In the 1950s and 1960s, landowners in southwest San Bernardino County, California, transferred 19 parcels of land to various individuals by grant deed, reserving a partial interest in all minerals beneath the surface. The current owners of the surface estate are mining companies that wish to extract sand and gravel from the combined 196-acre tract through open-pit excavation. Mineral rights holders, descendants of the original grantors, claim a one-half interest in the mining proceeds. The question in this appeal was whether “minerals” in the original reservations include rights to mine sand and gravel. Concluding they do, the trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of the mineral rights holders, and the mining companies appealed.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court held that the plain language of the deed was ambiguous as to the term "minerals," and therefore turned to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent. The court found that sand and gravel had been mined in the region for decades before the grant deeds, and that these substances possess commercial value. Although open-pit mining will affect the usability of the surface estate, the surface estate retains a 50 percent interest in the extracted minerals. The court concluded that the deeds' ambiguity as to whether sand and gravel were included in the mineral reservation was resolved by California Civil Code section 1069, which requires that deed reservations be construed in favor of the grantor. Thus, the court held that under these deeds, the term "minerals" included sand and gravel. View "Vulcan Lands, Inc. v. Currier" on Justia Law

Austin McGee was involved in a car accident on a stretch of Highway 45 in South Dakota that was undergoing resurfacing. He claimed that the accident was caused by a negligent failure by the South Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) and several of its employees to ensure that the contractor responsible for the resurfacing complied with DOT standards and industry practices. The DOT argued that sovereign immunity protected it from the lawsuit. The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision that McGee could sue the DOT and its employees, rejecting the DOT's arguments that McGee lacked standing as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the DOT and the contractor, and that McGee failed to establish an actionable duty. The court found that the DOT had a ministerial duty under its own Standard Specifications not to exceed the estimated amount of tack coating to be applied each day, but found no ministerial duties relating to the use of precautionary measures. Thus, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mcgee V. Spencer Quarries" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute arising from a real estate transaction between appellants Donnell and Marilyn Bauer and appellees Jesse Lee and Mary A. Beamon. The Bauers sold Lot 24A to the Beamons, failing to disclose certain defects and issues related to the property. After the sale, the Beamons discovered a mold issue in the residence and soil instability on an adjacent lot, Lot 18, which the Bauers had also owned. The Beamons attempted to remediate these issues, incurring significant costs. They ultimately sought to rescind the contract, alleging fraud and deceit by the Bauers.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's denial of the Beamons’ rescission claim, finding that the Beamons had waived their right to rescission by taking possession of the property, engaging in mold eradication, and attempting to remediate the soil conditions on the hillside. These actions were found to be inconsistent with an intent to rescind.However, the court reversed the lower court's award of damages to the Beamons for breach of contract. The court found that the Beamons had not alleged breach of contract in their complaint, and thus could not recover damages on that basis. Furthermore, the court found that the Bauers' constitutional right to a jury trial had been violated, as the Beamons’ claim for rescission, an equitable remedy, had been tried without a jury, and the Bauers were not given a jury trial on the legal claim for damages. View "BAUER V. BEAMON" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which dismissed a plaintiff's 2019 complaint against art dealers for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and rescission in connection with his 2001 purchase of an allegedly forged painting. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claims as time-barred and ruled that the plaintiff's fraud claim could not be granted relief. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that he was on inquiry notice of the alleged fraud before bringing the suit. The appellate court agreed with the district court that claims for breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and rescission were time-barred under New York law. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the fraud claims were time-barred and in denying the plaintiff's request for leave to amend his complaint. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Meyer v. Seidel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Missouri issued an opinion involving a dispute between Tyler Technologies, Inc., and several individual and corporate property owners. The property owners had filed a class-action petition alleging that Tyler Technologies negligently carried out its contractual obligations to assist Jackson County with the 2023 real property assessment. The property owners claimed that Tyler Technologies' failures resulted in some class members not receiving timely notice of increased assessments and others having their property assessments increase by more than 15 percent without a physical inspection.Tyler Technologies filed a motion to dismiss the allegations, arguing that the property owners failed to allege facts showing that Tyler Technologies owed them a duty of care. The circuit court overruled the motion to dismiss, prompting Tyler Technologies to file a petition for a writ of prohibition, which the Supreme Court of Missouri issued as a preliminary writ.After a review, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the property owners did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Tyler Technologies owed them a duty of care. The court noted that the duties the property owners described were statutory obligations of the county assessor, not private, third-party contractors like Tyler Technologies. The court also invoked the rule of privity, which generally states that a party to a contract does not owe a duty to a plaintiff who was not a party to the contract. In the court's view, disregarding this rule would expose Tyler Technologies to excessive and unlimited liability and potentially discourage contractors from entering into service contracts due to the fear of obligations and liabilities they would not voluntarily assume.Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that Tyler Technologies was entitled to dismissal of the disputed counts of the property owners' petition. The court made its preliminary writ of prohibition permanent, barring further action from the circuit court other than dismissing the contested counts with prejudice. View "State ex rel. Tyler Technologies, Inc. v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

