The Hancock Center in Chicago is managed by Shorenstein (several related companies). Shorenstein hired an architectural firm, MCA, to design and oversee renovation of windows and exterior walls; MCA hired a general contractor. In 2002, a scaffold fell from the 42nd floor in a high wind and killed three people in cars, severely injuring several others. Shorenstein settled with plaintiffs in 2006 for a total of $8.7 million. MCA’s contract with Shorenstein had required MCA to obtain liability insurance covering the owner, Shorenstein, and any other party specified by the owner. MCA obtained the required insurance policy from AMICO, covering “any person or organization to whom [MCA is] obligated by virtue of a written contract.” There was a dispute concerning which Shorenstein entities were covered. Shorenstein was awarded $959,866.02 by the district court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court erred in apportioning the award among the Shorenstein entities. The court rejected AMICO’s arguments that the claim was barred by an exclusion of coverage for injuries “due to rendering or failure to render any professional service” by an insured and that Shorenstein gave up its right to indemnity by AMICO by asking its other insurer for indemnification. View "Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs acquired the assets of a restaurant. Defendant owned the real property on which the building was located. Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into an agreement granting Plaintiffs a ten-year lease of Defendant's real property. The lease granted Plaintiffs the option to purchase Defendant's real property in 1999 at the expiration of the lease. Plaintiffs claimed they provided written notice to Defendant of their interest in purchasing the property and that Defendant agreed to the appointment of an independent appraiser in 2000, but Defendant never followed through in procuring an appraisal. In 2009, Plaintiffs filed a complaint requesting a declaratory judgment and order requiring Defendant to select an independent appraiser and sell the property. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint on statute of limitations grounds and granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on her unlawful detainer counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a set of facts that would enable them to equitably estop Defendant from raising her statute of limitations defense; and (2) the district court did not improperly consider matters outside the pleadings in reaching its decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. View "Situ v. Smole" on Justia Law

In 2002, U.S. Health entered into a 20-year lease for a nursing home and adjacent property owned by Lock. Before mid-2006, U.S. Health assigned the lease to Americare without obtaining Lock’s written consent, a required by the lease. Two lawsuits followed. One charged that U.S. Health had violated a provision of the lease under which it was required to fund a replacement reserve and resulted in a stipulated judgment in Lock’s favor of $679,287.96, plus prejudgment interest. The next day, U.S. Health filed a motion to set aside the judgment. Days later, the parties stipulated to a new judgment of $485,430.56 with attorneys’ fees to be agreed by June 10, and entry of a supplemental judgment. After extensions, the court entered a final judgment of $485,430.56, plus post-judgment interest at 5.13 percent. The court later granted Lock’s motion for fees of $29,238.85. Weeks later, the court granted Lock’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) and (3) to modify the judgment to include Americare as a judgment debtor because it had only then learned that U.S. Health, without the necessary authorization from Lock, had assigned its lease to Americare. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that it had jurisdiction. View "Lock Realty Corp. IX v. U.S. Health, LP" on Justia Law

Petitioner Northstar Project Management, Inc (Northstar) entered into a contract with Respondent DLR Group, Inc. for the construction of a new building. DLR began performing under the contract and submitted invoices to Northstar. Northstar paid DLR in part, but became dissatisfied with DLR's performance before fully satisfying DLR's invoices. Negotiations proved unsuccessful between the parties and Northstar terminated the contract. Northstar sued DLR for breach of contract and related declaratory relief. DLR counterclaimed for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The court admitted a number of exhibits as evidence of the parties' contract claims. Northstar ultimately prevailed at trial. DLR filed a post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that Northstar failed to meet its prima facie case and that the verdict was not supported by any proper measure of damages. Specifically, DLR took issue with the trial court's admission of several trial exhibits, and argued that the admission of these exhibits led the jury to award "excessive damages" to Northstar. DLR appealed that denial; the appellate court's reversal of the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred when it held that the record designated by DLR on appeal satisfied C.A.R. 10(b). Therefore, the court of appeals did not have the information necessary to determine whether the evidence sufficiently supported the jury's verdict in favor of Northstar. View "Northstar v. DLR Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Condominium Association’s declaration required Bayside to provide fresh water and wastewater treatment to the Association and made all of the water facilities common property of the Association. Bayside contracted with TSG to construct and operate a system to fulfill its obligations. TSG charged Bayside $0.02 per gallon. By 2005, Bayside owed millions of dollars to creditors including TSG and the Association. Bayside assigned its rights to TSG, permitting TSG to charge $0.05 per gallon. To secure the Association’s consent Bayside and TSG threatened to cease providing services even though it was not feasible to obtain those services elsewhere. The Association’s Board consented and signed a Water Supply Agreement, which provided that Bayside owned the water facilities and contained an arbitration clause. After not receiving payments under the WSA, TSG temporarily stopped producing potable water for the Association, which then filed suit, asserting criminal extortion under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act; breach of obligations under the Declaration; and ownership of the water treatment systems. The district court ordered arbitration. The Third Circuit affirmed in part but vacated in part. The Association raised a bona fide question as to whether its Board had authority to enter into the WSA, a question that requires judicial determination. View "SBRMCOA, LLC v. Bayside Resort Inc." on Justia Law

