Appellant Jay Warren appealed an order that denied his Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b)(1), SCRCP motions, as well as his independent motion to set aside a judgment sale. On appeal, he contested only the denial of his motion to set aside. Warren is a state bail bondsman, and Respondent Arrow Bonding Company is also in the bond business. Warren agreed to be responsible if a mutual client forfeited a surety bond issued by Respondent. In October 2006, Respondent obtained a $5,120.00 judgment against Warren after the client forfeited. In August 2007, the clerk issued a Judgment Execution, and on September 19, 2007, the sheriff issued an Execution Account Statement. In this statement, he reported receiving a $1,000 payment from Warren, from which he deducted his $52.50 fee, leaving $947.50 to be applied against the debt. After deducting the $947.50 and adding the interest accrued as of September 19, 2007, Warren's judgment debt stood at $4,705.15. In January 2008, Respondent brought an action to foreclose its judgment lien. Warren did not answer, and the clerk granted Respondent's motions, ordering entry of the default against Warren, and referring the matter to the Master-in-Equity. On the sales day, Warren went to the sheriff's office and tendered the amount due under the original judgment, not the amount then due in light of the accumulated interest and other fees. The Master issued a deed to Respondent, who bought all of Warren's properties, which were sold at the sale as a single lot, leaving a deficiency. Warren filed a motion to set aside the default order under Rule 55(c) and/or Rule 60(b), and to set aside the foreclosure deed. The Master denied all relief requested, and denied the request to reconsider his decision. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Master did not err in refusing to set aside the sale or by selling the properties as a single lot. View "Arrow Bonding Company v. Warren" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a leasing agreement between Contour and the Seminole Tribe. Contour appealed from a district court order dismissing its Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on account of the Tribe's sovereign immunity. The district court rejected Contour's arguments and affirmed the judgment. Because the problems of inconsistency and unfairness that were inherent in the procedural posture of Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. were absent in this case, and because an Indian tribe's sovereign immunity was of a far different character than a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court declined to extend Lapides. In regards to Contour's Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. 1301-1303, claim, it must fail because the Supreme Court had already held that Indian tribes were immune from suit under the statute. Finally, in regards to the equitable estoppel claim, that claim was unavailable because it was grounded on a waiver provision contained within a lease agreement that was wholly invalid as a matter of law. View "Countour Spa at the Hard Rock, v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, et al." on Justia Law

Interstate Bakeries granted licenses to some of its trademarks to Lewis Brothers in certain Illinois territories. Interstate Bakeries subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and later contended that its licensing agreement with Lewis Brothers was an executory contract, subject to assumption or rejection under 11 U.S.C. 365. The bankruptcy court agreed and concluded that the agreement was an executory contract. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the agreement constituted an executory contract because a material obligation remained. View "Lewis Brothers Bakeries v. Interstate Brands Corp." on Justia Law

