In this case from the Supreme Court of Wyoming, LFP Consulting, LLC (LFP), a financial advisory company, sued former employee David Edward Leighton for breach of contract and various torts after his resignation. The key issue was a clause in the parties' contract that selected Minnesota as the forum for disputes (a forum selection clause). LFP had filed the lawsuit in Wyoming and attached a waiver of the forum selection clause. However, the Wyoming chancery court dismissed LFP’s complaint for improper venue, concluding that LFP did not have the right to unilaterally waive the forum selection clause. The Supreme Court of Wyoming disagreed with the lower court, ruling that LFP, as the assignee of the contract, had the right to unilaterally waive the forum selection clause because it was included in the contract for the sole benefit of Ameriprise Financial, the original party to the contract with Leighton. The court also noted that Leighton had no relationship with Minnesota, which further supported the decision to allow LFP to waive the forum selection clause. The court reversed the decision of the chancery court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LFP Consulting, LLC v. Leighton" on Justia Law

In a dispute between Adams County and the City and County of Denver over the use of a noise-modeling system instead of a noise-monitoring system at Denver International Airport, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that Adams County's breach-of-contract claim, brought in 2018, was barred by the statute of limitations. The court found that the claim accrued no later than 1995, when Adams County became aware of Denver's breach of their contract by using a noise-modeling system. The court concluded that under Colorado law, a breach-of-contract claim accrues at the time the breach is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The court dismissed the argument that the claim only accrued when Adams County became aware of the full extent of its damages and had certainty of harm and incentive to sue in 2014. View "City & County of Denver v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, REV, LLC ("REV"), a veteran-owned small business that provides software consulting services, appealed a decision from the United States Court of Federal Claims regarding a bid process by the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA").REV participated in the VA's bid process for its Transformation Twenty-One Total Technology-Next Generation (“T4NG”) program, aimed at replenishing the pool of Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) vendors. REV was successful in the first stage of the bid process, but was eliminated in the second stage and was not among the final awardees.REV filed a lawsuit against the VA in the Court of Federal Claims, arguing that the VA's evaluation process was arbitrary and capricious due to alleged flaws in the process, including the VA's evaluation of rival bidders' submissions. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed REV's claims, ruling that REV lacked standing to challenge the VA’s evaluation of rival bidders' submissions and the VA’s establishment of the competitive range. The court found that REV failed to show that it was prejudiced as it could not establish that it had a greater than an insubstantial chance of securing an award had certain awardees been excluded from the bid process.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision, holding that REV had standing to challenge the VA's evaluation of rival bidders' submissions and the VA’s establishment of the competitive range. The court reasoned that REV had shown a substantial chance that it would have been added onto the T4NG contract if not for the alleged errors, thereby satisfying the requirements for standing. The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "REV, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., a global financial services company, appealed a decision by the Court of Chancery. The case involved the company's contractual provisions that allowed it to withhold distributions otherwise owed to a partner who leaves the partnership and then competes with the partnership. The plaintiffs were six former partners who had their distributions, ranging from under $100,000 to over $5 million, withheld after they left Cantor Fitzgerald and joined competing businesses.The lower court held that these "forfeiture for competition" provisions were unenforceable, ruling they were unreasonable restraints on trade. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision. It ruled that, under Delaware law, courts should enforce such agreements absent unconscionability, bad faith, or other extraordinary circumstances. The court emphasized the importance of freedom of contract, particularly in the context of sophisticated parties entering into a limited partnership agreement. It argued that public policy considerations favored enforcing the agreement, particularly as the parties had voluntarily agreed to the terms. As such, it held that Cantor Fitzgerald was within its rights to withhold the distributions based on the plaintiffs' competitive activities. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Ainslie" on Justia Law

In this case, a woman was severely injured while moving an inoperable airplane owned by her husband. She sought recovery from her husband's homeowner's insurance policy. The insurance policy, however, excluded injuries "arising out of" the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of an aircraft. The woman argued that the policy should cover her injury because, in her view, the aircraft had become mere "parts" after her husband removed the wings, elevators, and tail rudder. The lower court disagreed and concluded that her injuries were not covered by the policy. The woman appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska agreed with the lower court’s interpretation of the homeowner's insurance policy exclusion. The court maintained that regardless of whether the airplane was considered an aircraft or a collection of airplane “parts” when it injured the woman, the injury arose out of the husband’s ownership of the airplane. This interpretation was supported by the clear language of the policy which excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of ownership or maintenance of an aircraft. As a result, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Thompson v. United Services Automobile Association" on Justia Law

In a dispute arising from a contract for refurbishing an elementary school, the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled that no unfair trade practices claim could be stated against the State of Louisiana, Department of Education, Recovery School District (the “State”). The plaintiff, Advanced Environmental Consulting, Inc. (“AEC”), had subcontracted to perform asbestos abatement services for Law Industries, LLC, the general contractor. When the State terminated the contract due to unsatisfactory asbestos remediation progress, AEC amended its answer to Law Industries' breach of contract suit to include a claim of unfair trade practices under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“LUTPA”). The State had objected to this claim, arguing that AEC had no cause of action and that the claim was perempted (time-barred). The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that AEC had failed to state a valid LUTPA cause of action against the State. It concluded that the State's actions were in furtherance of its governmental function of providing safe educational facilities for schoolchildren. The State, in this case, was a consumer of construction services, not a participant in "trade or commerce" as defined in the LUTPA, and was therefore not subject to a LUTPA claim. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its ruling. View "LAW INDUSTRIES, LLC VS. STATE" on Justia Law

