Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

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The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld a district court's decision concerning a wage dispute between an employee and his former employer. The employee, Paulo Trindade, claimed that his former employer, Grove Services, Inc., breached their contract and violated the Massachusetts Wage Act by short-changing him on his sales commission compensation. Grove Services challenged the timeliness of Trindade's Wage Act claim relating to the 2016 commission, but the court agreed with the district court that the claim related back to his original complaint, making it timely. The First Circuit also upheld the district court's damages award. Trindade was awarded $330,597 in damages, which included compensation for late and unpaid wages for the 2016 commission, subject to mandatory trebling under the Wage Act, and damages for the 2014 breach of contract. View "Trindade v. Grove Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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In a dispute between K&S Staffing Solutions, Inc. (K&S) and The Western Surety Company (Western) and VSS International, Inc. (VSSI), the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District upheld the Superior Court of San Joaquin County's decision that K&S was not a “laborer” within the meaning of the mechanics’ lien law and that payment bonds issued for the projects in question were subject to the mechanics' lien law’s requirements.K&S, a staffing company, sued VSSI and Western to recover unpaid amounts for services provided on state projects, arguing it was a “laborer” under the mechanics' lien law and thus entitled to assert a claim against payment bonds for the projects. The court disagreed, interpreting the term “laborer” in the law as a person "acting as an employee" performing labor or bestowing necessary services on a work of improvement, and concluded K&S, as an employer, did not qualify.Furthermore, K&S argued that the payment bonds issued for these state projects were not subject to the mechanics' lien law’s requirements because they were not "payment bonds" within the meaning of the law. However, the court disagreed, ruling that the bond requirements of the mechanics' lien law apply to state projects that require a bond under Public Contract Code section 7103 and other public entity projects that require a bond under section 9550. Consequently, the court affirmed the lower court's attorney fee award to the defendants under section 9564, which mandates attorney fees be awarded to the prevailing party in any action to enforce the liability on a payment bond. View "K & S Staffing Solutions v. The Western Surety Co." on Justia Law

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In November 2015, Joseph H. Reeves contracted with Wilson Floor & Wallcovering, Inc. ("Wilson Floor") and its owner, Tom Wilson, to replace the wood flooring in his home. After the work was completed, Reeves found the new flooring to be unlevel and claimed that Wilson Floor and Tom Wilson refused to make further repairs. Reeves filed a complaint against "Tom Wilson" and "Wilson Flooring" in May 2017, alleging negligence, fraudulent suppression, fraudulent inducement, and breach of contract.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case after the Autauga Circuit Court dismissed Reeves's claims against Wilson Floor due to "lack of service" under Rule 4, Ala. R. Civ. P. Although it was undisputed that Reeves's attempted service on Wilson Floor was ineffective, the Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that Wilson Floor was adequately informed of Reeves's action against it, and hence, the trial court's dismissal of his claims against Wilson Floor was prohibited under Rule 4(i)(2)(C).The Court noted that while Tina Wilson, Tom Wilson's wife, was not Wilson Floor's registered agent, she was one of the company's listed officers and could accept service on its behalf. As Tina had actually received the summons and the complaint, the Court established that Wilson Floor was informed of Reeves's action within time to avoid default. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's order dismissing Reeves's action against Wilson Floor and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reeves v. Wilson Floor and Wallcovering, Inc." on Justia Law

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In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two, the plaintiff, a minor identified as J.R., filed a putative class action against Electronic Arts Inc. (EA), alleging causes of action for unlawful and unfair business practices, violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and unjust enrichment. J.R. claimed that EA deceptively induced players, particularly minors, to purchase in-game currency for its game, Apex Legends. EA sought to compel arbitration under the terms of its user agreement, which J.R. had accepted to play Apex Legends. The lower court denied EA's motion to compel on the grounds that J.R. had exercised his power under Family Code section 6710 to disaffirm all of his contracts with EA, including the arbitration agreement. EA appealed, arguing that an arbitrator, not the court, should decide issues of arbitrability due to a delegation provision within the agreement. The appellate court rejected EA's arguments, affirming the lower court's decision. The court held that J.R.'s disaffirmance of "any... contract or agreement" accepted through his EA account was sufficient to challenge the validity of the delegation provision specifically, thereby authorizing the court to assess the validity of J.R.'s disaffirmance. View "J.R. v. Electronic Arts" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute between Harvest Group, LLC ("Harvest") and Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc. and Musket Corp. (collectively, "Love’s") over a breach-of-contract claim. Harvest, a company that assists businesses in acquiring economic development incentives, entered into a contract with Love’s to help secure incentives for a renewable diesel facility. In return, Harvest would receive a fee of 10% of the value of any incentives it helped Love's secure.A property tax assessment for the project, which significantly reduced the estimated tax burden, was at the center of the dispute. Harvest claimed that this assessment qualified as an incentive under their agreement, and thus they were entitled to a fee. Love’s, however, argued that the assessment was not an incentive as defined by their contract and that it was not the product of Harvest’s efforts, but simply the result of the assessor’s application of Nebraska tax law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment to Love’s on the issue of whether the assessment was an incentive/benefit under the Agreement and whether the assessment was the product of Harvest’s efforts. There were genuine disputes of material fact about these issues, meaning they must be decided at trial, not on summary judgment. The court also reversed the lower court on the issues of Harvest’s entitlement to interest and whether Harvest was the prevailing party. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings. View "Harvest Group v. Love's Travel Stops & Country Stores" on Justia Law

