This case involved a residence that the plaintiff homeowners allege contained "major structural defects." After discovering these defects and notifying the builder, the parties entered a "tolling agreement" to toll the applicable limitations period, so they could "engage in a review and analysis of the structural settlement issues to determine an agreed upon repair." After the builder refused to correct the defects, the plaintiffs filed suit averring breach of the New Home Warranty Act (NHWA); breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose; implied warranty of construction performed in a workmanlike manner; negligence; and fraud/misrepresentation/and/or omission of fact. In response, the defendant builder asserted the claims were time-barred and that the tolling agreement was void. This appeal arose from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling that the tolling agreement was void: "Parties should not be discouraged from honest efforts to settle and/or compromise disputes, and thereby avoid incurring the attendant expenses and uncertainty of litigation and further burdening the courts – all laudable and desired goals. . . .parties should be allowed to agree to extend statutes of limitations (or repose) if they believe this to be in their best interest; however, the limitation period should not be shortened, absent an act of the Legislature." View "Townes v. Rusty Ellis Builder, Inc." on Justia Law

In July 2001, Kaye Hankins entered into a home-construction contract with Elite Homes, Inc. ("Elite"). An August 2001 soil-test report on the subject property recommended that "a stabilizing blanket of natural silty clays . . . and/or compacted fill soils having a maximum 7-foot thickness" was required "to minimize the Yazoo Clay . . . swell or heave potential to within limits tolerable to a strong slab foundation . . . ." Hankins received assurances from Elite that the Yazoo clay "was nothing to be concerned about." She moved into the new home in April 2002. During Hankins's first year in the home, she reported to Elite numerous cracks, leaks, and difficulties in closing doors and windows. In September 2009, Hankins filed a complaint against Elite averring "that the damage which has occurred to said house . . . would not have occurred except for the negligence" of Elite. Thereafter, a "Default Judgment" of was entered against Elite. In August 2010, Hankins filed a "Suggestion for Writ of Garnishment" against Elite's commercial general liability ("CGL") insurer, Maryland Casualty Company/Zurich American Insurance Company ("Maryland Casualty"). In October 2010, a default judgment was entered against Maryland Casualty. Subsequently, Maryland Casualty filed a "Motion to Suspend Execution of Default Judgment against Maryland Casualty and For Leave to File Answer to Writ of Garnishment," which argued, inter alia, that because its CGL policy "exclud[ed] coverage for property damage caused by earth movement," then it "has no property or effects in its possession belonging to" Elite. Maryland Casualty then filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on the same basis. The circuit court concluded that the "earth movement" endorsement "excludes the damages suffered by [Hankins] from coverage under the policy." Based thereon, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, and set aside the default judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Maryland Casualty's "earth movement" endorsement was unambiguous and operated to exclude the property damage Hankins suffered from coverage under the CGL policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the insurance company, and the setting aside of the default judgment. View "Hankins v. Maryland Casualty Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (collectively "Tellus") alleged that they owned the "shallow gas" rights in a tract of land known as the Bilbo A Lease. While ownership of the shallow gas was disputed, all parties agreed that the defendants (collectively "TPIC") owned the gas rights below 8,000 feet and the oil rights in both the shallow and deep zones. In 2004, Tellus sued TPIC, alleging that it had produced Tellus's shallow gas through one if its wells known as the A-1 well. After much pretrial litigation and a two-month jury trial, the trial judge declared that the plaintiffs were the rightful owners and submitted the plaintiffs' conversion and negligence claims to a jury. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants, and both sides appealed. Finding no reason to reverse, the Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict and the trial court's declaratory judgment. View "Tellus Operating Group, LLC, v. Texas Petroleum Investment Co." on Justia Law

