This was an appeal after a retrial on remand in a breach of contract claim by Insured against Insurer. At issue on appeal was the optional replacement cost coverage that Insured contracted. The question was whether Insurer's general denial of liability excused Insured from complying with a policy condition requiring that Insured actually repair or replace the damaged property before replacement costs would be paid. The Supreme Court remanded the cause for a new trial on the limited issue of the extent to which Insurer's conduct prevented Insured from complying with the repair / replace condition to replacement cost coverage under the policy. Also to be tried on remand was the amount of the actual cash value of the loss in the event Insured was not excused from the condition precedent to replacement cost coverage.

White-Spunner Construction, Inc., and Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford") appealed the grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney fees in favor of Construction Completion Company, LLC ("CCC"), in CCC's action alleging that White-Spunner failed to pay it for labor and materials it provided as a subcontractor to White-Spunner in the fall of 2008 in conjunction with White-Spunner's work as the general contractor on a public-works project at Auburn University CCC cross-appealed, arguing that the Mobile Circuit Court erred in dismissing its bad-faith and fraud claims against Hartford, which had issued payment bonds to White-Spunner for the project. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment based on the fact that CCC's claims against White-Spunner and Hartford stemmed from an illegal contract CCC entered into with an unlicensed contractor that provided that contractor's employees would complete the work CCC was contracted to perform. As a result of this reversal, the Court dismissed the cross-appeal as moot.

Monte Sano Research Corporation ("MSRC"), Steven L. Thornton, and Steven B. Teague appealed a preliminary injunction entered against them in an action brought by Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc.; Digital Fusion, Inc. ("DFI"), and Digital Fusion Solutions, Inc. ("DFSI") alleging breach of the duty of loyalty, breach of contract, tortious interference with business and contractual relationships, and civil conspiracy. Additionally, Kratos sought injunctive relief. Thornton and Teague were employees of DFI, which also engaged in government subcontract work; they became employees of Kratos when Kratos Defense merged with DFI in 2008. In February 2009, Thornton and Teague met with Doyle McBride, a NASA consultant who had never been employed by Kratos, to discuss starting a new company to perform government contract work. Several months later, MSRC was incorporated, with McBride and Teague each owning 50 percent. Thornton had no legal interest in MSRC at its formation. McBride acquired office space, issued stock, filed tax returns, obtained business licenses, registered to engage in government contracting, attended meetings, and talked with prime contractors on MSRC's behalf. In June 2011, Thornton's supervisor at Kratos learned that several employees under Teague's supervision had resigned in a short period. Following an investigation, Kratos terminated Teague's employment on June 23, 2011; Thornton resigned four days later. Teague and Thornton then went to work for MSRC. Thornton subsequently purchased MSRC from McBride and became its CEO and president. Subsequently Kratos filed a complaint against MSRC, Thornton, and Teague alleging specifically that Thornton and Teague, while employed by Kratos, assisted in the creation of MSRC, solicited Kratos employees, wrongfully diverted business opportunities, and misappropriated confidential and proprietary information. Kratos also alleged that MSRC wrongfully diverted business opportunities and misappropriated confidential and proprietary information. Kratos applied for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and for a preliminary injunction on June 29, 2011. On appeal, MSRC, Thornton, and Teague argued that the preliminary injunction should be dissolved. MSRC, Thornton, and Teague raised several issues on appeal; however, because the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's order was overbroad and that it failed to comply with Rule 65, Ala. R. Civ. P., the Court did not reach any of their other issues.