In the state of California, an individual named Chad Grayot purchased a used vehicle from a car dealership with a contract that was later assigned to the Bank of Stockton. This contract included the Federal Trade Commission's 'Holder Rule' notice, which allows a consumer to assert against third party creditors all claims and defenses that could be asserted against the seller of a good or service. Grayot sought to hold the Bank responsible for refunding the money he paid under the contract based on the holder provision in the contract. The Bank argued that it could not be held responsible because it was no longer the holder of the contract as it had reassigned the contract back to the dealership. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank, accepting its argument. Grayot appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that a creditor cannot avoid potential liability for claims that arose when it was the holder of the contract by later reassigning the contract. This interpretation of the Holder Rule is in line with the Federal Trade Commission's intent to reallocate any costs of seller misconduct to the creditor. The court sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Grayot v. Bank of Stockton" on Justia Law

In this case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three, the plaintiff, Sally Ann Haydon, a former resident of Elegance at Dublin, a residential care facility for the elderly, sued the facility and its affiliated entities for elder abuse and other claims. The defendants attempted to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the resident agreement that Haydon had signed. The trial court denied the motion, finding the arbitration agreement to be unconscionable. The defendants appealed this decision.Haydon had lived at the facility for a few days and has dementia. The agreement she signed, which contained the arbitration clause, was over 40 pages long, and the arbitration clause was one of over 20 "miscellaneous" provisions at the end of the document. Haydon claimed she signed the agreement under duress and without understanding its contents.On appeal, the court found that there was a high degree of both procedural and substantive unconscionability in the arbitration clause, and therefore affirmed the trial court's decision not to enforce it. The court found procedural unconscionability in the circumstances of the agreement's formation, considering the pressure Haydon was under to sign the agreement, the lack of explanation about the arbitration clause, and the confusing presentation of the clause. The court found substantive unconscionability in the confidentiality provision of the arbitration agreement, the limitations on discovery under the applicable arbitration rules, and the requirement that parties bear their own costs and fees in connection with the arbitration. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever the unconscionable provisions from the arbitration clause, given the extent of the unconscionability. View "Haydon v. Elegance at Dublin" on Justia Law

In the State of Montana v. Sky M. Little Coyote, the Supreme Court of Montana dealt with an appeal by Little Coyote, who had been incarcerated and was appealing the revocation of his suspended sentence. Little Coyote argued that his time served had been incorrectly calculated and that, when correctly accounted for, his sentence had already expired before the State filed its revocation petition. The State argued that Little Coyote was bound by an agreement he had entered into regarding the time served.The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for dismissal of the State's Petition for Revocation. The court found that Little Coyote's time served had indeed been inaccurately calculated. It ruled that the parties involved had been operating under a mutual mistake regarding the time Little Coyote had served. The court held that, when correctly calculated and credited, Little Coyote's sentence had expired nearly three months before the State filed its revocation petition. Thus, the disposition imposed on Little Coyote was deemed illegal as the lower court had lacked the authority to revoke or impose a disposition after the expiration of his sentence. View "State v. Little Coyote" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho upheld a lower court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, George and Jesse’s Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc., and two of its owners, Bruce and Richard Byram. The plaintiff, Adam Davis, had been employed as an assistant manager at Les Schwab from April 2016 till June 2019. In March 2019, there was a shortage in the cash deposits and surveillance footage showed Davis bending down out of camera view in the area where the cash deposits were kept while he was alone in the store. This led to Davis being arrested and charged with grand theft, and his employment was terminated. Although the charges against Davis were later dropped, he sued the defendants for breach of his employment contract, false arrest, defamation per se, and for knowingly giving a false report to the police. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of Davis’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no genuine issue of material fact that could support Davis’s claims. The court found that Davis was an at-will employee who could be terminated without cause and that there was no evidence to show that the defendants had acted with malice. The court also found that the plaintiff's attorney had violated Rule 11.2 by submitting arguments that were not well grounded in fact, and awarded a portion of the defendants' attorney fees to be paid by the plaintiff's counsel. View "Davis v. George and Jesse's Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa to dismiss the lawsuit of Iowa-based livestock feed seller Hawkeye Gold, LLC against China National Materials Industry Import and Export Corporation, also known as Sinoma, for lack of personal jurisdiction. Hawkeye Gold sued Sinoma to recover an unpaid default judgment it obtained against Sinoma's now-defunct wholly owned United States subsidiary, Non-Metals, Inc., for breach of a contract to purchase livestock feed. After six years of litigation, the District Court dismissed the case because it did not have personal jurisdiction over Sinoma, a decision which Hawkeye Gold appealed. The Appeals Court, after reviewing the evidence, agreed with the District Court's conclusion that Sinoma had insufficient minimum contacts with Iowa to support personal jurisdiction. The Court also rejected Hawkeye Gold's argument that Sinoma was a party to the contract or that Non-Metals was the alter-ego of Sinoma. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the District Court's denial of Hawkeye Gold's request for sanctions against Sinoma for alleged discovery violations. View "Hawkeye Gold, LLC v. China National Materials" on Justia Law