Two public utilities (the companies) were wholly owned subsidiaries of appellant FirstEnergy Corporation. Appellees were residential customers of the companies. The customers filed a class-action complaint against FirstEnergy and the companies in the county court of common pleas. The complaint raised four causes of action: declaratory judgment, breach of contract, fraud, and injunctive relief. The trial court granted FirstEnergy's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) had exclusive jurisdiction over the allegations in the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed in all respects except with regard to the customers' fraud claim. The appellate court determined on two separate grounds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the fraud claim and remanded that claim to the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding (1) the customers' fraud claim was not a pure tort action, but rather, was a claim that the companies were overcharging the customers for electric service; and (2) because the complaint was challenging the rates charged for utility service, it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUCO. View "DiFranco v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute between a Netherlands holding company and an Italian businessman. The businessman made a loan to the holding company for a joint venture. The joint venture eventually went into bankruptcy and defaulted on its loan obligations, including the loan from the businessman. The businessman filed this action alleging, among other things, that the holding company induced him to make the loan by representing that it would support and continue to back the joint venture. The holding company denied making those representations or having any obligations to the businessman. The holding company moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds. The Court of Chancery (1) found the businessman's claims were not barred for lack of standing; (2) denied summary judgment on the ground of laches; (3) denied summary judgment on the holding company's English statute of frauds defense; (4) granted summary judgment in the holding company's favor on the businessman's Italian law claim for breach of implied or oral contract and his Dutch law claim; and (5) granted the holding company's motion for summary judgment regarding the businessman's claim for unjust enrichment. View "Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V." on Justia Law

This case began as a control dispute in which the managing member of Oculus Capital Group, LLC sought to block the non-managing member from attempting to take over the managerial role. After a stipulated order and assorted rulings, the control dispute was largely resolved. What remained were the non-managing member's counterclaims, which sought damages from the managing member and its human controller based on the actions they took that caused the relationship between the parties to deteriorate and led to the control dispute. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the counterclaims. The Court of Chancery (1) granted the motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim in part; (2) granted the motion to dismiss the aiding and abetting the breaches of the operating agreement claim in part; (3) denied the motion on the breach of default of fiduciary duty claim as to one of plaintiffs and stayed the count as to the other plaintiff pending arbitration; (4) denied the motion to dismiss the gross negligence claim as to one of the plaintiffs and granted the motion as to the other plaintiff; and (5) granted the motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment. View "Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC" on Justia Law

After Mack Pitts was killed in a construction accident at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, his estate and minor children sued the City of Atlanta and several contractors for breaches of contracts concerning the construction project on which Pitts had been working. Although Pitts was not a party to these contracts, his estate and children asserted that he was an intended beneficiary and that they, therefore, had standing to sue for breach of the contracts. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that Pitts was not an intended beneficiary, denied summary judgment to the estate and children, and awarded summary judgment to the City and contractors. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court should have awarded summary judgment on the claims for breach of contract to the estate and children, not to the City and contractors. The Court of Appeals determined that Pitts was, in fact, an intended beneficiary of the contracts, and it found that the evidence was undisputed that the City and contractors had breached the contracts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals misapplied or failed to apply several fundamental principles of contract law in its consideration of these cases. Accordingly, the Court vacated the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Holder Construction Company v. Estate of Pitts" on Justia Law

Paul Ehlen appealed a judgment that dismissed his action against John and LynnDee Melvin to enforce a purchase agreement, a judgment for costs, and an amended judgment. The matter stemmed from a property transaction between the parties from early 2011. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court's finding the parties did not mutually consent to the purchase agreement was not clearly erroneous. View "Ehlen v. Melvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendant formed and managed a limited liability company for the purpose of entering into a long-term lease on a building in Manhattan. Later, Defendant took sole possession of the property and bought Plaintiffs' membership interests in the LLC. Defendant subsequently assigned the lease to a subsidiary of a development company. Believing that Defendant surreptitiously negotiated the sale with the development company before he bought their interests in the LLC, Plaintiffs commenced this action against Defendant, claiming that, by failing to disclose the negotiations with the development company, Defendant breached his fiduciary duty to them. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. A divided Appellate Division modified Supreme Court's order, allowing four of Plaintiffs' claims to proceed - breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, and fraud and misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals reversed ad dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety, relying on its recent decision in Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de C.V. View "Pappas v. Tzolis" on Justia Law