Defendant Jean Millman worked as a sales representative for Plaintiff Target Industries, an industrial bag company. Plaintiff Thomas F. Fox was Target's director of development and purchased all of its assets after Target filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1999. Plaintiffs asserted that Millman signed a confidentiality agreement when hired. Target terminated Millman on September 7, 2000. Several days later, Defendant Polymer Packaging Inc., an industrial bag company owned by Defendants Larry and William Lanham, hired Millman knowing that she had previously worked for Target. The Lanhams asserted that Millman assured them that she was not subject to the terms of either a confidentiality agreement or a non-compete clause. The Lanhams did not verify independently the truth of that assertion. The Lanhams conceded that Millman provided Polymer with a list of customers, but contended that she described it as a customer base that she had developed over the years, thereby implying that she had generated the list on her own. The list did not identify Target or bear any indication that it was not Millman's own, and the Lanhams did not further inquire into the genesis of the list. Millman sold products for Polymer to former Target customers and, before leaving Polymer in October 2004, was responsible for generating substantial sales for the company. The core dispute over the list gave rise to a series of rulings by the trial court prior to and following a jury verdict based on special interrogatories, all of which were affirmed by the Appellate Division. Plaintiffs' petition for certification to the Supreme Court asserted that it was error for the trial court to permit Defendants to raise the defense of laches. In particular, they argued that permitting a laches defense, in circumstances in which the statute of limitations had not expired, would erase clearly defined deadlines and therefore create ambiguity, lead to confusion and engender inconsistent results in application. Further, Plaintiffs asserted that the trial and appellate courts erred in rejecting the continuing violation doctrine, in misapplying settled precedents from the Supreme Court recognizing that customer lists are protected as trade secrets, and in failing to require Defendants to inquire independently about the proprietary nature of the customer list prior to utilizing it. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the equitable doctrine of laches could not be used to bar an action at law that was commenced within the time constraints of an applicable statute of limitations. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Plaintiff-Appellee William Mohr was struck in Delaware as a pedestrian by a car insured in Delaware. He recovered the minimum $15,000 coverage limit from the carrier that insured the striking car. Plaintiff also sought to recover from Defendant-Appellant Progressive Northern Insurance Company which sold an automobile insurance policy to Plaintiff's mother. Under the policy, Plaintiff's mother was the named insured, and Plaintiff was a member of her household. The Progressive policy, by its terms, did not cover Plaintiff as a pedestrian. The superior court held nonetheless that Plaintiff was entitled to recover under Progressive's policy because insofar as it denied PIP coverage, the policy conflicted with the Delaware automobile insurance statute which mandated such coverage. Progressive appealed. The court ordered Progressive to pay the difference between the amount Plaintiff recovered from the striking-car's policy and PIP limit of his mother's policy. Finding no error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Business Communications, Inc. (BCI) asserted two breach-of-contract claims against its former employee, Albert Banks: breach of BCI's business-protection agreement (BPA), which included a noncompetition provision, and breach of BCI's reimbursement-of-costs agreement (RCA). At trial, the jury awarded BCI $1,000 for breach of the BPA and $9,000 for breach of the RCA. Thereafter, the Circuit Court of Madison County granted Banks’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Subsequently, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant of JNOV as to the RCA, but reversed regarding the BPA, "reinstat[ing] the jury's verdict [of $1,000], and remand[ing the] case to the trial court to consider BCI's motion for attorney's fees." The Supreme Court granted Banks's petition for writ of certiorari to address the elements of a breach-of-contract claim involving a noncompete agreement and the nature of the damages to which BCI was entitled. Regarding the elements of a breach-of-contract claim, the Court held that monetary damages were a remedy for breach of contract, not an element of the claim. As to damages for breach of the BPA, BCI acknowledged it had sustained no identifiable loss. But because (1) the jury was instructed on both compensatory and nominal damages, (2) the special-verdict form did not specify the type of damages awarded, and (3) the jury's award of $1,000 was well within the continuum of legitimate nominal damage awards, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reinstatement of that jury verdict. The Court also affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision to remand to the circuit court to consider BCI's motion for attorney's fees.

The Surgical Institute of South Dakota, P.C. filed suit against Dr. Matthew Sorrell who was formerly employed by the practice. The practice alleged breach of contract against the physician for failing to give required notice of resignation and breach of an implied contract resulting in unjust enrichment. The implied contract claim was dismissed by summary judgment; a jury found the physician did not breach the contract. The practice timely appealed the dismissal of its implied contract claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury's verdict, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the practice's motion for a new trial. Additionally, the Court found that the practice did not show a "clear abuse of discretion" in excluding certain evidence from trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the extent of uninsured motorist coverage provided under an automobile insurance policy issued to a husband and wife who were both injured by an uninsured motorist while riding their motorcycle. The husband, Leo Fontaine, died as a result of his injuries. The motorcycle in question was not expressly identified in the policy at issue. Plaintiff-Insurer New London County Mutual Insurance Company (NLC) filed suit for declaratory relief seeking clarification of the rights and obligations of the parties pursuant to their policy issued to the couple. Arguing that the policy language unambiguously excluded the defendants' claim for uninsured motorist benefits, NLC filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the Superior Court. Defendants Karolyn Fontaine, individually and on behalf of the estate of her husband, Leo appealed the grant of summary judgment and contended that the pertinent policy provision was ambiguous and should have been construed in favor of coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the policy language explicitly excluded Defendants' claims from coverage. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment.

Petitioner, The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation (ACT), filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that a public highway construction contract awarded to Respondent, Nicewonder Contracting, Inc., by Respondent, West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH), violated state competitive bidding and prevailing wage laws. The circuit court dismissed ACT's action, finding it lacked standing to challenge the highway construction contract. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that ACT had representative standing to seek the declarations. On remand, the circuit court determined that the Court's opinion in ACT I did not completely decide the issue of ACT's standing and ordered that ACT join the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) as a defendant in the action. The Supreme Court subsequently granted ACT's requested writ of prohibition because the circuit court did not give effect to the mandate of the Court in ACT I, holding (1) ACT, as a matter of law, had standing to prosecute its lawsuit; and (2) FHWA was not an indispensable party to the lawsuit.

As the primary beneficiary under an insurance policy issued by Appellee Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, Appellant Roger Goff brought a cause of action under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, asserting that Penn Mutual had violated the statutory duty of good faith and fair dealing. After deciding that Goff did not meet the accepted definition of either a first- or a third-party bad faith claimant, the trial court dismissed Goff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a primary life insurance beneficiary may assert a statutory bad faith action upon the death of the insured. Remanded.