Petitioner, New Hampshire Insurance Company, appealed an order of the circuit court granting partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent, RRK, Inc., finding that pursuant to the commercial marine property insurance policy issued by New Hampshire, RRK's barge and the barge's contents were covered property under the policy and that a wear-and-tear exclusion in the policy was invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that there was no question of fact regarding whether a renewal policy was mailed to and received by RRK; but (2) the circuit court erred by granting partial summary judgment in favor of RRK because there was a question of fact as to whether, under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the wear-and-tear exclusion present in the policy mailed to RRK was part of the insurance contract. Remanded. View "N.H. Ins. v. RRK., Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the sale of a residence. The buyers, the plaintiffs below, sought compensatory and punitive damages from the sellers regarding water leakage in a basement storage room of the residence the buyers purchased. The leak was disclosed to the buyers after the signing of a purchase agreement and before the closing of the sale. In the complaint, the buyers also asked the circuit court to direct the sellers to proceed with the closing and deliver a deed to the buyers containing covenants of general warranty as specified in the purchase agreement. In granting partial summary judgment to the sellers, the circuit court concluded that the buyers' claims were without merit because they were on notice of the water leak prior to the closing of the sale. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the sellers were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law based on the purchase agreement; (2) the refusal of the circuit court to allow discovery constituted reversible error; and (3) the circuit court erred in failing to direct the sellers to deliver a deed to the buyers setting forth the language required by the purchase agreement. View "Hinerman v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Southeast Construction, L.L.C. ("SEC") appealed a circuit court's judgment and WAR Construction, Inc. ("WAR") filed a cross-appeal (which was treated as a petition for a writ of mandamus). The matter came before the Supreme Court following the appeal of the entry of the arbitration panel's ruling on the parties' respective construction contract claims. The decision resulted in a net award to WAR of $373,929. SEC filed a motion for modification of the award. WAR responded with a "Motion for Clerk's Entry of Arbitration Award as Final Judgment" pursuant to Rule 71C, Ala. R. Civ. P. The circuit court entered an order in which it declined to have the award entered as a judgment at that time. Eventually the court did enter an order based upon the arbitration award, and the parties appealed. "Given the nature of the award made by the arbitrators in this case and the nature of the resulting judgment the circuit court properly ordered the clerk to enter, it is apparent that the circuit court must take some additional responsibility for enforcing that award and the resulting judgment. To the extent WAR complain[ed] in its petition of the circuit court's reluctance to do so, [the Supreme Court agreed] with WAR" and, accordingly, ordered the circuit court to take appropriate action to enforce the judgment it has entered based upon the arbitrators' award. View "Southeast Construction, L.L.C. v. WAR Construction, Inc. " on Justia Law

Under the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, the City of Newport provided health insurance benefits to its retired firefighters. After the City decided to modify those benefits, Local 1080, International Association of Firefighters, ALF-CIO (Union) filed grievances and sought arbitration. The City responded by seeking relief in the superior court to determine the arbitrability of disputes over changes to these benefits. The superior court determined that this dispute was not arbitrable. The Union disagreed and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the parties did not intend to arbitrate disputes regarding retiree healthcare, and therefore, such disputes must be resolved, if at all, judicially rather than through arbitration. View "City of Newport v. Local 1080, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

LSED sought to rescind an agreement to purchase bond insurance from FGIC and recover its $13 million premium payment. LSED based its claim on failure of cause, a tenet of Louisiana law that required all contracts be supported by cause. Because the court found that the principal cause of the agreement between the parties was the purchase of bond insurance to protect the bondholders in the event of default, not to reduce the interest rate LSED paid to borrow money, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "In Re: Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his declaratory judgment, contract, unjust-enrichment, tort, and shareholder claims. Applying a choice-of-law analysis, the district court dismissed the contract and unjust-enrichment claims as barred by a Delaware statue of limitations and dismissed the tort and declaratory judgment claims as derivative of the contract claims. The district court dismissed the shareholder claims as insufficiently pleaded. The court held that plaintiff's pleadings were minimally sufficient to present plausible shareholder claims. Therefore, the court reversed as to the shareholder claims but affirmed in all other respects. View "Whitney v. The Guys, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

This dispute between The Saint Consulting Group (Saint) and its liability insurer, Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company (Endurance), stemmed from Endurance's refusal to defend Saint in a lawsuit against Saint in the Northern District of Illinois. The district court dismissed Saint's lawsuit against Endurance based on an exclusion in the policy that stated explicitly that the policy does not apply to any claim based upon or arising out of any actual or alleged violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act or any similar provision of any state law. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the second complaint alleged that Saint engaged in an anti-competitive scheme the exclusion was triggered; and (2) the policy did not cover the negligent spoliation claim in the first complaint. View "Saint Consulting Group, Inc. v. Endurance Am. Specialty, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was severely injured in a workplace accident and sued Trail King, the custom manufacturer of the trailer involved in the accident. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's finding that Defendant had not been negligent nor in breach of any warranty. In the trial court in that diversity case, Plaintiffs belatedly attempted to amend their complaint to add another claim, one under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A for unfair and deceptive trade practices. The trial judge denied the motion, finding the effort to amend untimely. Plaintiffs did not appeal this denial in their earlier appeal. This case concerned whether Plaintiffs may now maintain an independent suit for the ch. 93A claims against Trail King. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice, finding that the doctrine of claim preclusion applied. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that ch. 93A, 9(8) provides an exception to the normal rules of res judicata. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that under the facts of this case, Plaintiffs may not now bring this ch. 93A claim because of the failure to appeal from the denial of the motion to amend. View "Hatch v. Trail King Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought coverage under his homeowners' insurance policy issued by Insurer for damages allegedly caused by sheets of drywall manufactured in China that were installed in his home during its construction. Insurer denied Plaintiff's claim and brought an action in the U.S. district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff's homeowners policy did not provide coverage for such losses. The district court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the policy did not provide coverage for the damages allegedly caused by the drywall because of certain policy exclusions. The U.S. court of appeals certified to the Virginia Supreme Court the question of whether the policy exclusions were applicable to Plaintiff's claimed losses. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that the policy unambiguously excluded from coverage damage caused by the Chinese drywall installed in Plaintiff's residence. View "TravCo Insurance Co. v. Ward" on Justia Law

HPD, LLC and TETRA Technologies Inc. entered into an agreement for HPD to supply equipment to be used in TETRA's future facility. The contract contained a provision for binding arbitration. After the construction of the plant was completed, TETRA filed a complaint against HPD, alleging that the equipment designed by HPD did not perform to expectations. TETRA also sought a declaratory judgment that the contract and the embedded arbitration clause were illegal and thus void because HPD performed engineering services without obtaining a certificate of authorization as allegedly required by Ark. Code Ann. 17-30-303. HPD moved to compel arbitration. After a hearing, the circuit court rule in TETRA's favor that it would determine the threshold issues of arbitrability before deciding whether the case must proceed to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the entry of an order compelling arbitration, holding that the circuit court erred by not honoring the parties' clear expression of intent to arbitrate the existing disputes. View "HPD LLC v. TETRA Techs., Inc." on Justia Law