Eureka Water Company contended that a 1975 agreement granted it the exclusive license in 60 Oklahoma counties to sell spring water and other products using the "Ozarka" trademark. It sued Nestle Waters North America, Inc., the current owner of the Ozarka trademark, to obtain a declaratory judgment of that right and to obtain monetary relief under several theories, including breach of contract, tortious interference with business relations, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. A jury found for Eureka on its contract and tortious interference claims, and the district court entered a judgment declaring that the 1975 agreement granted Eureka the exclusive right that it claimed in the Ozarka mark. In a post-verdict ruling, the district court denied as duplicative Eureka's equitable claims based on unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. Nestle appealed. The Tenth Circuit agreed with most of Nestle's principal arguments. First, the Court reversed the district court's denial of Nestle's motion for JMOL on the contract claim because the 1975 agreement unambiguously did not cover spring water and under Oklahoma contract law. The Court reversed the denial of JMOL on the tortious-interference claim because Eureka failed to show that Nestle's decision to charge Eureka what it charged other vendors for bottled water was not privileged or justified. Third, the Court affirmed the denial of Eureka's unjust enrichment claim because the claim is based on the false premise that Eureka's license to use the Ozarka trademark covers spring water. The Court reversed, however, the denial of Eureka's promissory-estoppel claim, and remanded that claim for further consideration by the district court. View "Eureka Water Company v. Nestle Waters North America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Marnita Goddard was injured while riding on a trolley operated by the city of Deadwood, South Dakota. Invoking diversity jurisdiction, Goddard sued the city for negligence and the South Dakota Public Assurance Alliance (SDPAA) for uninsured motorist coverage. After Goddard settled with the city, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of SDPAA, concluding that Goddard was not covered under the uninsured motorist provision in the city's agreement with SDPAA. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Goddard had not shown she was entitled to coverage under the uninsured motorist provision of the SDPAA agreement. View "Goddard v. S.D. Pub. Assurance Alliance" on Justia Law

Quality owns dozens of restaurants in several states. To refinance its debt, Quality created subsidiaries (plaintiffs-borrowers) and made a deal with Captec Financial and GE Capital for 34 separate loans totaling $49 million, with each loan secured by a restaurant. The parties disagree about the prepayment requirements for 12 of those loans. The borrowers prepaid according to their own interpretation of the prepayment provision and the lender rejected the effort. The district court granted the lender summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded for the district court to consider extrinsic evidence. The court concluded that extrinsic evidence supported the borrowers’ interpretation and awarded prejudgment interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "BKCAP, LLC v. CAPTEC Franchise Trust 2000-1" on Justia Law

Ronske’s widow sued Heil after a dump truck body it manufactured caused Ronske’s death. Heil held a commercial general liability policy. Evanston insured the first $1 million loss in excess of $500,000 self-insured retention. Heil was required to defend, investigate, and accept any reasonable settlement offer within the SIR; Evanston could choose to assume charge of defense and settlement. Heil retained attorney Pelini. After more than two years, Evanston wanted to assume defense and appointed Sutter, with Pelini to remain involved. Pelini’s fees would count toward exhaustion of the SIR, and Evanston would pay Pelini’s fees in excess of the SIR. The parties settled for $5,711,000. Evanston paid $1 million, leaving Heil responsible for $4,711,000 and $63,533.79 in fees and costs in excess of its SIR. Evanston declined to pay fees and costs. A jury found that Evanston breached the contract and refused in bad faith to pay amounts owed under the policy, but did not fail to settle the wrongful death action in bad faith, awarded Heil compensatory damages plus prejudgment interest for breach of contract, $15,883.44 in statutory damages for bad faith refusal to pay, and $2 million punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit vacated the $2 million punitive damages award, but affirmed the finding of liability under state law. View "Heil Co. v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Wayne and Sandra Masloskie sued real estate agent G. Pat Baldwin and Century 21 American Real Estate Inc. on a number of causes of action including actual fraud. Baldwin and Century 21 moved for summary judgment, arguing that all causes of action were barred by statutes of limitation governing realtor malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment dismissing all claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their cause of action for fraud. Because that cause of action was subject to a longer statute of limitations, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded that portion of the judgment. View "Masloskie v. Century 21 American Real Estate, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA) against Lockheed Martin Corporation, alleging that Lockheed defrauded the United States Air Force under a contract for the Range Standardization and Automation IIA program concerning software and hardware used to support space launch operations at Vandenberg Air Force Base and Cape Kennedy. Hooper filed his suit in the Maryland district court, which transferred the suit to the central district of California on forum non conveniens grounds. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lockheed on all grounds. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the district court's evidentiary rulings and conclusion that Hooper failed to establish his claims of fraudulent use of the software and defective testing procedures because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lockheed "knowingly" submitted a false claim; and (2) reversed the district court's dismissal of (i) Hooper's wrongful discharge claim as barred by California's two-year statute of limitations, holding that Maryland's three-year statute of limitations applied here, and (ii) Hooper's claim that Lockheed violated the FCA by knowingly underbidding the contract. View "Hooper v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

Alpine Glass, Inc. appealed the district court's partial denial of Alpine's motion to consolidate 482 short-pay claims for arbitration against the Country Mutual Insurance Co. and five of its subsidiaries. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Alpine's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because the district court's order was not a final order; and (2) the denial of a motion to consolidate arbitrations does not imperil a substantial public interest sufficient to warrant jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, and therefore, the order was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. View "Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Sweeney owned a transmission shop and referred customers to Tradewell, who owned a nearby car rental business. Sweeney would sometimes simply refer customers to Tradewell or drive them to Tradewell’s business. If employees were available, Tradewell would have them take a car to Sweeney’s shop. Sweeney would sometimes pick up a car from Tradewell and deliver it to the customer and would occasionally use the car for personal errands. This was encouraged by Tradewell, who asked Sweeney to make sure the cars were running properly. In 2004 Sweeney, returning from a personal errand, was injured in an accident while driving a car owned by Tradewell that was intended for delivery to a customer the following morning. Sweeney sought underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to his policy with Liberty. Liberty sought a declaration that Sweeney was not entitled to coverage. On remand, the district court granted Liberty summary judgment, finding that “intended use” and “regular use” provisions did not bar coverage, but Liberty could deny coverage based on the “auto business” provision. The Third Circuit reversed, in favor of Sweeney, noting that Sweeney was on a personal errand, not engaged in “auto business” and did not have unfettered use of the cars. View "Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted leave in two cases to address the question whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicle that the person had taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of personal protection insurance benefits (PIP benefits) under the no-fault act, notwithstanding the fact that MCL 500.3113(a) bars a person from receiving PIP benefits for injuries suffered while using a vehicle that he or she "had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code (including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, the "joyriding" statutes) has taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Furthermore, the Court held that the use of the phrase "a person" in MCL 500.3113(a) "clearly and plainly" includes a family member who has taken a vehicle unlawfully, thereby precludes that person from receiving PIP benefits. View "Spectrum Health Hospitals v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Michigan" on Justia Law

Milliken & Company sued Brian Morin after he resigned from the company and started a new venture using Milliken's proprietary information. The primary basis of the suit was that Morin breached the confidentiality and invention assignment agreements he signed when he started working for Milliken. A jury found for Milliken, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the narrow issue of whether these agreements are overbroad as a matter of law. Upon review, the Court held that they were not and affirmed as modified. View "Milliken & Company v. Morin" on Justia Law