husband, Robert Hazard, which real estate he acquired before his marriage to Connie Hazard. Upon Connie's motion to enforce the agreement, an appraiser valued the property at significantly less than the parties' alleged understanding of the property's value at the time of the agreement. The family court granted Connie's motion and ordered Robert to pay Connie $192,500. Robert appealed, arguing that based upon a mutual mistake of fact, Connie received an unconscionable windfall and that the agreement should be vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the hearing justice that a mutual mistake of material fact was not established in this case by clear and convincing evidence.

In 1990, Pedicini purchased a LICOA supplemental cancer-insurance policy that provided for unlimited cash benefits, payable directly to Pedicini, equal to “usual and customary charges” for radiation or chemotherapy received as treatment. In 2001, Pedicini obtained assistance from an insurance agent, who negotiated a policy with LICOA that capped benefits for treatments at $25,000 per year, lowering the premium. The policy, effective October 2001, tied benefits to “actual charges” made by a person or entity furnishing services treatment or material. Unbeknownst to Pedicini, in February 2001, LICOA changed its practices. It had paid benefits tied to the amount billed by medical providers regardless of the amount accepted in payment, but began paying benefits equal to the amount accepted as full payment by providers. LICOA did not notify policyholders, but did notify its agents. In 2007, Pedicini was diagnosed with cancer. His benefits were only equal to the discounted amount accepted by his provider due to his status as a Medicare recipient. Pedicini won summary judgment on a breach of contract claim, but the court ruled in favor of LICOA on bad faith claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the contract claim, but reversed with respect to bad faith claims.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Oceania Cruises after he became ill on the cruise and received allegedly substandard care. Plaintiff claimed that Oceania negligently hired, retained, and supervised the ship's doctor. Oceania attempted to bring this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(3), contending that the district court erred when it held that a limitation-of-liability provision in Oceania's ticket contract was unenforceable. The district court concluded that the provision, which incorporated by reference portions of international treaties and the United States Code, was so confusing that it did not reasonably communicate to the passengers the cruise line's liability limits. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Ford Motor Co. v. S.S. Santa Irene, which held that the application of the limitation-of-liability provision was not an immediately appealable order under section 1292(a)(3).

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of CGI in its action seeking "appropriate equitable relief" under section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. CGI appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of defendant's counsel and codefendant, dismissing the codefendant from the action. CGI also appealed the district court's grant of proportional fees and costs to the codefendant, deducted from CGI's recovery from defendant. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the codefendant, dismissing it from the action. However, because the court saw no indication that in fashioning "appropriate equitable relief" for CGI, the district court did more than interpret the plain terms of the reimbursement provision, and no indication that the district court considered traditional equitable principles in assigning responsibility to CGI for attorneys' fees and costs, the court vacated the judgment in favor of CGI, vacated the judgment that the codefendant deducted fees and costs from CGI's entitlement, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.