These petitions for certiorari pertained to contribution among joint tort-feasors and arose from a medical malpractice action in which Petitioners, the Spences, alleged wrongful death and survival claims against Petitioner Mercy Medical Center and Respondents, a medical doctor and his practices. The issue of contribution arose because the Spences and Mercy entered into a pre-trial settlement by which the Spences agreed to dismiss their claims against Mercy without exacting an admission of liability. After Mercy was dismissed as a party, the case proceeded to trial against Respondents, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the Spences. Respondents subsequently initiated a separate action against Mercy seeking contribution. The Spences contemporaneously brought suit against Respondents seeking a declaration that Respondents were not entitled to contribution. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the Spences' release extinguished any right Respondents had to seek contribution against Mercy because Respondents did not join Mercy as a third party defendant in the original action after it was dismissed as a party. The Court of Appeals held that Respondents were not prohibited from pursuing contribution from Mercy in a separate action because the release's conditional language did not fully relieve Mercy's contribution liability. View "Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Julian" on Justia Law

The owners of two properties leased them to developer-tenants for the purpose of building an apartment building on each. As construction was beginning, the landlords breached the leases by refusing to provide estoppel certificates and contesting the tenants' building permits. The landlords' breach prevented the tenants from obtaining financing, which ended the development project. The tenants sued for lost profits. Before trial, the circuit court ruled against the landlords on several motions, holding in part (1) the landlords could not introduce evidence of the 2008 crash in the real estate market to show that the tenants would not have made profits, and (2) the tenants could introduce evidence of the landlords' reasons for breaching, including communications with their former counsel. The jury awarded the tenants over $36 million in damages, holding the landlords jointly and severally liable. The court of special appeals held the landlords could not be held jointly and severally liable but otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did nor err in excluding all evidence of post-breach market data in measuring damages; and (2) the landlord waived the attorney-client privilege as to communications relevant to the subject matter of the claim of bad faith. View "CR-RSC Tower I, LLC v. RSC Tower I, LLC" on Justia Law

A small dental implant company sued a university for breach of a contract for the university to clinically test a new implant the company had patented. The company sought damages for lost profits beginning in 1998, ranging from $200 million to over $1 billion. It claimed that, but for the university's breach of the contract, the company would have become a worldwide leader in the dental implant industry and made many millions of dollars a year in profit. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court excluded as speculative the proffered testimony of an expert to this effect. A jury found that USC had breached the contract and awarded the company $433,000 in compensatory damages. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the expert testimony was speculative, and the trial court acted within its discretion when it excluded the testimony. View "Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal." on Justia Law

Jorgensen Farms sued Country Pride Cooperative alleging that Country Pride sold Jorgensen fertilizer contaminated with rye, damaging its 2007 wheat crop. Country Pride settled with Jorgensen but preserved its claims against third-party defendants Agriliance, Agrium, and Dakota Gasification Company (Dakota Gas). Country Pride brought claims against the third-party defendants alleging that, if Jorgensen proved the fertilizer it purchased from Country Pride was contaminated, the contamination must have occurred in the chain of fertilizer distribution. The trial court granted the third-party defendants' motions for summary judgment, reasoning that Country Pride failed to provide specific facts upon which a jury could find a party responsible without resorting to speculation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Agriliance was not liable as a matter of law under either a breach of contract or negligence theory; (2) Country Pride's claims against Agrium were barred by Country Pride's failure to give notice, the economic loss doctrine, and the statute of limitations; and (3) Dakota Gas did not have a duty to inspect the vehicles used by trucking company for delivery. View "Jorgensen Farms, Inc. v. Country Pride Coop., Inc." on Justia Law