Trinity terminated Dr. Assaf’s employment in 2009t. Assaf filed suit for breach of contract. While the case was pending, Assaf negotiated with Trinity’s new CEO, Tibbitts, Apparently without attorneys, Assaf and Tibbitts signed an agreement that provided that Assaf would receive a salary of $50,000 each year from 2009 to 2011. After that, his employment would automatically renew for a year unless either party gave notice of termination. Trinity refused to honor the agreement. The district court decided to enforce the agreement, but granted Trinity’s motion to bar any evidence of Assaf’s lost professional fees. Trinity never re-employed Assaf, claiming that “there is a policy against ordering specific performance of a personal services contract.” The court ordered Trinity to reinstate Assaf. Rather than reinstating Assaf, Trinity filed a “motion to clarify or stay.” The court reversed its earlier order, proceeded, without trial, to award Assaf his salary for the years 2009 through 2011, attorney’s fees, and compensatory damages. The court did not award any amount in lost professional fees. The Seventh Circuit reversed, declining to address specific performance because Trinity properly reterminated Assaf in 2011. The district court abused its discretion in barring evidence of lost professional fees. View "Assaf v. Trinity Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Northwest Building Company, LLC (Contractor) performed construction services for Northwest Distributing Co., Inc. (Owner) on a Taco John’s/Good Times facility in Gillette, Wyoming. Contractor brought an action against Owner seeking payment for its services, and Owner counterclaimed. After Contractor’s attorney moved to withdraw, the district court ordered Contractor to find substitute counsel in time for the pretrial conference. When Contractor was unable to find substitute counsel by the deadline, the district court sanctioned it by dismissing its complaint and granting judgment in favor of Owner on its counterclaims. Contractor appealed, raising a number of procedural issues. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the Contractor's complaint, and affirmed the lower court's judgment. View "Northwest Building Company, LLC v. Northwest Distributing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Developer and Tenant had done business for many years and had established a template for future transactions. A dispute arose when Tenant forwarded to Developer a commercial lease containing a material term that deviated from the parties' previous leases without specifically drawing Developer's attention to the change. Developer signed the lease without reading the proffered lease line by line. Years later, when Developer discovered the new term, it filed suit against Tenant. The district court, without passing on the merits of the dispute, entered summary judgment against Developer on the ground that the action was time-barred. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately determined that Developer's action was brought too late. View "Rared Manchester NH, LLC v. Rite Aid of N.H., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, a Union Pacific train derailed in Oklahoma causing extensive damage to both the railroad and the train’s cargo. Kawasaki, K-Line, and Union Pacific sought damages, alleging that Plano’s steel injection molds were improperly packed, broke through their crate, and fell onto the track. The district court granted Plano summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Negligence claims were properly rejected, Plano had no indication that the parties with which it dealt would be unable to properly package and transport its steel molds from China to the United States, nor did Plano have any special knowledge of any unique danger the molds would pose during transit. Plano owed no special duty of care to the carriers. There were, however, unresolved questions of fact material to the determination of one contract claim, based on a bill of lading. It was unclear whether Plano or another arranged the molds’ shipment. View "Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. v. Plano Molding Co." on Justia Law

Chad Jones sued his insurance company, Farmers Insurance Exchange, for breach of contract, bad faith breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after Farmers denied his claim. Farmers defended by arguing that it did not breach its contract because Jones's claim was "fairly debatable." Farmers claimed this defense must be resolved through summary judgment. The district court granted Farmers' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fairly-debatable defense should not be resolved through summary judgment if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the defendant's conduct measures up to the standard required for insurance claim investigations. Remanded. View "Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether an appellate court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court order confirming an arbitration award in part and vacating the award in part based on the existence of unresolved questions of law or fact necessary to a ruling, yet the trial court did not expressly direct a rehearing. The court of appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction over the appeal, holding (1) the judgment was not final because it did not contain finality language or otherwise state that it was a final judgment and necessarily contemplated resolution of the remaining issues by way of a rehearing, and therefore, the appeal was interlocutory; and (2) no statute permitted an appeal in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed and, for different reasons, dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding (1) the appeal was interlocutory; (2) the Texas Arbitration Act did not provide jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal; and (3) there is no jurisdiction over arbitration awards that are incomplete unless, under certain circumstances, the parties file a writ of mandamus, which neither party here filed. View "Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge" on Justia Law

This case, which involved the summary suspension of the medical privileges of Plaintiff by Defendant, Bradley Memorial Hospital and Health Center, Inc., came to the Supreme Court for the second time. In Plaintiff's appeal, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denying Plaintiff's motion for punitive damages. On remand, Plaintiff was awarded punitive damages and offer of judgment interest. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that Defendant was entitled to immunity as a matter of law under the federal health Care Quality Improvement Act from money damages arising from its summary suspension of Plaintiff's privileges. Remanded with direction to render judgment in favor of Defendant. View "Harris v. Bradley Mem'l Hosp. & Health Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law