In a dispute between Jonathan H. Paul and Rockpoint Group, LLC, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied Rockpoint's motion to dismiss Count III and granted Paul's cross-motion for partial summary judgement. The case stemmed from a disagreement about how to divide the proceeds from a transaction involving the investment fund complex that Paul co-founded and later left. After Paul's departure, he and his former partners agreed to an amendment to the company’s limited liability agreement, which stipulated Paul would receive a share of the proceeds from certain future transactions. A dispute arose over the calculation of Paul’s share when a qualifying transaction occurred. The court determined that the dispute resolution mechanism in the agreement called for an expert determination, not a plenary arbitration. The court also affirmed that the third amended and restated LLC agreement, not the first, governed the dispute. The court ruled that the appraiser could not consider extrinsic evidence, such as legal arguments and affidavits, presented by Rockpoint in its valuation. The court further directed that Rockpoint's appraisal must be redacted to omit the offending material. View "Paul v. Rockpoint Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Randall Ewing and Yasmany Gomez entered into a contract with 1645 W. Farragut LLC (Farragut) to purchase a house. The house was in need of substantial renovations, but Ewing and Gomez proceeded with the contract based on Farragut's assurance that the house would be renovated and ready by closing time. Unbeknownst to Ewing and Gomez, the house was under a stop work order, which hindered their ability to secure a mortgage. When they requested their earnest money back, Farragut refused. They subsequently sued Farragut for breach of contract, common law fraud, and fraud under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found Farragut liable for fraud and breach of contract and awarded Ewing and Gomez $905,000 in damages. Farragut appealed the decision and Ewing and Gomez cross-appealed, seeking to add Farragut's principal, Erik Carrier, to the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decisions, finding that the record supported the damages awarded and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial and the motions to amend. View "Ewing v. 1645 W. Farragut LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Griggs & Browne Pest Control Co., Inc. (plaintiff), and its former employee, Brian Walls (defendant). Upon hiring Walls in 2011, the parties entered into a noncompetition agreement, which was updated in 2020. The agreement stipulated that, in return for his training and access to the company's client list, Walls would refrain from soliciting business from or performing services for the company's current or former customers for 24 months after ending his employment with the company.In 2021, the company introduced a new policy requiring all employees to receive the COVID-19 vaccination or terminate their employment. Walls vocally opposed the policy and was told he could no longer resume his employment. A month later, the company discovered that Walls was contacting their former clients and performing pest-control services for them, in violation of the noncompetition agreement. The company initiated a lawsuit to prevent Walls from further violating the agreement.The Superior Court of Rhode Island granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff, which Walls appealed. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the lower court's decision, determining that the noncompetition agreement was valid and enforceable. The court rejected Walls' argument that he had been improperly terminated due to his refusal to receive the COVID-19 vaccine, noting that the circumstances surrounding his departure were immaterial to the enforcement of the noncompetition agreement. The court also found that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm due to loss of customer goodwill if Walls were allowed to continue servicing the company's clients. The balance of equities favored the plaintiff, and the injunction was necessary to uphold the status quo. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff. View "Griggs & Browne Pest Control Co., Inc. v. Walls" on Justia Law

In a personal injury case, Alejandro Lopez Aguilar, the appellant, had filed a lawsuit against Lucky Cab Co. and Adugna Demesash, the respondents. Before trial, Lucky Cab made an offer of judgment to Aguilar for a lump sum of $150,001, explicitly stating that this amount did not include prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs incurred to date. Aguilar accepted the offer. Lucky Cab sent Aguilar both a check for $150,001 and a stipulation and order for dismissal. However, Aguilar did not process the check or consent to the dismissal, arguing that Lucky Cab had not fully paid the offer amount as it had not yet paid any costs or prejudgment interest. The district court granted dismissal with prejudice, concluding that Lucky Cab was entitled to dismissal once it tendered payment within the stipulated window. Aguilar appealed.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s decision. The high court clarified that when an offer of judgment explicitly excludes costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees, it promises two sums if accepted: (1) the principal amount for the claim(s), specified in the offer; and (2) a separate amount for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees that would be recoverable if a judgment were entered based on that offer. Consequently, under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 68(d)(2), an offeror cannot obtain dismissal unless they pay both the principal offer and the additional allowance for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees. In this case, Lucky Cab did not pay the pre-offer costs and interest that were promised and that Aguilar would be entitled to as a prevailing party. The case was remanded for the district court to determine the amount of awardable pre-offer costs and interest that Lucky Cab must pay to obtain dismissal. View "Aguilar v. Lucky Cab Co." on Justia Law