Johnson Farms, Inc. and Floyd Johnson filed a complaint against Ethel Halland alleging (1) in her capacity as secretary of Johnson Farms, Inc., Ethel breached her fiduciary duties by diverting corporate funds to herself and others; and (2) Ethel conferred gifts to herself and other family members in contravention of a written trust agreement. The district court granted Ethel's motion for summary judgment, finding that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and that equitable estoppel did not toll the statute of limitations. The district court also awarded Ethel attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Johnson's claims were barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) the district court did not err in awarding Ethel attorneys' fees and costs. View "Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Halland" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of an employment contract between defendant and plaintiffs, his employer. After receiving a favorable judgment in a prior proceeding, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint in the present action on the basis of res judicata. Defendant also filed a motion requesting sanctions and attorney's fees. The district court granted the motion to dismiss but declined to impose sanctions or award attorney's fees. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that the district court properly decided the merits of defendant's res judicata defense on a motion to dismiss. On the merits, Count VI was barred by res judicata where the cause of action existed at the time of the first judgment and it occurred from the same transaction or occurrence. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision to deny sanctions and attorney's fees. View "C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., et al v. Lobrano, Jr." on Justia Law

This case arose when Highland filed suit against Bank of America for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, alleging that the terms sought by Bank of America in a debt-trade agreement did not conform to the parties' oral agreement. Highland appealed the district court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of its claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Because the court found that the district court was justified in dismissing Highland's promissory estoppel claim, but that it erred in dismissing Highland's breach of contract claim, the court affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. View "Highland Capital Mgmt. LP v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

In this breach of contract case, defendant DHL Express (USA), Inc. ("DHL") appealed from a judgment on the pleadings for plaintiff C.A. Acquisition Newco LLC ("Newco"). The district court concluded that DHL had terminated the contract and awarded the $50,000 per month provided for in the contract in the event of a "termination." In total, the court entered final judgment for Newco in the amount of $413,333 plus interest. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the contract was ambiguous as to whether DHL's actions constituted a termination under the contract. Remanded. View "C. A. Acquisition Newco, LLC v. DHL Express (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

GFK, a shipowner, appealed from the district court's dismissal of its action for declaratory judgment that it was not contractually bound to arbitrate a fuel agreement with AM, a marine fuel supply company. The court held that the district court properly exercised admiralty jurisdiction over the case even though plaintiff disclaimed the existence of any maritime contracts. However, concluding that the district court prematurely resolved disputed factual issues over whether the actual fuel purchaser had authority to bind GFK to the alleged contracts with AM, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garanti Finansal Kiralama A.S. v. Aqua Marine and Trading Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant James Newman (husband) and appellee Judy Newman (wife) were married in May 2007. Just before their wedding, they executed a 20-page type-written prenuptial agreement to which they added a handwritten provision acknowledging "that there [were] certain ambiguities contained [within] the body of this document which each party agrees to clarify and re-write within 30 days of the date of execution hereof." Wife filed for divorce in 2011. After a hearing, the trial court granted wife's motion to enforce the prenuptial agreement and entered a judgment of divorce incorporating its terms. The Supreme Court granted husband's application for discretionary appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment: "[i]n essence, husband argue[d] that any agreement the parties may have had was voided by the addition of the language indicating their belief that the agreement contained ambiguities and their intent to clarify such ambiguities. Because the language of the prenuptial agreement demonstrate[d] the parties reached a complete agreement regarding the disposition of property in the event their marriage ended in divorce, we conclude the trial court did not err by granting wife's motion to enforce the agreement and incorporating the agreement into the final divorce decree." View "Newman v. Newman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners of condominium units that were destroyed by Hurricane Katrina, sued defendants after defendants failed to complete construction of the rebuild. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, based on the district court's finding that the 24-month construction obligations in the Purchase Agreements were not illusory and, therefore, the parties' contracts were exempted from the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosures Act (ILSA), 15 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. The court found that the language of the Purchase Agreements did not negate plaintiffs' abilities to seek damage and specific performance remedies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Hillman, et al v. Loga, III, et al" on Justia Law