Harley-Davidson had a licensing agreement with a subsidiary of DFS and received notice that the companies had merged. Harley-Davidson did not exercise its right to terminate, but later discovered that DFS had sold unauthorized products bearing the trademark to an unapproved German retailer. Harley-Davidon sent an e-mail saying that it believed DFS was in breach of contract and that it was suspending approval of products. DFS responded in kind. Harley-Davidson then attempted to recover unpaid royalties and to secure from DFS information required under the agreement. DFS refused these attempts, but submitted production samples for a new collection. Harley-Davidson reminded DFS of the termination. DFS advised Harley-Davidson that it had “wrongfully repudiated the License Agreement” and that DFS planned to act unilaterally in accordance with its own views of rights and obligations. The district court granted injunctive relief against DFS, which was attempting to litigate the dispute in Greece. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Harley-Davidson made strong showings that DFS was deliberately breaching a licensing agreement and “has tried numerous legal twists and contortions to try to avoid the legal consequences.” The court rejected an argument that the agreement provision consenting to personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin was not binding on DFS. View "H-D MI, LLC v. Hellenic Duty Free Shops, S.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, victims of identity theft, appealed the district court's dismissal of their Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court held that among its other deficiencies, the complaint failed to state a cognizable injury. The court found, however, that the complaint stated a cognizable injury for the purposes of standing and as a necessary element of injury in plaintiffs' Florida law claims. The court also concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged the causation element of negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, breach of implied contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint similarly alleged facts sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss on the restitution/unjust enrichment claim. However, the complaint failed to allege entitlement to relief under Florida law for the claims of negligence per se and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Therefore, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Curry, et al. v. AvMed, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether mere statements of intent to discontinue a joint venture cause automatic dissolution of the venture as a matter of law. Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of an oral agreement, alleging that Defendant promised to transfer his interest in the venture to Plaintiff. Defendant denied the existence of this contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that Defendant's communications to Plaintiff were conclusive evidence of dissolution of the joint venture and warranted summary judgment on the basis that Defendant lacked standing to assert any claims to the venture. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant produced evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to his intent to dissolve the partnership, the court of appeals erred in affirming summary judgment on that basis. Remanded. View "Buck v. Palmer" on Justia Law

In this subrogation action, appellant Insurer sought to recover payments it made to its Insured for the repair of water damage allegedly caused by the negligence of respondent, the commercial tenant of Insured. The district court dismissed Insurer's subrogation claim as a matter of law, relying on the court of appeals decision in United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bruggeman. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed after rejecting the rule from Bruggeman, holding that the question of whether an insurer may pursue a subrogation action against the tenant of an insured, when the tenant's negligence caused damage to the insured's property, must be answered by examining the unique facts and circumstances of each case. Remanded. View "RAM Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rusty Rohde" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the workers' compensation courts had the authority to hear a petition filed by Insured to determine whether Insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify Insured under a policy for workers' compensation insurance. Insurer moved to dismiss Insured's petition, arguing that the compensation judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petition because it asserted a breach of contract claim rather than one arising under the workers' compensation laws. The compensation judge disagreed and denied Insurer's motion to dismiss. The workers' compensation court of appeals (WCCA) affirmed, concluding that Insured was seeking a declaration that its insurance coverage with Insurer was still "in effect," a question within the compensation judge's authority to decide. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the workers' compensation courts had jurisdiction to decide the issues presented in Insured's petition for declaration of insurance coverage, as the real nature of the claim was whether Insured's insurance coverage was in effect, a question that was within the authority of the compensation judge to answer. View "Giersdorf v. A & M Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009 the Forest Service awarded Scott contracts to remove timber on federally-owned plots during a designated period. Scott was then pursuing litigation based on delays in other contracts resulting from environmental litigation. The government therefore included provisions in the contracts at issue, authorizing suspension of the contracts to comply with court orders or for environmental reasons. The contracts provided for term adjustment, but prohibited award of lost profits, attorney’s fees, replacement costs, and similar losses. Another environmental suit arose in Oregon, resulting in an injunction that included the contracts at issue. The Forest Service suspended the contracts and began protected species surveys required by that litigation. Surveys were completed in late 2000, but the suspensions continued, due to new litigation, until 2003. In 2004-2008, Scott harvested the total contractual amount of timber. In 2005, Scott sought damages. The Claims Court found breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and that the government unreasonably delayed the surveys and continued the suspensions. The court found that Scott was entitled to $28,742 in lost profits and $129,599 in additional costs, offset by some actual profit; the government was also liable to a log-processing subcontractor, for $6,771,397 in lost profits; The Federal Circuit reversed. View "Scott Timber Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a flood insurance policy from Appellee, American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida. Their policy was issued pursuant to a federal program under which private insurers issue and administer standardized flood insurance policies (WYO companies), and all claims are paid by the government. After a flood damaged their home in Rhode Island, including the contents of their basement, Plaintiffs sought compensation. American Bankers disallowed much of the amount claimed, asserting that the contents of Plaintiffs' basement were not covered by their policy. Plaintiffs subsequently brought suit in federal court, arguing that the Declarations Page of their policy created an ambiguity as to the scope of coverage and that, under federal common law and general insurance law principles, this ambiguity should be resolved in their favor. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of American Bankers. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' claim was not remotely a claim on which a WYO company may be required to pay damages. View "McGair v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla." on Justia Law

in this trade secret misappropriation and breach of contract case, defendant Chance Mold Steel Co. (Chance) appealed from a permanent injunction and from a jury award of damages. The injunction, based on a finding of contract breach, prohibited Chance from selling, displaying, manufacturing, or assisting others in manufacturing a number of ergonomic computer mouse products. The injunction barred sale of specific products that were materially identical to products Chance had previously manufactured for Contour Design, Inc. (Contour) and a new product known as the ErgoRoller. Chance challenged the scope of the injunction and contended that the jury improperly awarded lost profits damages. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the injunction as applied to the ErgoRoller, holding that the record did not support the finding that Chance breached the contract in producing the ErgoRoller; (2) affirmed the scope of the injunction as applied to the other enjoined products; and (3) affirmed the damages award. View "Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

This case involved the duties and standard of care of an oil and gas operator under an exculpatory clause in a joint operating agreement (JOA). Based on language in the exculpatory clause in the JOA, the trial court instructed the jury to find that to find a breach of the JOA the operator's conduct must have risen to the level of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The jury found the operator, Petitioner, breached his duties under the JOA to the working interest owners. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the gross negligence and willful misconduct instruction should not have been included in the charge because the case centered around a breach of contract; but (2) there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings that Petitioner breached his duty as operator when measured against the elements of breach of contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the exculpatory clause in the JOA established the standard for the claims against Petitioner; and (2) there was legally insufficient evidence that Petitioner was grossly negligent or acted with willful misconduct. View "Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

In July 2008, Appellant-Plaintiff Monica Claman purchased a house in Rock Springs, Wyoming, from Appellee-Defendant Jean Popp. In September 2008, Appellant filed an action against Popp based on subsidence-caused defects in the house. The district court entered summary judgment against Appellant on her breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation claims, and following a bench trial, it entered judgment against her on her fraudulent inducement claim. The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the trial court appropriately entered summary judgment against Appellant as to her breach of contract claim; (2) whether the trial court appropriately entered summary judgment against Appellant as to her claim for negligence/negligent misrepresentation; and, (3) whether the district court erred in its conclusions relating to the Department of Environmental Quality. Finding that the district court's summary judgment against Appellant's breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation claims were in accordance with law and undisputed facts, and that the court's findings of fact on the fraudulent inducement claim were not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Claman v. Popp" on Justia Law