In the case, Remy Holdings International, LLC ("Remy") sued Fisher Auto Parts, Inc. ("Fisher") after Fisher terminated their business relationship and sold its inventory to a different manufacturer. Remy claimed that Fisher wrongfully terminated their agreement and that the inventory Fisher sold belonged to Remy. Remy brought claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Fisher counterclaimed for breach of contract due to Remy's poor performance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions, which were all in Fisher's favor. The court found that Remy committed the first material breach of the contract by failing to keep Fisher competitive in the marketplace. Furthermore, Fisher did not waive its right to assert the first material breach defense by continuing to order from Remy and occasionally waiving the order-fill penalty. Therefore, Remy was precluded from enforcing the contract and its breach of contract claim related to ownership of the inventory was dismissed.The court also rejected Remy's argument that the district court should have reinstated its unjust enrichment claim after declaring its contractual rights unenforceable. Remy had failed to respond to Fisher's motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, and as a result, forfeited any opposition to its dismissal.Lastly, the court found no error with the district court's evidentiary rulings, including the admission of expert testimony and the USA Core Policy, and its refusal to instruct the jury on certain defenses. View "Remy Holdings International, LLC v. Fisher Auto Parts, Inc" on Justia Law

This case revolves around an interlocutory appeal from a consolidated case between Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc., Abbott Diabetes Care Sales Corp. (collectively, “Abbott”), and DexCom, Inc. at the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. DexCom had sued Abbott for infringing its patents, leading Abbott to petition for inter partes review of the asserted patents before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. DexCom sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Abbott from proceeding with the inter partes review proceedings based on a forum selection clause in a settlement and license agreement between the parties. DexCom appealed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. The court found that the forum selection clause in the settlement and license agreement did not preclude the filing of inter partes review petitions after the Covenant Period because it allowed them during the Covenant Period. Therefore, DexCom could not succeed on its breach-of-contract counterclaim, making it ineligible for a preliminary injunction. View "DEXCOM, INC. v. ABBOTT DIABETES CARE, INC. " on Justia Law

