John and Minerva Sutherland entered into a mining lease granting Meridian Granite Company the right to conduct mining operations on the Sutherlands' property. A dispute developed between the Sutherlands and Meridian regarding the Sutherlands' obligation to pay taxes relating to the mineral production. The dispute led to litigation. The district court granted Meridian's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Sutherlands were obligated to pay the disputed taxes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in allowing Meridian to deduct ad valorem and severance taxes from payments to the Sutherlands when such tax payments were not required by the State, as the Sutherlands and Meridian agreed in the mining lease that the Sutherlands would pay the taxes.

When Plaintiffs' efforts to act as general contractors on a new home foundered because of faulty work performed by a framing subcontractor, they made a claim on the homeowner's insurance policy issued to them by Defendant, Peerless Insurance Company. After Defendant denied the claim, citing two exclusions in the policy, Plaintiffs filed a declaratory-judgment action against the carrier. A hearing justice determined that the terms of the policy were ambiguous. Consequently, the hearing justice construed the policy against the insurer and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err when she determined that the policy was ambiguous; and (2) Plaintiffs were entitled to coverage for the repairs that were necessary to bring their home into compliance with the applicable building code.

Plaintiffs were catastrophically injured in automobile accidents. All sustained traumatic brain injuries and are now mentally impaired. State Farm initially paid no-fault insurance benefits for the cost of attendant care services rendered at home, but reduced the rates on the basis of market surveys of the cost of the services. State Farm refused to raise the rates because it could not verify whether plaintiffs had received the type of care that would justify paying higher rates. Plaintiffs refused to submit documentation regarding the nature and extent of the care they were receiving. Plaintiffs sued. The district court awarded plaintiffs monetary sanctions, instead of default judgment, in response to State Farm’s violation of discovery orders. A jury rendered a verdict in State Farm’s Favor. The Sixth Circuit dismissed appeal regarding the discovery sanctions, for lack of jurisdiction, but otherwise affirmed.

Respondent Hook Point, LLC (Hook Point) was granted a preliminary injunction preventing Appellant Branch Banking and Trust Company (BB&T) from drawing on, and Defendant First Reliance Bank (First Reliance) from honoring, a $1.5 million letter of credit. BB&T appealed. In late 2007, Hook Point sought a loan from BB&T for the purpose of developing a subdivision on property Hook Point owned on Lake Murray called Panama Pointe. BB&T issued a commitment letter to Hook Point in September 2007 indicating that it would loan the company $5.1 million and establish a $2 million line of credit to enable Hook Point to develop the subdivision. Security for the loan included a first mortgage on the Panama Pointe property, personal guarantees of Hook Point’s four principals, and a $1.5 million standby letter of credit issued by First Reliance in favor of BB&T. On December 23, Hook Point filed suit alleging several causes of action against BB&T, including for fraudulent misrepresentation by which BB&T induced Hook Point to enter into a loan agreement. Hook Point admitted to being $70,000 in arrears on interest but argued that the terms of the agreement did not permit BB&T to draw the full amount of the letter of credit (LC) if that exceeded the amount of interest due. It also sought an ex parte temporary restraining order to prevent First Reliance from honoring a draft on the LC by BB&T, which the court granted. After a hearing, the court also granted a preliminary injunction against drafts on or honor of the LC beyond amounts of accrued interest, requiring extension of the LC for one year, and requiring Hook Point to post a $50,000 bond with the court. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of the injunction: "[t]he standard under which a fraud in the transaction claim must be measured when deciding whether to enjoin honor of a letter of credit requires that the beneficiary have no colorable claim or basis in fact for asserting its rights under the letter of credit. In this case BB&T has, in [the Court's] view, not only a colorable claim but an undeniable basis in fact for asserting its rights under the letter of credit. Therefore, the circuit court erred when it granted the preliminary injunction."

Plaintiff, an irrevocable trust, filed a complaint against Defendant, a university graduate student, alleging that he breached his lease agreement by painting over expensive historical wallpaper inside Plaintiff's nineteenth century building and by failing to pay the last month's rent. The superior court trial justice found that Defendant breached the lease by painting portions of the premises but ruled that Plaintiff had failed to prove that the trust had incurred damages that exceeded the amount of unpaid rent. The trial justice then awarded Plaintiff $1,600, plus interest, representing one month of unpaid rent. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment with respect to that portion of the trial justice's decision declining to award damages for the repair of Plaintiff's property and for her failure to award attorney's fees, holding (1) the trial justice erred when she determined damages because she applied the wrong standard; and (2) the clear language of the lease agreement provided contractual authorization for the award of attorneys' fees, and the trial justice abused her discretion in failing to do so.

In two civil actions, Plaintiffs in the underlying action alleged that Cheaters, Inc. and Cheaters Holding Corporation negligently and/or recklessly served alcoholic beverages to William Powers, who afterwards drove a vehicle off the premises and collided with other vehicles, resulting in one death and injuries to others. Before the accident, United National Insurance Corporation had issued an insurance policy to Cheaters and the Holding Corporation. Based on the policy's on-premises endorsement and liquor liability exclusion, United National disclaimed any responsibility for the defense and/or indemnification of the Holding Corporation. Plaintiff corporations then filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment as to their rights under the terms of the policy. The superior court hearing justice granted United National's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the on-premises endorsement, which limited coverage to on-premises losses only, applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that coverage was barred by the on-premises endorsement.

