P.E. Systems, LLC (PES) offered to analyze and reduce the credit card processing costs of CPI Corp. (CPI). The parties signed an agreement that appeared to be a contract. CPI later repudiated the contract, disputing its validity. PES sued for breach. CPI attached a copy of the contract to its answer to PES's complaint, and then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the "contract" was a mere agreement to agree and therefore unenforceable. PES responded to the motion and attached an identical copy of the contract and a PowerPoint presentation it had given to CPI. The trial court found the contract was not binding but merely an agreement to agree and granted CPI's motion, thereby dismissing the case. PES appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed holding that both the contract was enforceable and that CPI had breached it. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals to the extent it held the contract was a valid with an open term, but reversed the balance of the Court of Appeals' opinion. View "P.E. Sys., LLC v. CPI Corp." on Justia Law

Appellants, the M/V Akili, its owner, and manager, appealed from the district court's judgment holding that it was liable in rem for damage to cargo shipped aboard the vessel. Ferrostaal cross-appealed from the holding that the owner and manager were not liable in personam under a bailment theory. At issue was whether (1) an in rem proceeding rendering the Akili liable for damage to, or loss of, cargo was unavailable in this matter because a vessel was not a "carrier" within the meaning of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. 30701, and (ii) the free-in-and-out provision in the Voyage Charter Party purportedly absolving the Akili of in rem liability was enforceable. The court held that the first issue was essentially irrelevant because a vessel's in rem liability for damage to cargo existed under maritime common law, not COGSA, for a violation of a carrier's contractual or statutory obligations. The court resolved the second issue against enforcement of the free-in-and-out provision so far as it might be construed to prevent in rem liability of the vessel. In doing so, the court did not decide whether COGSA applied as a matter of law to this voyage because, even if it did not, the Voyage Charter Party's Clause Paramount contractually incorporated the Hague-Visby rules prohibiting a carrier from contracting for a waiver of its obligations regarding damage to cargo. The court also held that there was no in personam liability for the owner and manager where the carriers remained responsible for delivery of the goods and maintained exclusive control and custody over the cargos through agents they hired directly. View "Man Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Akili" on Justia Law

Bowen's Wharf was a tourist destination including a marina and a variety of retailers, restaurants, and art galleries. In this appeal, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide a question that would clarify the rights and obligations of two adjacent landholders whose combined property comprised the entirety of Bowen's Wharf. The question presented for review was whether the trial justice erred in finding that a right of first refusal granted to Defendant, Bowen's Wharf Company, Inc., by Plaintiff, Ronald Fatulli, in 1969 had expired by expiration of law. The trial justice found the parties' right of first refusal agreement expired in 1979, and accordingly, Plaintiff was not obligated to offer a parcel of the property, a wharf, and a business to Defendant in the event of a bona fide third party's offer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that, on these facts, a wharf or dock may properly be characterized as real property; and (2) Defendant's right of first refusal expired by operation of R.I. Gen. Laws 34-4-26, which governs the expiration of recorded rights affecting real estate. View "Fatulli v. Bowen's Wharf Co." on Justia Law

In this dispute over real property, Roslyn Shephard, in her capacity as personal representative of the estates of real property owners (Lessors), terminated the third lease of Lessees based on an alleged violation of the terms of the lease. Shephard then sued Lessees, seeking to invalidate Lessees' third lease due to the fact that she had not signed it on Lessors' behalf. Shephard alternatively sought an order declaring that Lessees had breached the terms of the lease. Lessees counterclaimed, alleging that Shephard had breached the terms of the lease by wrongfully terminating the lease and by failing to provide notice to them of the alleged breach. The district court found in favor of Lessees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the lease was valid without Shephard's signature; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that Lessees had not violated the lease; and (3) the district court correctly determined that the terms of the lease entitled Lessees to notice of their alleged breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Shephard v. Widhalm" on Justia Law