In March 2015, Jere Hinman hired BrightView Landscape Development, Inc., to design and construct a pool at her residence. BrightView subcontracted with Georgia Gunite and Pool Company, Inc., to install plumbing and spray shotcrete for the pool shell. In November 2015, Hinman contacted BrightView after receiving an unusually high water bill and discovered that the pool was leaking water due to a missing part that was not included in Georgia Gunite’s scope of work. BrightView and Georgia Gunite worked together to address the issue in April 2016. In 2018, Hinman sued BrightView for defective construction of the pool, and BrightView filed a third-party complaint against Georgia Gunite, seeking indemnification based on the subcontractor agreement. Georgia Gunite moved for summary judgment, arguing that BrightView's claim was barred by Tennessee's four-year statute of repose for actions alleging defective improvements to real estate.The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, which granted summary judgment in favor of Georgia Gunite. The court held that, although BrightView's indemnification claim against Georgia Gunite was contractual in nature, it fell within the scope of Tennessee's statute of repose for deficient construction of an improvement to real property because, at its core, it sought to recover damages arising from such deficient construction. The court rejected BrightView's argument that the statute of repose only applies to tort actions. The court also rejected BrightView's argument that the application of the statute of repose in this case would extinguish its claim before it even accrued, noting that this argument is directed at the nature of a statute of repose. The court further held that the repose statute is not mutually exclusive with statutes of limitation. Thus, BrightView's claim against Georgia Gunite was barred because it was not brought within four years after substantial completion of the pool construction. View "Hinman v. ValleyCrest Landscaping Dev." on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District was asked to determine two key issues. The first issue pertained to whether K&S Staffing Solutions, Inc., a staffing company, could be considered a “laborer” within the meaning of the mechanics’ lien law. The second issue was whether the payment bonds issued for two state projects were subject to the mechanics’ lien law’s requirements. The staffing company had been contracted by a subcontractor, Titan DVBE Inc., to fulfill its staffing needs for two road maintenance projects awarded by California’s Department of Transportation (Caltrans) to VSS International, Inc. (VSSI). When Titan failed to pay K&S all the amounts owed for the projects, K&S sued VSSI and the Western Surety Company, which had issued payment bonds for the projects. K&S argued that it was a “laborer” within the meaning of the mechanics’ lien law and was therefore entitled to recover against the payment bonds. The trial court disagreed, finding that K&S was not a “laborer” as it failed to show it was the employer of the laborers. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, interpreting the term “laborer” as defined in the mechanics’ lien law to mean “a person who, acting as an employee, performs labor upon, or bestows skill or other necessary services on, a work of improvement.” The court concluded that K&S was not a “laborer” as it was not acting as an employee in any capacity. The court also affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to the defendants under a provision in the mechanics’ lien law. Although K&S argued that this provision was inapplicable because the payment bonds for the projects were not “payment bonds” within the meaning of the mechanics’ lien law, the court rejected this argument. The court concluded that the general requirements of the mechanics’ lien law for payment bonds applied both to state projects that required a bond under the Public Contract Code and other “public entity” projects that required a bond under the mechanics’ lien law. View "K & S Staffing Solutions v. The Western Surety Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana had to decide if the Thirteenth Judicial District Court erred by disallowing a stipulated agreement for entry of a consent judgment between American Express National Bank (Amex) and Jocelyn Born (Born), and subsequently dismissing the action with prejudice.Born had accumulated a debt of $20,754.69 on her American Express credit card that she failed to repay, despite Amex’s demands for repayment. The parties had entered into a stipulation and consent agreement where Born agreed to the entry of judgment for the amount of her debt, plus costs. After some payments by Born, the amount owed had reduced to $19,368.19. The District Court initially entered a consent judgment for the reduced amount but later the same day vacated the judgment and dismissed the litigation with prejudice.Amex appealed this decision arguing that the District Court misunderstood the nature of the stipulation and consent agreement and treated it as a "cognovit judgment" - a judgment entered in advance of legal action in case of default, rather than a "judgment on consent" - an agreed judgment entered after action is commenced.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana agreed with Amex's argument, finding that the stipulation was a valid consent judgment and constituted a contract between the parties. The court held that the District Court erred in vacating the judgment and abused its discretion by denying Amex's motion for relief. The court reversed the order of dismissal and remanded the matter for entry of a consent judgment as contemplated by the parties' stipulation. View "American Express v. Born" on Justia Law

In this case, Defendant-Appellee Martin Andersson purchased an insurance policy for his vessel from Plaintiff-Appellant Great Lakes Insurance SE. The vessel ran aground off the coast of the Dominican Republic, and Great Lakes brought a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage under the policy. Andersson filed counterclaims for breach of contract and equitable estoppel. Great Lakes' motion for summary judgment was denied, and Andersson was granted partial summary judgment on his breach of contract claim. Great Lakes appealed, claiming the district court erred in refusing to apply the policy's definition of seaworthiness.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that under the absolute implied warranty of seaworthiness, the insured vessel must be seaworthy at the policy's inception, and if not, the policy is void. The court affirmed the district court's ruling, stating that Great Lakes' argument that the absolute implied warranty required the vessel to carry up-to-date charts for all geographic areas covered by the policy in order to be considered seaworthy was unsupported by admiralty case law and was unreasonable.Additionally, the court held that Great Lakes' argument that the express terms of the policy required updated paper charts for every location that could be navigated under the entirety of the policy coverage area was unsupported by the express language of the policy itself. The court found no precedent supporting the claim that updated paper charts for every location covered by the policy were required to be onboard the vessel at the inception of the policy. As a result, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision in favor of Andersson. View "Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Andersson" on Justia Law