PBM Nutritionals filed a declaratory judgment action against three insurance companies (collectively the Insurers) seeking insurance coverage for its loss resulting from infiltration of filter elements into the infant formula it manufactured between January 22 and January 30, 2009. The Insurers claimed that the insurance policies' "Pollution Exclusion Endorsements" excluded coverage for PBM's infant formula loss because the formula was "contaminated." The circuit court entered judgment for the Insurers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did no err in finding that the Insurers were not liable to provide insurance coverage for PBM's loss of infant formula product.

Summit Group Properties, LLC (Summit) sued Orthopedic & Sports Physical Therapy Associates (OSPTA) and its partners for breach of lease and damages. OSPTA filed a counterclaim in which it alleged fraud in the inducement and damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Summit against OSPTA in the amount of $187,000. The jury found for Summit on OSPTA's counterclaim. OSPTA appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting a jury instruction offered by Summit because it misstated the law by instructing the jury that a limited liability company could not be liable for any fraudulent activity unless the fraud was approved by the members of the LLC. The Supreme Court agreed with OSPTA that the instruction was misleading because it was not a complete statement of the law and held that the trial court erred in giving the instruction. Remanded.

The Mathewses conveyed a parcel of land by deed of trust to a credit union to secure a promissory note. PHH Mortgage Corporation subsequently became the holder of the note and the beneficiary of the deed of trust. After the Mathewses failed to make payments, PHH commenced foreclosure proceedings on the parcel. The Mathewses filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure sale would be void because PHH had not satisfied conditions precedent to foreclosure set forth in the deed of trust. Specifically, they alleged that 24 C.F.R. 203.604 (the Regulation) required PHH to have a meeting with them thirty days before the commencement of foreclosure proceedings. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the Regulation was incorporated into the deed of trust as a condition precedent to foreclosure but that, under Virginia common law, the party who breaches a contract first cannot sue to enforce it. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) borrowers may sue to enforce conditions precedent to foreclosure even if they were the first party to breach the note secured by a deed of trust through non-payment; and (2) the Mathewses pled sufficient facts for the Regulation to apply. Remanded.

A developer contracted with B&R Construction Management (B&R) for the demolition a redevelopment and housing authority facility (hereafter referred to as the Contract). B&R subcontracted some of the demolition work to Beamon Enterprises (Beamon). Beamon, in turn, subcontracted with Environmental Staffing Acquisition Corporation (En-Staff) to provide labor. After Beamon failed to pay En-Staff for the work performed, En-Staff filed a complaint against B&R seeking the amount it was owed under its contract with Beamon. En-Staff asserted it had standing to bring a breach of contract claim against B&R as a third-party beneficiary of the Contract. B&R filed a demurrer disputing En-Staff's status as a third-party beneficiary. The circuit court sustained B&R's demurrer and dismissed En-Staff's claims against B&R with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in finding that the language of the Contract precluded third-party action against B&R, but the error was harmless; and (2) En-Staff was not a third-party beneficiary of the Contract because it benefitted only incidentally from the Contract.

This case arose out of a dispute between two attorneys, John Cattano and Carolina Bragg, the only shareholders of Cattano Law Firm. Bragg filed an amended complaint including claims for a writ of mandamus for the copying and inspection of corporate records, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, breach of contract, and judicial dissolution. A jury returned a verdict finding (1) Bragg owned 27.35 percent of the firm; (2) in Bragg's favor on her claim of derivative conversion, awarding the firm damages; and (3) in favor of Bragg on the breach of contract and judicial dissolution claims, awarding Bragg damages individually. The circuit court then awarded what it determined to be reasonable fees to Bragg. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that there was no error in the judgment of the circuit court.

The AES Corporation paid premiums to Steadfast Insurance Company for commercial general liability (CGL) policies. In February 2008, the village and city of Kivalina, a community located on an Alaskan barrier island, filed a lawsuit (the Complaint) in the U.S. district court against AES and other defendants for allegedly damaging the village by causing global warming through emission of greenhouse gases. Steadfast provided AES a defense under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming that it did not owe AES a defense or indemnity regarding the Complaint. The circuit court granted Steadfast's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Complaint did not allege property damage caused by an "occurrence" as that term was defined in AES's contracts of insurance with Steadfast. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kivalina did not allege that its property damage was the result of a fortuitous event or accident, and therefore, such a loss was not covered under the relevant CGL policies.

Plaintiff's son, Hayden, was involved in a near-drowning accident in which he suffered severe permanent injuries. Plaintiff subsequently sought coverage for the cost of his treatment from Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance, under which Hayden was insured. Wasatch Crest was later declared insolvent, and Plaintiff filed a claim against the Wasatch Crest estate. The liquidator of the estate denied Plaintiff's claim, concluding that Wasatch Crest had properly terminated coverage under the language of the plan. The Supreme Court reversed, interpreting the plan in favor of coverage. Plaintiff resubmitted her claim for medical expenses to the liquidator for payment under the Utah Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act. One year later, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment with the district court. The liquidator subsequently issued a second amended notice of determination denying Plaintiff's claim on the merits. The district court then denied Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, as Plaintiff had not yet challenged the second amended notice of determination and could do so under the Liquidation Act. Plaintiff appealed the district court's order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because Plaintiff did not appeal from a final judgment and had not satisfied any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule.

Ballard, successor in interest to Kilroy, sued Devon, successor in interest to Wise Oil, for breach of a provision in an American Association of Petroleum Land Men (AAPL) Model Form Operating Agreement (Operating Agreement) that was an exhibit to and incorporated by reference in a May 1971 Farmout Agreement (collectively, Joint Operating Agreement or JOA) between Kilroy and Wise Oil. Ballard's lawsuit turned on the interpretation of one sentence in the multi-paragraph "Area of Mutual Interest" (AMI) provision of the Operating Agreement. The court held that, because the entire AMI provision - including its acquisition provisions and its surrender provisions - expired before the claims asserted by Ballard arose, Devon had not breached its contract with Ballard, and the district court's summary judgment was proper.

Plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class, alleged failure to compensate them for work performed during their meal break and before and after shifts, and for time spent attending training sessions, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206-207; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1059(a)(1), 1104(a)(1); and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962, 1964(c). The district court held that the FLSA claim was deficiently pled, and that this was fatal to the complaint because the ERISA and RICO claims were derivative of the FLSA claim. The court found the allegation of under-compensation insufficient, given the lack of any information on plaintiffs' approximate weekly wages and hours worked, or even an allegation that they had worked in excess of 40 hours in any workweek. The First Circuit vacated. The allegations were insufficient under the FLSA, but plaintiffs should be permitted to amend.

In 2003, Shaw Construction obtained a line of credit from Rocky Mountain Hardware (RMH). Over the years, RMH supplied hardware for several jobs on which Shaw was the general contractor. In 2007, Shaw began work on a project for Snake River Sporting Club in which it acted as construction manager rather than general contractor. Although RMH was chosen as the hardware supplier, no separate contract was executed between RMH and either Shaw or Snake River. After none of the balance due was paid, RMH filed the instant action against Shaw, claiming Shaw was obligated to pay the outstanding balance and that RMH had a written contract with Shaw by virtue of the 2003 credit agreement. Shaw claimed Snake River was responsible for all payments to suppliers. The district court ordered Shaw to pay for the hardware furnished by RMH on the project as well as contractual interest and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly ruled the credit agreement applied in this case and, pursuant to its terms, Shaw was responsible for the principal balance due on the hardware contract, together with contractual interest and attorney fees.