In October 2003, insurance agency Plaintiff Kennedy, Lewis, Renton & Associates, Inc. ("KLR"), secured a property insurance policy with Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation ("Citizens") for Plaintiff Kirk Prest on property located in Boothville, Plaquemines Parish. Hurricane Ivan damaged Plaintiffs' buildings in 2004. Plaintiffs subsequently made repairs and undertook new construction on the property insured by Citizens. Because they were penalized for being underinsured for their losses in Hurricane Ivan, Plaintiffs wanted to ensure their property was properly covered by sufficient amounts of insurance in the future. The total amount of insurance coverage on the property was $350,000. As each phase of reconstruction and expansion was completed, Plaintiffs requested increased coverage on their buildings. There was a mistake on the form sent requesting increased coverage, in that the words "renew policy" were typed in rather than "increasing coverage." However, the comments immediately below correctly described the increased amounts of coverage on the buildings requested by the policy holder. Hurricane Katrina hit southeast Louisiana on August 29, 2005, eleven days after an August 2005 policy change request. At that time, Plaintiffs believed they had a total of $540,000 in insurance coverage on their property. The KMR insurance agent assisting Plaintiffs in requesting the coverage increases also believed Plaintiffs had coverage in that amount. In May 2006, Citizens sent a letter to Plaintiffs, advising them the policy had been reviewed and the requested increases in the policy limits would not be honored. According to Citizens, Plaintiffs only had the original $350,000 worth of coverage on their property. Plaintiffs filed suit against Citizens, seeking payment of the full policy amounts, including the amount of the requested coverage increases, attorney fees and penalties. In the alternative, Plaintiffs also sought recovery from KLR. After engaging in pretrial discovery, Plaintiffs and Citizens entered into a settlement agreement in late 2008. Without admitting liability, Citizens settled the claims against it for a total of $540,000 from Citizens. After trial on the merits against KLR, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, finding KLR was negligent in its handling of its clients' requests for coverage increases. KLR appealed both the finding of liability and the award of damages. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's finding of negligence in part, holding there was manifest error in the trial court's finding the insurance agency failed to exercise reasonable diligence with regard to a July 2005 request for increased coverage. The Supreme Court granted KLR's writ, primarily to determine the correctness of the trial court's award of general damages. After review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding general damages and reversed that portion of the damage award. View "Prest v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute related to the purchase of a lot in the Bahamas. The court held that the district court erred when it determined that the appraisal fraud claims were within the scope of the lot purchase contract's forum-selection clause. The court also held that the district court erred in applying equitable estoppel to allow the nonsignatories to the lot purchase contract to invoke the lot purchase contract's Bahamian forum-selection clause. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment granting the motion to dismiss for improper venue and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bahamas Sales Assoc., LLC v. Byers" on Justia Law

Beneva and Iberiabank became parties to the sublease at issue through a series of assignments. At issue was whether the sublease transferred by the FDIC to Iberiabank after it took over the assets of a failed bank was enforceable despite a clause purporting to terminate the sublease on sale or transfer of the failed bank. Because the court found that the FDIC acted within its power to enforce contracts under 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(13)(A) and that the termination clause was unenforceable against Iberiabank as the FDIC's transferee, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Iberiabank. View "Iberiabank v. Beneva 41-I, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal stemmed from a lawsuit in which Mark Wolgin sued various entities alleging wrongdoing surrounding his 2006 purchase of a condominium on the Gulf Coast. In case #2010-CA-00653-SCT, Wolgin appealed the Chancery Court's decision to dismiss two credit reporting agencies (Trans Union LLC and Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian")), finding that claims against them were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). In case #2010-CA-01177-SCT, the broker for the sale, The Power Broker, Inc. ("Power Broker"), appealed the Chancery Court's decision to order discovery on the scope of the mandatory arbitration clause in the "Contract for the Sale and Purchase of Real Estate" instead of fully granting its "Motion to Compel Arbitration." Regarding Wolgin's appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the credit reporting agencies, as Wolgin's claims are preempted by the FCRA. As to Power Broker's appeal, the Court reversed the trial court judgment ordering discovery and remanded the case with instructions to stay the proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration. View "Wolgin v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Two public utilities (the companies) were wholly owned subsidiaries of appellant FirstEnergy Corporation. Appellees were residential customers of the companies. The customers filed a class-action complaint against FirstEnergy and the companies in the county court of common pleas. The complaint raised four causes of action: declaratory judgment, breach of contract, fraud, and injunctive relief. The trial court granted FirstEnergy's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) had exclusive jurisdiction over the allegations in the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed in all respects except with regard to the customers' fraud claim. The appellate court determined on two separate grounds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the fraud claim and remanded that claim to the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding (1) the customers' fraud claim was not a pure tort action, but rather, was a claim that the companies were overcharging the customers for electric service; and (2) because the complaint was challenging the rates charged for utility service, it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUCO. View "DiFranco v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute between a Netherlands holding company and an Italian businessman. The businessman made a loan to the holding company for a joint venture. The joint venture eventually went into bankruptcy and defaulted on its loan obligations, including the loan from the businessman. The businessman filed this action alleging, among other things, that the holding company induced him to make the loan by representing that it would support and continue to back the joint venture. The holding company denied making those representations or having any obligations to the businessman. The holding company moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds. The Court of Chancery (1) found the businessman's claims were not barred for lack of standing; (2) denied summary judgment on the ground of laches; (3) denied summary judgment on the holding company's English statute of frauds defense; (4) granted summary judgment in the holding company's favor on the businessman's Italian law claim for breach of implied or oral contract and his Dutch law claim; and (5) granted the holding company's motion for summary judgment regarding the businessman's claim for unjust enrichment. View "Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V." on Justia Law