In Mississippi, Samuel and Sandra Evans appealed the trial court's decision not to set aside a foreclosure sale. They executed a deed of trust for real property in 2003, but defaulted on their payments. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated and the property was purchased at the foreclosure sale by MC&J Investments, LLC. The Evans alleged that they had an oral agreement with the managing member of MC&J Investments to buy the property at the foreclosure sale and then sell it back to them. The trial court found that the bid price paid by MC&J Investments was not so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court and that no written evidence was provided to support the alleged promise to sell back the property. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's decision, ruling that the oral agreement was barred under the statute of frauds and did not fall under the doctrine of promissory estoppel because there was no evidence that the Evans relied on the alleged promise. Additionally, the court found that the price paid at the foreclosure sale didn't shock the conscience of the court and therefore didn't err in not setting aside the foreclosure sale. View "Evans v. MC & J Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

The case in question involved a dispute between Epochal Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Divine Orchids, and LF Encinitas Properties, LLC and Leichtag Foundation, over a commercial lease agreement for a property containing dilapidated commercial greenhouses known to contain asbestos and lead paint. Epochal Enterprises claimed that the defendants failed to disclose the presence of these hazardous substances, which resulted in economic damage when the County of San Diego quarantined the leased premises. A jury found the defendants liable for premises liability and negligence, and awarded Epochal Enterprises damages for lost profits and other past economic loss.However, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), based on a limitation of liability clause in the lease agreement that purported to prevent Epochal Enterprises from recovering the economic damages awarded by the jury.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, reversed the trial court's judgment. It found that the jury necessarily concluded that the defendants had violated the Health and Safety Code by failing to disclose the existence of asbestos, and that this violation of law rendered the limitation of liability clause invalid under Civil Code section 1668. The court concluded that the limitation of liability clause could not bar Epochal Enterprises from recovering damages for the defendants' statutory violations.The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion for partial JNOV on the issue of damages, finding that the jury had a reasonable basis for calculating the amount of lost profits. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Epochal Enterprises, Inc. v. LF Encinitas Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Contitech USA, Inc., a division of tire manufacturer Continental AG, contracted with a trucking company, McLaughlin Freight Services, Inc., and its owner, Dan McLaughlin, to deliver rubber between two of its facilities. The fee schedule included a base rate and a higher "rounder" rate, which required pre-approval from Contitech. Over three years, McLaughlin submitted 645 unapproved "rounder" bills to the third-party payments administrator, using fraudulent emails that purported to show pre-approval from Contitech. Contitech discovered the scheme and sued for fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for Contitech on the fraud and unjust-enrichment counts. The court rejected McLaughlin's argument that Contitech failed to prove proximate cause and damages, noting that under Iowa law, a defrauding defendant cannot claim that its misrepresentations did not cause any damages to the plaintiff. Furthermore, McLaughlin was contractually obligated not to charge rounder rates without pre-approval from Contitech. Thus, a reasonable jury could have found that the difference between the contractual base rate and the actual billed amount was the amount of money McLaughlin received, which in equity and good conscience belonged to Contitech.The court also affirmed the district court's decision to remit Contitech's unjust-enrichment award to $0 and to remit McLaughlin’s damages award to prevent double recovery. The court reasoned that while a party is entitled to proceed on various theories of recovery, it is not entitled to collect multiple awards for the same injury. Furthermore, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting pre-judgment interest to Contitech, and that postjudgment interest is mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 and should be awarded regardless of whether the district court orders it. View "Contitech USA, Inc. v. McLaughlin Freight Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In April 2008, the Department of the Navy awarded a contract to Strategic Technology Institute, Inc. (STI) to provide various aircraft engineering and support services. The contract incorporated Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment, and FAR 52.242-4, Certification of Final Indirect Costs. STI was required to submit its cost rate proposals for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 by certain deadlines. STI did not submit these proposals until 2014, upon request by the government. After receiving these proposals, the government conducted audits and found that STI's proposals included approximately $1 million in unallowable costs. The government issued a final decision, demanding payment of unallowable costs, penalties, and interests.STI appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, arguing that the government's claim was barred under the six-year statute of limitations under the Contract Disputes Act. The Board rejected STI’s argument and held that the statute of limitations on any government claim for disallowed costs does not begin until the contractor submits the incurred cost proposal and provides sufficient audit records.STI then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court held that the event that started the clock for the statute of limitations is the submission of STI’s cost rate proposals in September 2014, not STI’s failure to timely submit the proposals. The court held that STI's liability for receiving overpayment was not fixed until STI submitted unallowable costs in the cost proposal. Therefore, the government’s claim could not have accrued until STI submitted its cost rate proposals. The court affirmed the decision of the Board. View "STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE, INC. v. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE " on Justia Law