Policyholder obtained a title insurance policy from Insurer for a parcel of property it owned. Because an ambiguity in the legal description of the property prevented Policyholder from reselling the property, Policyholder filed an action seeking a declaration of Insurer's obligations under the policy and alleging breach of contract against Insurer. The district court held in favor of Policyholder, concluding that Insurer was liable because the title to the property was unmarketable. The court, however, limited Policyholder's recovery to the face value of the policy. The court of appeals affirmed the finding of liability but held that Policyholder was entitled to recovery in excess of the policy limit. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to Policyholder on the question of Insurer's liability for its failure to defend and indemnify Policyholder; but (2) reversed the court of appeals' award of damages to Policyholder in excess of the policy limit and remanded for reinstatement of the district court's award of damages. View "Mattson Ridge, LLC v. Clear Rock Tile, LLP" on Justia Law

The parties in this case entered into a written contract under which Plaintiff, a contractor, agreed to install a fence around real property owned by Defendant. Defendant paid a deposit of half of the amount due upon execution of the contract but refused to pay the balance owed on the contract upon substantial completion of the fence. Plaintiff sued Defendant. In his answer, Defendant alleged he was not liable under the contract because Plaintiff failed to comply with the Home Improvement Act by failing to indicate a starting and completion date in the contract. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that the contract did not comply with the Act but that Defendant invoked the Act in bad faith. The appellate court reversed the award of attorney's fees, costs, and interest, but otherwise directed judgment in favor of Plaintiff for the balance due under the bad faith doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff the balance due. View "Walpole Woodworkers, Inc. v. Manning" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the servicer of their home loan, violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605, because it did not respond adequately to three letters in which they challenged the monthly payment due on their loan. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the claim because a servicer must receive a valid "qualified written request" to incur the duty to respond under section 2605, and it determined that the letters were not qualified written requests that triggered the statutory duty. Because plaintiffs' letters to defendant challenged the terms of their loans and requested modification of various loan and mortgage documents, they were not qualified written requests relating to the servicing of plaintiffs' loan. Because section 2605 did not require a servicer to respond to such requests, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claim and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Medrano, et al v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff corporation and two of its officers brought suit against Defendant, a brokerage firm, to recover damages that allegedly resulted when the president of the corporation independently engaged the brokerage firm's services to locate and lease new office space while the corporation was still liable under a previous lease, which it later breached. Plaintiff sued under theories of inducement, tortious interference, and negligence. The district court concluded that the brokerage company was not liable to Plaintiff for assisting the president to enter into a new lease while knowing that the corporation remained liable under a previous lease. The Supreme Court affirmed, either not reaching Appellants' assignments of error or finding them to be without merit. View "Pro. Mgmt. Midwest, Inc. v. Lund Co." on Justia Law

This dispute arose from a contractual relationship between Appellant, a provider of audio, Web, and video conferencing services, and Appellee, a corporation engaged in the sale of business software. After Appellee failed to pay for certain services Appellant provided pursuant to a contract, Appellant sued Appellee, asserting breach of contract. Appellee asserted affirmative defenses and a counterclaim to recover what it claimed to be overpayments. The district court granted Appellant's motion with respect to its claim for unpaid invoices but ruled in favor of Appellee on its counterclaim that it was fraudulently induced by Appellant to enter into the original service agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) not finding as a matter of law that Appellee failed to prove that Appellant misrepresented a fact that Appellee relied upon; (2) allowing Appellee to amend its counterclaim to allege material misrepresentation; (3) instructing the jury; and (4) overruling Appellant's motion for new trial or motion to alter or amend the judgment. View "Intercall Inc. v. Engenera, Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Defense issued a solicitation seeking offers for a multiple award, indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract for information technology services. The agency described the services as “Net-Centric Integrated Enterprise Information Technology Services,” including help desk, server, network, and applications support services. The solicitation instructed bidders to submit separate bids for the Basic Contract, Task Order 1, and Task Order 2. Every bidder, including Comint, submitted separate bids. The Department then limited the initial award to the Basic Contract and amended the solicitation. Comint acknowledged the amendment. The Source Selection Evaluation Board evaluated each proposal according to factors in the solicitation, the most important of which was “Quality/Capability.” The Board rated Comint’s proposal as “marginal,” concluding that Comint had a “moderate to high associated risk of unsuccessful performance.” The district court rejected Comint’s challenge of the award to another bidder; Comint lacked standing to challenge the solicitation or award because the agency had not erred in rejecting Comint’s bid on technical grounds. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Comint failed to preserve its right to challenge the solicitation by failing to raise objections before award and that Comint has not demonstrated standing to protest the agency’s failure to award it a contract. View "Comint Sys. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