SEL owns the 463 patent, which names Nagata as a co-inventor. During prosecution in 1991, Nagata assigned his rights to applications and patents related to the patent to SEL’s founder Yamazaki, and subsequently signed a substitute Declaration and Assignment of those applications and patents. From 2002 to 2003, Nagata assisted SEL in a patent infringement suit against another party and was paid for his cooperation and services. In 2009, SEL sued Samsung and others for infringement and contacted Nagata for further assistance, but learned that Nagata had agreed to assist Samsung as a fact witness. Nagata gave testimony repudiating his signature on the 1991 Declarations and Assignments. Samsung then claimed that the patents, including the 463 patent, were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. SEL sued Nagata, alleging violation of patent law, anticipatory breach of contract, slander of title, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed the federal claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1338(a). The Federal Circuit affirmed; there is no federal cause of action based on assignor estoppel. View "Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., Inc. v. Nagata" on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondents executed a land contract whereby Respondents agreed to sell a piece of property to Petitioners. After the land contract had been fully consummated, Respondents refused to tender a deed to Petitioners. Petitioners filed suit, seeking a delivery of a general warranty deed for the property, including all oil and gas rights. Two months later, Respondents tendered a deed to Petitioners reserving oil and gas rights. The deed was recorded on February 17, 2010. Petitioners moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the land contract did not contained any language indicating Respondents' intention to except oil and gas rights, any questions of interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grantees. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, finding that when the deed was recorded, the land contract was merged in the deed and any cause of action based upon the contract was extinguished. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract was unambiguous, and Respondents failed to establish any legally sufficient basis for varying its terms; and (2) therefore, Respondents were obligated to convey their title and interest to the property, including their vested oil and gas rights. Remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. View "Spitznogle v. Durbin" on Justia Law

Basic Research, LLC marketed the weight-loss product Akavar. Customers who purchased Akavar filed lawsuits against Basic Research claiming false advertising, defective product, and failure to perform as promised. Basic Research was insured by Admiral Insurance under a policy that provided coverage for "personal and advertising injury." After the underlying claims were filed, Basic Research invoked its coverage and asked Admiral to defend it. Admiral refused to defend, alleging that the underlying claims were not covered by the terms of the policy. Thereafter, Basic Research brought this suit for declaratory relief. The district court granted Admiral's motion for summary judgment, finding that the underlying claims were specifically excluded from coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the asserted claims were not covered by the policy and were in fact squarely excluded by its terms; and (2) therefore, Admiral had no duty to defend Basic Research. View "Basic Research, LLC v. Admiral Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff served as superintendent of schools in the town of North Brookfield until 2005. Plaintiff's employment contract provided that, on his retirement, Plaintiff would be reimbursed thereafter for a percentage of his health insurance premiums on an annual basis. In 2006, Plaintiff sent a request for reimbursement for a fixed percentage of the premium costs for his health insurance policy from the date of retirement. When the town refused to honor the request Plaintiff filed this action against the school committee and the town for breach of contract and specific performance of the contract. The superior court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Defendants argued that the obligation to reimburse Plaintiff for a percentage of his health insurance costs annually for his life signaled that Plaintiff's final employment contract was a lifetime agreement that exceeded six years in duration and therefore violated Mass. Gen. Laws 71, 41. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the employment contract at issue in this case was valid and enforceable even though the reimbursement clause would presumptively exceed six years, as a contract that has expired may include enforceable obligations to be performed by the parties thereafter. View "O'Neill v. Sch. Comm. of N. Brookfield" on Justia Law

An Arizona couple was injured on their motorcycle by another biker. The accident occurred in South Dakota. Because the other motorcyclist left the scene, the couple sought uninsured motorist benefits from their insurer. The couple's policy was issued in Arizona for a motorcycle registered and principally garaged in Arizona. The insurer tendered the policy's full uninsured motorist benefits of $15,000 per person. However, the couple would have recovered $25,000 per person in South Dakota had they been able to obtain the other biker's liability insurance. The circuit court declared that the terms of the Arizona insurance policy, rather than South Dakota law, governed the applicable coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that altering the terms of the parties' contracts in these circumstances was not supported by law. View "Milinkovich v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law