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In South Carolina, Phillip Francis Luke Hughes, on behalf of the estate of his late mother, Jane Hughes, sued Bank of America for fraud, fraudulent concealment, and breach of contract, alleging that the bank charged insurance premiums in connection with a home equity line of credit his parents obtained in 2006, even though they declined the insurance offer. The bank argued that the claims did not survive Jane Hughes's death, were barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations, and that their motion for sanctions was not premature.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the claims for fraud and fraudulent concealment survived Jane Hughes's death. However, it also held that all three claims were barred by the res judicata effect of rulings in related federal court litigation. The court affirmed as modified in part and reversed in part the lower court's decision. The court also affirmed the lower court's decision that the sanctions motion was not premature. The court further held that the claim for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act survived Jane Hughes's death, but was also barred by res judicata.As for the statute of limitations issue, the court held that the statute of limitations had expired before the action was commenced and that the plaintiff was precluded from relitigating the equitable tolling issue. The court remanded Bank of America's sanctions motion to the lower court for disposition. View "Hughes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

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In the dispute between fashion designer and social media influencer Hayley Paige Gutman and her former employer, JLM Couture, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the preliminary injunction and contempt order issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The lower court had awarded JLM control of two social media accounts previously managed by Gutman and enforced a five-year restrictive covenant that prohibited Gutman from identifying herself as a designer of certain goods. The court also held Gutman in civil contempt for posts on Instagram that it deemed as marketing, violating an earlier version of the preliminary injunction.The Court of Appeals dismissed Gutman's appeal from the contempt order due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. It affirmed the district court's refusal to dissolve the preliminary injunction based on the law of the case. However, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order that modified its preliminary injunction. The court found fault in the lower court's determination of the ownership of the disputed social media accounts and its failure to evaluate the reasonableness of the five-year noncompete restraint on Gutman. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Court of Appeals. View "JLM Couture, Inc. v. Gutman" on Justia Law

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In this case, the plaintiff, Jordan Nissensohn, as the administrator of the Estate of Michael Nissensohn, filed a suit against University Medical Group (UMG), Dr. Alan Epstein, and Dr. Steven Sepe, alleging numerous claims including defamation, breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual relations, conversion, and violations of the Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (RIWPA). The Superior Court entered a judgment in favor of the defendants, granting summary judgment.The plaintiff, Dr. Michael Nissensohn, had been employed as a gastroenterologist by UMG and was supervised by Dr. Epstein. The plaintiff had a series of disagreements and conflicts with Dr. Epstein over teaching responsibilities and alleged discrepancies in teaching compensation. The plaintiff also claimed that Dr. Epstein had disclosed his mental health information to another staff member, and had spread a rumor about his mental health. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that Dr. Epstein interfered with his prospective business relations with patients and his contract, and converted his personal laptop.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court held that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that he engaged in protected conduct under the RIWPA because he did not report actual violations of the law. The court also ruled that the plaintiff's defamation claim abated upon his death and therefore did not survive. Regarding the breach of contract claim, the court found that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of a breach of the written agreement. The court further held that the plaintiff failed to show that Dr. Epstein intended to harm his contract, which was an essential element of his claim for tortious interference. Lastly, the court found that the plaintiff failed to provide any non-hearsay evidence to prove his demand and refusal, thus failing to establish his claim for conversion. View "Nissensohn v. CharterCARE Home Health Services" on Justia Law

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In a case before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, plaintiffs Mark Quillen and Dawn Quillen entered into a Purchase and Sales Agreement (P & S Agreement) with defendant Clint Cox to purchase a property for a total sale price of $632,000, which included a $31,000 deposit. An issue arose when the parties' chosen escrow agent, Beycome Brokerage Realty, refused to accept the deposit, leading to an amendment in the agreement that allowed the plaintiffs to submit the deposit to a different brokerage firm, Trusthill. This amendment led to a dispute with the defendant claiming the plaintiffs failed to meet the deposit requirement, thereby breaching the contract.The trial justice in the Superior Court found that the defendant had prevented the plaintiffs from effectuating delivery of the deposit, thereby eliminating the condition precedent. The court also found that the plaintiffs were ready, willing, and able to purchase the property. Despite the defendant's claims, the court concluded that plaintiffs had met all their obligations under the contract. The court ordered specific performance, directing the defendant to transfer the property to the plaintiffs. The defendant's counterclaims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and damages were dismissed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court held that the trial justice correctly determined that the plaintiffs timely and properly delivered the deposit in accordance with the amended agreement. The court also agreed with the trial justice's finding that the plaintiffs were ready, willing, and able to purchase the property. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the trial justice failed to apply the clear and convincing standard in her factual findings, noting that the defendant failed to raise this issue in the lower court. The court also dismissed the defendant's contention that he was entitled to the deposit as damages, as the court found no evidence of breach on the part of the plaintiffs. View "Quillen v. Cox" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute between American Precision Ammunition, L.L.C. (APA) and the City of Mineral Wells in Texas. APA and the City entered into a Tax Abatement Agreement ("Agreement") where the City promised to gift APA $150,000 and provide APA ten years of tax abatements. However, the City terminated the Agreement, claiming that the $150,000 gift was illegal under the Texas Constitution. APA sued the City for breach of contract, violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA), and denial of federal due process and due course of law under the Texas Constitution. The district court dismissed all claims, and APA appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the Agreement was illegal and unenforceable under Texas law because the City's contractual obligation to "gift" APA $150,000 constitutes a gratuitous payment of public money. The court also dismissed APA's TOMA claim as moot because there was no "agreement" to reinstate given that the Agreement was unenforceable. Furthermore, the court found that APA's due process claims failed because the promise for the $150,000 gift was void and did not constitute a contract, and therefore, APA had no protected property interest in the gift. Even assuming that APA had a property interest in the tax abatements, the court held that APA's due process and due course of law claims still fail because Texas law affords APA sufficient opportunity to pursue that claim in state court. View "American Precision v. Mineral Wells" on Justia Law