While driving a car owned by her divorced parents, Plaintiff was hit and injured by an uninsured drunk driver. Plaintiff's father's policy specifically covered Plaintiff's car and paid Plaintiff $100,000 in uninsured motorist benefits. This amount did not fully compensate Plaintiff for her injuries, however, and Plaintiff filed a claim under her mother's policy with Farmers Mutual Insurance Company of Nebraska (Insurer). The policy did not specifically cover Plaintiff's car but covered Plaintiff as an insured. Farmers denied Plaintiff's claim for uninsured motorist benefits under an "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion in its policy. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action seeking a declaration that the "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion was void and that she was entitled to uninsured motorist benefits from Farmers. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers, concluding that the exclusion was valid and enforceable in relation to uninsured motorist coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court incorrectly applied the law when it used the Supreme Court's statements in previous cases to conclude that the exclusion was valid and enforceable under S.D. Codified Laws 58-11-9; and (2) the "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion was void in this case. View "Wheeler v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. of Neb." on Justia Law

Appellee, a graduate of a foreign medical school, was required to be certified by the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (commission) before applying for medical residency in Ohio. Appellee thus applied to take a United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) examination administered by the commission. Appellee took and failed Part I of the examination. Fifteen years later, Appellee sued the commission for breach of an express written contract, alleging that the commission had failed to administer part I of the USMLE in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in an informational pamphlet provided by the commission, and the breach caused him to fail the examination and suffer damages. The trial court granted the commission's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the documents attached to the complaint did not constitute an express written contract and that, even if a contract existed, the statute of limitations for oral contracts barred recovery. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the informational pamphlet was not a written contract, and thus, Appellee could prove no facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief, and the commission was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Rayess v. Educ. Comm'n for Foreign Med. Graduates" on Justia Law

Appellant contracted to provide traffic control on a road improvement project coordinated and facilitated by Respondent. The parties' contract required Appellant to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless Respondent to the extent that Appellant caused any injury or damage. After a woman was injured in connection with the road improvement project and sued the parties for negligence, Respondent sought indemnification and defense from Appellant. Appellant, however, denied that it was obligated to provide indemnification and defense. After a jury trial in which the jury found Appellant did not proximately cause the underlying accident, the district court granted Respondent's motion to enforce indemnification, concluding that Appellant presented no evidence to suggest a lack of its potential liability under the contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a plain reading of the contractual indemnity language imposed a causal limitation on Appellant's duty to indemnify and defendant Respondent; and (2) because the jury found Appellant did not proximately cause the underlying accident, Appellant did not have a duty to indemnify or defend Respondent. View "United Rentals Highway Techs. v. Wells Cargo Inc." on Justia Law

In this divorce action, Appellant Michael Grisham and Respondent Susie Grisham negotiated based on a draft property settlement agreement (PSA). At the end of an uncontested divorce prove-up hearing, the district court orally accepted the settlement. Michael, however, refused to sign the PSA. After several months, Susie moved for entry of a divorce decree based on the PSA. The district court entered a final written decree incorporating the PSA and denied Michael's motion for mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's procedure complied with applicable district court rules, which obviated any issue as to the statute of frauds, and the PSA otherwise met the requirements for an enforceable contract. View "Grisham v. Grisham" on Justia Law