Lake Cabin Development entered into two separate written agreements with the Robert Hurly and John Hurly families to purchase their respective properties. Pursuant to an agreement, Lake Cabin provided Robert Hurly with a $250,000 option payment. After public opposition to Lake Cabin's proposed development on the land forced Lake Cabin to extend the deadline on the closing date of its agreement with the Hurlys, Lake Cabin declared the contract to be null and void and demanded return of its option payment. Both Hurly families brought separate breach of contract actions. The district court concluded that Robert Hurly was required to refund the $250,000 option payment to Lake Cabin because there was never an enforceable contract between the parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in determining that the parties had not entered into a binding agreement, and (2) Lake Cabin was not entitled to a refund of the option payment. Remanded.

Appellants David and Barbara Moore defaulted on the Note to their mortgage in 2008. U.S. Bank, National Association, commenced foreclosure proceedings later that year, not in its individual capacity, but solely as trustee on behalf of GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6 (Appellee). According to the verified petition, the Appellee was "the present holder of said Note and Mortgage having received due assignment through mesne assignments of record or conveyance via mortgaging servicing transfer." The original petition did not attach a copy of the note in question sued upon. Appellants answered, pro se in 2009, disputing all allegations and requesting that the Appellee "submit additional documentation to prove [its] claims including the representation that they were the "present holder of said Note." Appellee subsequently filed an amended petition and a second amended petition to add additional defendants. Neither of these amendments included a copy of the note. Appellee submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment to the court, again representing that it was the holder of the Note. Documentation attached to the Motion attempted to support this representation: including the Mortgage, the Note, an Assignment of Mortgage, and an Affidavit in Support of Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the first time, Appellee submitted the Note and Mortgage to the trial court. The note was indorsed in blank and contained no date for the indorsement. Appellants did not respond to Appellee's Motion, and the trial court entered a default judgment against them. The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the Appellee. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no evidence in the record establishing that Appellee had standing to commence its foreclosure action: “[t]he trial court's granting of a default judgment in favor of Appellee could not have been rationally based upon the evidence or Oklahoma law.” The Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Sisters of Mary of the Presentation Long Term Care, d/b/a Ave Maria Village ("Sisters of Mary"), appealed, and Northern Excavating Co., Inc. ("Northern") cross-appealed a trial court's judgment awarding Northern $81,694.23 plus interest at 1.5 percent and costs at $743.33, and awarding Sisters of Mary $3,231.00 in attorney's fees. In October of 2009, Sisters of Mary and Northern executed a contract wherein Northern agreed to repair a water main break on Sisters of Mary's property for the cost of its "[t]ime and [m]aterials[.]" The contract did not contain a specific price. Following completion of the repairs, Northern submitted a bill for $103,244.11 to Sisters of Mary. Sisters of Mary found the bill excessive and refused to pay, asserting the repairs only had a value of approximately $40,000. Northern filed a construction lien covering the repaired property and sued Sisters of Mary seeking $98,806.98 for breach of contract and foreclosure of the lien. Sisters of Mary answered and counterclaimed alleging breach of contract, unlawful sales practices, and invalid construction lien/slander of title. Sisters of Mary also sought a jury trial. By stipulation, issues relating to the foreclosure of the construction lien were reserved and not submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict awarding Northern $81,694.23 plus interest at 1.5 percent for time and materials provided under the contract. After the verdict was rendered, Sisters of Mary applied for its costs and attorney's fees. In its post-trial brief, Sisters of Mary claimed it successfully challenged Northern's lien and argued the court was required to award it all of its attorney's fees and costs associated with the action. In its own post-trial brief, Northern argued it was unreasonable to require lienholders to pay costs and attorney's fees when a lienholder does not recover the precise amount claimed in a lien. The trial court ultimately awarded Sisters of Mary a portion of its attorney's fees, explaining it was a reasonable award given Sisters of Mary failed to specify "any fees that were directly related to the construction lien issue[.]" The trial court also found Northern was the prevailing party and awarded its costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Legislature intended to award an owner literally all of the costs and attorney's fees arising out of a lawsuit when challenging a lien was not the only disputed cause of action: "[t]here is nothing in the statute or the legislative history to support that conclusion. We recognize that Sisters of Mary must provide the court with an itemization of its attorney's fees and costs in order for the trial court to determine those related to the successful contest of the accuracy of the lien." The Court reversed the award of attorney's fees and costs and remanded that issue to the trial court. Because the district court misconstrued the fees and costs statute, the Court reversed in part and remanded for the district court to determine the reasonable amount of attorney's fees associated with contesting the accuracy of the construction lien.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's order dismissing his complaint against Target and Virginia Winn. Plaintiff, a Hispanic male, alleged that Winn, a white Target cashier, refused to serve him based on his race and publicly humiliated him when she turned him away from her register. Plaintiff brought suit against Winn for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); against Target for vicarious liability and for negligent training, supervision, and retention; and against both defendants for violating his right to make contracts under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court dismissed the case, explaining that plaintiff could not maintain a section 1981 claim because he was ultimately able to complete his purchase, and that Winn's alleged actions did not rise to the level of outrageousness required to state an IIED claim under controlling Florida law. After thorough review and having had the benefit of oral argument, the court agreed and affirmed the judgment of the district court.