The circuit court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment in a partition action for the sale of jointly owned real estate, having found that the statute of frauds prevented enforcement of an alleged oral "buy/sell" agreement between the parties. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Appellants, as the party attempting to force the sale, were impermissibly using the statute of frauds as a "sword" and not a "shield" and because "no action" was brought by Appellees that might trigger the application of the statute. The court therefore remanded the matter for a determination as to whether the oral buy/sell agreement existed and its effect on the disposition of the property at issue. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that because there was no signed writing in this case, and because there was no evidence that the agreement was not reduced to writing because of fraud at the time of omission or evidence that the application of the statute of fraud would result in Appellants being unjustly enriched, summary judgment was proper.

This matter involved the ability to recover attorney's fees based on a contingency fee arrangement when an attorney withdraws from representation of the client for what the lawyer believes is a valid cause. The district court found Attorney was not entitled to recover his attorney's fees based on a quantum meruit claim but awarded him funds to cover calculated expenses from his representation of Appellee in a personal injury case with a contingency fee contract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a disagreement with a client over whether to accept a settlement offer is not good and sufficient cause for an attorney to withdraw with expectation of a quantum meruit fee.

This case presented the question of whether an automobile insurance policy's permissive user step-down provision was valid and enforceable. Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed whether the particular provision at issue was sufficiently conspicuous, plain, and clear to satisfy the doctrine of reasonable expectations. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, declaring the permissive user step-down provision enforceable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy's permissive user step-down provision was insufficiently plain and clear to defeat the reasonable expectations of the insureds, and therefore, the provision violated the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Remanded.

The parties to this appeal were former spouses, and the issue before the Supreme Court involved the marital settlement agreement they entered into in connection with their divorce. The dispute centered around the appraisal of certain real estate of the former husband, Robert Hazard, which real estate he acquired before his marriage to Connie Hazard. Upon Connie's motion to enforce the agreement, an appraiser valued the property at significantly less than the parties' alleged understanding of the property's value at the time of the agreement. The family court granted Connie's motion and ordered Robert to pay Connie $192,500. Robert appealed, arguing that based upon a mutual mistake of fact, Connie received an unconscionable windfall and that the agreement should be vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the hearing justice that a mutual mistake of material fact was not established in this case by clear and convincing evidence.

In 1990, Pedicini purchased a LICOA supplemental cancer-insurance policy that provided for unlimited cash benefits, payable directly to Pedicini, equal to “usual and customary charges” for radiation or chemotherapy received as treatment. In 2001, Pedicini obtained assistance from an insurance agent, who negotiated a policy with LICOA that capped benefits for treatments at $25,000 per year, lowering the premium. The policy, effective October 2001, tied benefits to “actual charges” made by a person or entity furnishing services treatment or material. Unbeknownst to Pedicini, in February 2001, LICOA changed its practices. It had paid benefits tied to the amount billed by medical providers regardless of the amount accepted in payment, but began paying benefits equal to the amount accepted as full payment by providers. LICOA did not notify policyholders, but did notify its agents. In 2007, Pedicini was diagnosed with cancer. His benefits were only equal to the discounted amount accepted by his provider due to his status as a Medicare recipient. Pedicini won summary judgment on a breach of contract claim, but the court ruled in favor of LICOA on bad faith claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the contract claim, but reversed with respect to bad faith claims.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Oceania Cruises after he became ill on the cruise and received allegedly substandard care. Plaintiff claimed that Oceania negligently hired, retained, and supervised the ship's doctor. Oceania attempted to bring this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(3), contending that the district court erred when it held that a limitation-of-liability provision in Oceania's ticket contract was unenforceable. The district court concluded that the provision, which incorporated by reference portions of international treaties and the United States Code, was so confusing that it did not reasonably communicate to the passengers the cruise line's liability limits. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Ford Motor Co. v. S.S. Santa Irene, which held that the application of the limitation-of-liability provision was not an immediately appealable order under section 1292(a)(3).

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of CGI in its action seeking "appropriate equitable relief" under section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. CGI appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of defendant's counsel and codefendant, dismissing the codefendant from the action. CGI also appealed the district court's grant of proportional fees and costs to the codefendant, deducted from CGI's recovery from defendant. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the codefendant, dismissing it from the action. However, because the court saw no indication that in fashioning "appropriate equitable relief" for CGI, the district court did more than interpret the plain terms of the reimbursement provision, and no indication that the district court considered traditional equitable principles in assigning responsibility to CGI for attorneys' fees and costs, the court vacated the judgment in favor of CGI, vacated the judgment that the codefendant deducted fees and costs from CGI's entitlement, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Starski claims that he had a business relationship with a Vietnamese enterprise (Sovico) and sought to facilitate a $1.5 billion debt swap between the governments of Vietnam and the Russian Federation; that Starski joined with (defendant) Kirzhnev, said to have high level contacts in the Russian government; that Kirzhnev agreed to pay Starski a substantial commission; that $1 billion of the debt swap was completed and $100 million in commissions paid to some combination of Kirzhnev, Kirzhnev’s company, and Sovico; but that Kirzhnev paid Starski nothing. Starski’s suit, seeking at least $25 million in damages, included claims for conversion, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud and unfair business practices in violation of Massachusetts' Chapter 93A. The jury held that no contract had been proved by Starski. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the exclusion of evidence of Kirzhnev's convictions in Russian court for bribery and the bar on cross-examination of Kirzhnev about documents that were seized or destroyed during his arrest by Russian authorities for those same crimes. Starski did not adequately authenticate the convictions and offered nothing to support the fairness of the convictions or the Russian criminal justice system generally.

The State appealed the dismissal of its complaint against seventeen pharmaceutical companies, which the State alleged defrauded Utah's Medicaid program by reporting inflated drug prices. In its complaint, the State pursued two causes of action, violation of the Utah False Claims Act (UFCA) and fraudulent misrepresentation. The district court dismissed the claims based on three alternative grounds. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) although the State's complaint was insufficiently particular under the appropriate Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) standard for claims alleging a widespread scheme to commit fraud and submit false claims, it was in the interest of justice to grant the State leave to amend its complaint under the new standard; (2) the district court erred in dismissing the State's claims under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the State alleged all the elements of its causes of action; and (3) the district court properly applied the one-year statute of limitations to the State's UFCA cause of action and its dismissal of those claims alleged to have arises before April 30, 2006. Remanded.

Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen employed in international disaster relief assistance, returned from an overseas business trip and was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement at Dulles International Airport. An agent seized his laptop and two flash drives after permitting him to copy and retain one computer file and providing Customs Form 6051D indicating that the equipment would be detained for up to 30 days. While the laptop was detained, its hard drive failed, destroying much of its business software. A Customs representative sent a letter seeking to assure plaintiff that a prompt resolution of the issue would be addressed. About 10 weeks after its seizure, the laptop was returned. Plaintiff’s suit alleged breach of an implied-in-fact contract and a taking, with damages totaling $469,480.00 due to lost contracts resulting from inability to access files as well as replacement hardware, software, and warranty costs. The Claims Court dismissed, finding that the complaint did not sufficiently allege a bailment contract and that the property was not taken for a public use within the context of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The Federal Circuit affirmed.